

## de Gaulle's NATO policy in perspective

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by Elliot R. GOODMAN\*

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Almost from the moment de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he had his own unique ideas on the future of NATO. In essence, NATO was repugnant to de Gaulle because it placed France on a par with the other European countries, all of which looked to the overwhelming power of the United States for leadership. Among the European states Britain stood out as a world power, even though this role had been somewhat tarnished. In addition, Britain maintained a special relationship with America in the development of atomic weapons, which was inherited from their wartime collaboration. This rankled de Gaulle and made him vow that France would at least receive a status equal to that of Britain.

These issues of rank and prestige were first brought to a head in July 1958 as a result of the American and British military landings in Lebanon and Jordan, in response to the call of these governments for help against Nasser-inspired rebellions. France played no part in these events, but de Gaulle was fully prepared for the possibility of such troop landings, which occurred on July 15-17, since Secretary of State Dulles flew to Paris and discussed this contingency with him on July 5-6. The French government, however, circulated the complaint that it had not been consulted, but a subsequent interview with Dulles revealed that this was simply not so. The spurious French complaint was perhaps rooted in the unsatisfactory nature of the exchange that took place. De Gaulle insisted that the French people must « be made to believe again that France is a great power », and this took the form a demand that France be recognized as a world power instead of being treated as just another continental European state. Dulles paid tribute to the French contribution to Western civilization, and agreed that a strong France should emerge again, but he warned that in revi-

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ving its strength there would be serious strains in NATO if France should set itself apart from and above the positions of Germany and Italy. To this de Gaulle retorted that the Germans and Italians did not seem upset by the special position of Britain as a world power. Dulles also reaffirmed the need for the « integration » of NATO forces, while de Gaulle spoke only of « cooperation » among allied states (1).

In this exchange of views was found the seeds of the demands which de Gaulle formally submitted in writing to President Eisenhower, with a copy to Prime Minister Macmillan, on September 17, 1958. This communication, consisting of a memorandum with an attached cover letter, has not been made public, although its contents have been widely, and sometimes inaccurately, reported. The fullest and most useful published account of this famous secret document is found in David Schoenbrun's masterful biography of de Gaulle (2). It can be stated with assurance that his description of this document is entirely accurate, since the present writer was also privileged to read it in full. This account was likewise confirmed by the brief summary of de Gaulle's letter which the State Department subsequently made public.

The Anglo-American landings in the Levant, de Gaulle noted, might have precipitated events that could have quickly developed into a general war, in which France and the other members of the Atlantic Alliance might have become involved. The scope of the Atlantic Alliance was therefore unsatisfactory if it was confined to the defense of Europe, since the need to concert policies was world-wide. De Gaulle later explained this aspect of his secret proposal in a public press conference. It had become obvious, de Gaulle said, « that the possibilities of conflict and consequently of military operations were spreading far beyond Europe, were spreading all over the world. It became evident that the Middle East and Africa, in particular, were danger spots quite as much as Europe, and that there existed, between the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance, political differences concerning them which, if the occasion arose, might turn into disagreements on strategy ». Consequently it was necessary for the NATO states with global responsibilities, which in de Gaulle's view were the United States, Britain and France, to make some special arrangements among themselves. « We feel that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be something organized — where the Alliance is

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(1) David SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle* (New York, 1966), pp. 291-294.

(2) *Ibid.*, pp. 295-300. See also Dirk U. STIKKER, *Men of Responsibility* (New York, 1965), p. 360.

concerned — as to their political conduct and, should the occasion arise, their strategic conduct outside Europe, specially in the Middle East, and in Africa, where these powers are constantly involved (3). »

De Gaulle's memorandum of September 1958 had been more specific about how the three powers should be organized. They should « create a tripartite organization to take joint decisions on global problems ». The Atlantic Alliance should be revised so as to become world-wide in scope, with sub-regions or sub-commands set up within it. One of the special functions assigned to the Big Three would be the making of « joint decisions » on the use of nuclear weapons. This tripartite organization of the Atlantic Alliance (the word « directorate » was not used) should be entrusted with drawing up « strategic plans » and be empowered to « put them into effect », thereby governing « the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world ».

At first glance, these proposals seemed eminently sensible. What was more needed than the global coordination of Western policies? One might, of course, object that it was somewhat immodest of de Gaulle to consider France a great world power (although de Gaulle has never been bothered by the requirements of modesty), since at the time he first advanced his proposal France was extremely weak. At home, it had just come from the brink of civil war and domestic strife had by no means been quelled, while abroad France had lost its empire in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and was in the process of losing what was left of it in Africa. But even so, would it not have been extremely beneficial for the West to have a concerted global policy?

