This paper aims to conceptualise trafficking in human beings (THB) as an organised crime by drawing on the rational choice theory. Utilising crime scripting principles, it proposes trafficking schematics to capture and visualise THB in its entirety. Stemming from its transnational nature and varying conceptualisations, combatting THB faces challenges, such as the lack of harmonisation of policy instruments and differing stakeholder agendas. To mitigate these challenges, this paper proposes trafficking schematics. Their core lies in the modelling of THB constituent elements, including stages and their sequence, key actors and relationships, and financial modus operandi. Trafficking schematics may therefore contribute to addressing THB in a holistic, dynamic and integrated way, by enriching stakeholders’ understanding of the phenomenon and facilitating collaboration to address it. The paper contributes to theory and practice by drawing up a model of the procedural, human, logistical and environmental elements of THB that may be viewed as an instrument of public value creation.

The expansion of the EU has generated vast media interest and political debate about an alleged crime–migration nexus. The gradual disappearance of border controls within the EU has created opportunities for easier people movement, and potentially for offenders to commit criminal offences in other countries. However, little work has been undertaken to understand the general nature of criminal activity by intra-EU migrant populations. This paper discusses the complexity of carrying out research on this issue using openly available data sources across the EU and in particular notes a significant lack of data for informed policy development. Spatial clustering of individual nationalities is evident, distinct differences in movements on a regional scale in England are shown. There is also evidence of limited recording practices and data availability across the EU. Data on localised offending by foreign nationals can be used to inform intelligence by national and international police agencies, to generate effective cross-border information exchange, and inform crime reduction policies.

Protocol 36 of the Lisbon Treaty provided that the UK could choose not to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the enforcement powers of the Commission, in relation to these pre-Lisbon police and judicial cooperation measures. Consequently, former instruments adopted under the ‘third pillar’ that have not been amended, repealed or replaced since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, cease to apply to the UK. The UK aimed to re-join 35 measures that have been considered indispensable for UK security, however, opting back it would be irrelevant in case of Brexit. Rather than replicating the UK government reports focusing on UK police and justice official’s input to analyse opt-out implications, this paper focuses on the actual value of such practitioner consultation in the process of rulemaking or abolition. Analysing the UK government reports, it seems that EU instruments are crucial to UK policing. However, previous research on EU instruments concluded that practitioners were opposed and criticised their implementation into policing practice. It could follow that practitioner consultations to address the effectiveness of a measure are of limited usefulness. The broader question posing itself is, however, what law makers should then consider instead when establishing regulation.

The European Investigation Order (EIO) aims to solve the issue of the cross border collection of evidence. However it also creates more problems, in particular for the need of the executing authority to comply, not only with its own laws and procedures, but also those of the requesting member state, where the evidence needs to continue to be admissible in court. The EIO also covers a broader range of crimes than would traditionally be involved with the EU’s provisions on cross border law enforcement and prosecution. Law enforcement, investigating magistrates, prosecution and forensic scientists will all have to engage with their counterparts, and others from other EU jurisdictions. They will have to negotiate the gaps in the EU legislation. Onuf style constructivism is the key to understanding the processes that these professionals will have to engage in in order to make the EIO work in practice.

The paper takes into consideration prospects for the establishment of an EU law enforcement fusion centre as a mechanism of improved criminal intelligence analysis embedding the intelligence-led policing model throughout the European Union. It applies a multivariant analysis of the models of law enforcement fusion centres identified in the practical intelligence co-operation in the EU. It arrives at the conclusion that the network architecture of intelligence co-operation on the EU level is flexible enough to integrate various parts of information exchange and intelligence sharing. EU agencies and bodies have moved towards closer co-operation, widening cautiously yet constantly the scope of mutual undertakings. An EU law enforcement fusion centre should be seen as a virtual networked arrangement closely connecting the existing EU agencies implementing intelligence tradecraft.

Tackling money laundering effectively in the EU, demands partnership working between state and non-state actors. Accordingly, the legislative framework reflects the negotiation of justice between the state’s ability to outsource aspects of policing to the private sector on the one hand, and the private sector’s desire to keep state interference to a minimum on the other. The result furnishes non-state actors with a significant role concerning the categorisation of risky behaviour as well as the collation and dissemination of related intelligence. Addressing the role of legal professionals specifically, this paper contests their role as policing intermediaries in the anti-money laundering framework. It argues the appropriateness of these actors being given this function in the first instance, and thereafter, their ability to perform that function is not, in its current form, compliant with the rule of law. However, it concludes that implementation of the new supervisory structure captured in the 4th Money Laundering Directive will be a crucial determinant of future compliance and offers a potential solution to the regulatory gap.

In the wake of terrorist attacks on EU soil, EU Member States negotiated the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) to provide law enforcement authorities with a useful tool to prevent and repress serious crime, including terrorism. The implementation exercise has turned out to be complex and coupled with several controversial national judgements concerning the instrument’s failure to comply with the rights to privacy and protection of personal data. Invalidating the Directive, the 2014 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling in Digital Rights Ireland, requires both national and EU policymakers to rethink the entire data retention framework. This article seeks to identify factors that are likely to influence negotiations on this framework. It does so by first providing an overview of the development of data retention provisions within the EU and then exploring the impact of the CJEU ruling on national provisions in selected EU Member States. Taking into account the interplay with other files under discussion where security concerns and fundamental rights are to be balanced, further potential developments at the EU level are subsequently eventually assessed with a view that harmonisation could be a desirable policy option.