Only a closer look at de Gaulle's proposal and the subsequent exchange of notes and diplomatic activity which sought to clarify it, revealed the true meaning of this initiative. All indications point to the conclusion that de Gaulle was not primarily concerned with achieving a common Western global policy, but with elevating the status and prestige of France to the publicly recognized position of a great world power.

By attempting to become a member of the Big Three within NATO's fifteen member states, de Gaulle obviously sought to arrogate to himself the role of speaking for continental Europe. The first time de Gaulle broached this subject, Dulles warned of the difficulties such a pretension would create with the other NATO nations on the continent,

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(3) President de Gaulle's third press conference, September 5, 1960, Ambassade de France, New York, Speeches and Press Conferences, n° 152, p. 11.

especially with Italy and Germany. In order to surmount this objection and before dispatching his memorandum to Eisenhower and Macmillan, de Gaulle sent his Foreign Minister to Rome and Bonn in order to gauge the depths of the anticipated resistance. De Gaulle then personally courted Chancellor Adenauer. Through a carefully staged reception at de Gaulle's home at Colombey, which cultivated and flattered Adenauer's sensitivities, and by de Gaulle skillfully playing upon the character of « Europe » which France shared with Germany, but which might be betrayed by « the Anglo-Saxons, » de Gaulle succeeded in winning over the aging German leader. A highly amicable communique noted the results of the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks of September 14 ; three days later de Gaulle dispatched his proposal to Washington and London.

While Adenauer personally may have been satisfied with de Gaulle's triumvirate concept which permitted France to speak for Germany, the idea did not in general go down well with responsible German officials. This writer clearly remembers discussions with highly placed members of the German Foreign Office during Adenauer's reign, who bitterly denounced the Gaullist triumvirate proposal. They resented the idea of two classes of membership in NATO and insisted that since Germany had contributed by far the greatest number of troops to NATO of all the European member states, it should at least be given an equal voice in NATO affairs. The thought was sometimes expressed that a more limited group of states might be useful in the management of allied nuclear policy and related strategic questions. However, three was too restricted a number, and if membership was expanded to five or seven, room should be left in this group for other states to participate on a rotating basis.

The idea of a closed, exclusive inner club had, in fact, already been tried in NATO, and had been proven a failure. Former NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker recalls that when the North Atlantic Treaty went into effect in 1949, the United States, Britain and France, as the occupying powers in Germany, consulted closely and regularly among themselves to the exclusion of their other NATO partners. Their mode of operation in handling the German problem spilled over into other areas. « Tripartite dominance was underscored by the custom of the Big Three to meet privately before each meeting of the NATO Council for an exchange of views on the agenda. » Stikker recounts the resentment this aroused and the countermove in which he participated in his capacity at that time as Dutch Ambassador to NATO. « These arrangements finally led to the creation of a *Little Three*. » Pearson of Canada, Lange of Norway and I adopted the habit of meeting,

purely as friends, before each Council session for an exchange of views. » From 1950 on they were able to exercise considerable influence in shaping important NATO decisions. « It has been my experience », Stikker concluded, « that when the big powers, be they three or five, try too much to dominate an organization, counterforces inevitably arise to restore the balance. If the balance cannot be restored in this manner, the organization is doomed to failure » (4).

In one respect, NATO has had a formal triumvirate in existence from its beginning. The highest military representatives of the United States, Britain and France together formed the Standing Group, which in theory was the executive arm of the larger NATO Military Committee. Since the members of the Standing Group received their political and military instructions from their separate capitals, and since these directives have most often been in disagreement, Stikker pointed out that « the Standing Group frequently finds itself unable to formulate decisions ». As a consequence, « the Standing Group had, because of disagreement in this tripartite body, been unable to give any advice on the vital problem of strategy. It has proved already on other occasions to be impossible to arrive at an agreed opinion on military questions within NATO for lack of agreement in the Standing Group. If ever proof was needed that in an organization like NATO a triumvirate does not work, then the Standing Group provides a glaring example » (5). Following the French withdrawal from NATO, the Standing Group went out of existence.

President Eisenhower replied to de Gaulle's triumvirate proposal in a letter of October 20, 1958. For a number of years even the existence of this letter was kept secret, so that rumors repeatedly charged Washington with ignoring or snubbing de Gaulle (6). Eisenhower agreed that the threat to the free world was global in nature, and noted that the United States had sponsored a network of regional defense pacts

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(4) STIKKER, *Men of Responsibility*, pp. 290-291.

(5) *Ibid.*, pp. 384, 386.

(6) SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives*, p. 300, notes that Eisenhower's response of October 1958 was first leaked to the press, in order to set the record straight, in May 1964. In correspondence with this writer, Schoenbrun made the distinction between the deliberate, officially inspired State Department leak that was first mentioned by James Reston in the *New York Times*, May 1, 1964 and was then elaborated by Schoenbrun in a series of articles in *Le Figaro*, July 9-17, 1964, and the earlier private discoveries published by C.L. Sulzberger in the *New York Times*, March 18, 1963, as well as broadcast over CBS by Schoenbrun in the spring of 1963. Finally, so that all misunderstanding might forever be laid to rest, the State Department released the text of the Eisenhower letter of October 20, 1958 on August 11, 1966 through the office of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, and Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

covering Europe and North America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, France was a member of NATO and SEATO and could already participate with other allies in planning a global defense. This, of course, rejected the exclusive tripartite arrangement advocated by de Gaulle. The NATO Council in particular, Eisenhower argued, offered a forum for broadening still further the invaluable habit of consultation among the Western powers not only on events inside the NATO treaty area but also about the threats facing the free world in the Far East and the Middle East. Such consultation was imperative, since « we cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are being made without their participation ». This position ran contrary to the Gaullist scheme of an exclusive tripartite organization, which necessarily would have to take decisions affecting the vital interests of other allies without their participation. Eisenhower's letter ended with the invitation to explore the subject further (7).

In an effort to satisfy de Gaulle, Eisenhower instructed Dulles to set up a « tripartite committee » at the sub-cabinet level in order to discuss de Gaulle's proposal. Dulles appointed Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, who twice met with the French and British Ambassadors in Washington in December 1958. The French Ambassador echoed de Gaulle's demand for upgrading and extending this arrangement to include joint strategic nuclear planning on a global scale. On December 15 Dulles was received by de Gaulle in Paris, and was told that the world situation was too critical for « playing political games with committees ». Dulles again offered to exchange views on any subject in any part of the world, but held fast to the position that it was not possible to establish an official tripartite organ either over NATO or over the rest of the free world. However, in an effort to accommodate French demands, Dulles proposed tripartite consultations on the situation in the Far East. Two such meetings were held in February 1959 at the same level as the tripartite talks in December 1958, with the addition of general staff officers who could contribute to a discussion of the strategic aspects of the question. In April 1959 four days of tripartite talks took place on African problems, and the United States and Britain indicated that they were willing to hold further tripartite discussions among military experts on Africa,

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(7) *Text of Letter from President Eisenhower to General de Gaulle of October 20, 1958 and Department of State Statement Recording the Events Surrounding the French Proposal and Later Developments Regarding It* (mimeo), Annex, pp. 1-2.

but the French did not respond to this initiative. When Dulles first raised the possibility of tripartite planning on Africa in his December 1958 interview with de Gaulle, the French President retorted sharply that France might have been spared needless difficulties in North Africa had a common policy existed there before. Then de Gaulle added : « Of course, a common policy in North Africa would necessarily be a French policy » (8).

A second exchange of secret letters between de Gaulle and Eisenhower took place in March 1959, in which de Gaulle continued to press for an exclusive tripartite organization, while Eisenhower spoke in terms of maintaining the fullest, closest cooperation among all allies in NATO. Then on June 10, 1960 de Gaulle repeated his demand in still another secret letter for a « high level planning group » among the Big Three which would give France « an equal voice in joint decisions on the use of nuclear weapons » (9). This now fully confirmed what had been properly assumed up to this point : de Gaulle, in effect, wanted a veto right on the use of the Anglo-American nuclear arsenals. This demand de Gaulle repeated in a public statement in October 1960, when he said : « France intends that if, by misfortune, atomic bombs were to be dropped in the world, none should be dropped by the free world's side unless she should have accepted it » (10).

Eisenhower's reply of August 2 took the form of asking why de Gaulle continually made proposals, but took no action to implement suggestions in this direction, such as, for example, the American offer of joint planning with regard to Africa. Although de Gaulle had finally agreed to appoint a French delegate, a year and a half had gone by and the French chair remained vacant. Eisenhower then proposed a broader type of consultation, within a high-level three-power military committee to consider de Gaulle's demands for a global strategy. This stopped short of the Gaullist requirement for a formal tripartite « organization » that could take « joint decisions, » but it seemed to be a big step in that direction. It was, in fact, as far as Eisenhower could go without impinging upon the interests of the other excluded NATO partners and disrupting NATO itself.

De Gaulle shot back in his last secret letter to Eisenhower that a three-power summit meeting of the West would be preferable to a high-level committee to consider global strategy. The summit meeting, de Gaulle added, could undertake joint planning of global strategy,

(8) *Text of Letter*, pp. 2-3; SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives*, p. 303.

(9) *Text of Letter*, p. 3; SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives*, pp. 305, 309.

(10) *New York Times*, October 8, 1960.



and in addition, it could « reorganize the Alliance ». In his final reply of August 31, Eisenhower tried to keep his anger under control. He reminded his French counterpart that twice before de Gaulle had promised to send a detailed memorandum about suggestions for reorganizing the Alliance, but that he had never done so (11). Without such a document in hand, no useful discussion could be conducted.

Surveying the history of the de Gaulle-Eisenhower exchanges, Schoenbrun makes a useful distinction between the form and substance of allied collaboration, and concludes that de Gaulle was more interested in the form. « Since an « *organization* » is a formal institution, General de Gaulle was not only insisting upon the right to *participate in decisions*, he wanted this right to be *recognized officially and publicly* by creation of a formal institution. De Gaulle would not have been satisfied even if Eisenhower had granted him all his extraordinary demands, including a full French voice in American strategy and a French veto over the Anglo-Saxons' decisive power implied in « *joint decisions* » on the use of nuclear weapons. Nothing less than the public formalization of these arrangements would satisfy General de Gaulle » (12).

After retiring from office, Eisenhower read Schoenbrun's manuscript account of these events. Eisenhower confirmed that « our biggest arguments as presidents came out of this idea... to have a publicly proclaimed triumvirate. You've got that right in your book, that tripartite business and public recognition of France as a great power. That is exactly what he wanted » (13). He then related additional details to show how far he went in trying to satisfy de Gaulle. Eisenhower proposed that London become the center for triumvirate planning, since France maintained a big embassy there. « I'll make special appointments, » Eisenhower recalled telling de Gaulle, « I'll strengthen the embassy with special people, high-ranking people, both in the political and military world, and you can do the same. Britain can do it, of course, because they're right there in London. We will have all these top people there and we will put them, if you want, under a director, or some such title, and they will be authorized to take current plans, current problems, emerging problems and we will give them authority and plenty of time to coordinate our view so we can plan to be in a position to operate in unison, anywhere in the world, on any

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(11) *Text of Letter*, p. 3; SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives*, pp. 309-310; James RESTON, *New York Times*, May 3, 1964.

(12) SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives*, p. 299.

(13) Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 335-336.



problem, or at least not to act in disunion. We can map out broad areas of agreement for there are many, and can identify and contain the disagreements ». Eisenhower summed up his efforts with the affirmation : « I tell you I was offering him everything it was possible to offer and very far toward his requests. But he wouldn't have it. It was all or nothing with him. He wanted it at the top, all the way like Cicero and Pompey and Caesar » (14).

When President Kennedy visited Paris on June 2, 1961 he personally reviewed with de Gaulle the entire history of the exchanges conducted with Eisenhower, since Kennedy was convinced that the issue of the tripartite organization was at the heart of all the difficulties in Franco-American relations. In another effort to placate de Gaulle, Kennedy suggested the creation of a tripartite group of senior military officers to draft joint plans for Berlin and Laos, which at the time were troubled areas threatening world peace. Kennedy hoped that by tackling specific crisis situations, experience could be gained and confidence built up which would dissolve the past impasse. De Gaulle once again agreed to nominate top level officials to participate in these working groups, and once again he failed to carry out his pledge. Later Kennedy showed dismay at de Gaulle's unwillingness to implement plans that were drawn up for his benefit. In response to the President's questions, the explanation was again offered that de Gaulle was really not interested in such talks, even at a senior military level, because they were too restricted in scope and were to be conducted in secret. What de Gaulle wanted was public recognition of a formally organized tripartite group, meeting at the highest level at regular intervals, thereby openly acknowledging the great power status of France. In short, de Gaulle was not searching for agreed policies for the West, but for an institutionalized way of proclaiming French grandeur. Kennedy admitted the logic of this explanation, but still found it hard to believe (15). And for anyone not viewing the world through de Gaulle's eyes, it is, indeed, hard to believe.

When NATO Secretary General Stikker visited Kennedy, the President returned to the subject of de Gaulle, probing for answers about his behavior. He asked what would have happened if the United States had helped de Gaulle with the development of his *force de frappe*. Stikker replied : « If de Gaulle had had atomic weapons it would have made no difference ; he would not have been more helpful

(14) Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 339. Eisenhower's reference to Cicero is an obvious slip. The famous Roman triumvirate consisted of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar.

(15) *Ibid.*, pp. 314-315; *Text of Letter*, pp. 3-4.

in NATO. He would have wanted the veto for himself, but he would not have wanted anyone else to have it. His motivation is French nationalism, pure and simple » (16).

If this stark fact is accepted, then all the contradictions disappear. His idea of a common nuclear strategy was to have a French veto over the Anglo-American deterrents, even before France had an operational deterrent of its own, but once the *force de frappe* came into existence no one would have a veto over it. He asked for a common global policy among the Big Three of the West, and yet as he remarked about North Africa, « of course, a common policy in North Africa would necessarily be a French policy ». One wonders if de Gaulle would not expect a common global policy also to be a French policy. It is at least certain that he would have used the tripartite forum as a way of projecting himself into the world arena as a world statesman, and of asserting French interests and views on the world stage, but without abandoning his right to decide policies for France. In effect, de Gaulle's notion of formulating global policies is to influence the course of allied decisions, while insulating French policies from allied pressures designed to influence France.

Experience also informs us that de Gaulle's style of leadership has never made him an accomodating type of statesman, and that he has had a consistently poor record as an ally, beginning with his rise to prominence during World War II until today. In view of this, how could he have cooperated constructively in forming joint policies? Even in matters where the West has a highly apparent common interest like Berlin, de Gaulle has been extremely negative. But then consider the difficulty of implementing a common policy with de Gaulle beyond Europe, where for example, France had joined with the Soviet Union against the United States and Britain by refusing to pay for the UN peacekeeping activities in the Middle East or in the Congo. There are great obstacles preventing the formulation of common policies around the world among any group of Western powers, but of all partners with whom one could try to achieve it, surely the most difficult would be Gaullist France.

Essentially de Gaulle's nationalist philosophy is incompatible with his professions of a common allied cause. While still actively negotiating with Eisenhower about his triumvirate proposal in March 1959, de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO. His rationale was that NATO did not extend to the Middle East or Africa

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(16) STIKKER, *Men of Responsibility*, pp. 367-368.

and that France might be obliged to act in these areas. « She would therefore have to act independently of NATO. But how could she do so if her fleet were not available ? (17) ». In effect, de Gaulle was beginning to implement the threat posed at the conclusion of his September 1958 memorandum. If his demands were not met, he had warned, henceforth France would « subordinate » participation in NATO to the « recognition of French worldwide interests » (18).

Then on November 3, 1959 de Gaulle declared war on the principle of NATO integrated commands, in an address before the National Defense Staff College. « If we allowed the defense of France to be entrusted over a long period to non-national agencies or to be fused or confused with something else, it would no longer be possible for us to maintain the idea of the State. » He openly vowed to begin the process, which is now fully under way, of disentangling France from NATO. « The system known as « *integration*, » which was introduced and even put into practice to some extent after we had undergone great trials, and when we had not yet recovered our national entity, and at a time when it was thought that the free world was confronted by an imminent and unbounded danger—such systems of integration have had their day (19). » As part of the reassertion of independence from NATO, he added, France would proceed to build its *force de frappe* as a strictly French national force.

Logically there is an inconsistency in demanding a single global strategy for NATO while withdrawing forces from NATO for independent action and in denouncing NATO integration as incompatible with upholding the glory of the national state. De Gaulle claimed to have sought a coordinated global policy for the West, but he also always insisted on maximum freedom for independent national action. Again, these two demands could be reconciled only if the global policy also happened to be French policy.

The impulse behind de Gaulle's memorandum and his subsequent behavior toward NATO can perhaps best be summed up in the phrase of a former Minister in de Gaulle's cabinet, who remarked to this writer : « De Gaulle wants to be bound by nothing ». Alliances are therefore necessarily uncongenial to him, while the idea of frank and intimate collaboration with allies for the common good is simply not a part of his character.

(17) President de Gaulle's first press conference, March 25, 1959, Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, no 128, p. 8.

(18) SCHOENBRUN, *The Three Lives*, p. 299.

(19) Quoted in Roger MASSIP, « De Gaulle, Europe and NATO », *Western World*, February 1960, p. 14.

The North Atlantic Council is frequently used to exchange views and align policies of the member states, not only within the NATO area, but throughout the world. This process has been consciously stepped up as a result of the « Three Wise Men's report » of December 1956, which followed closely upon the debacle of Suez. To what extent has de Gaulle availed himself of his diplomatic forum ? When I asked this question of one of the senior members of the Council who has served as his country's permanent representative to NATO all during de Gaulle's tenure in office, the ambassador shot back : « De Gaulle consults about nothing ». De Gaulle's offer of consultation was confined to the exclusive context of the Big Three. If the others would not play the game according to his rules, he would not play at all.

Stikker contrasts the treatment he received from France and from the other allies, when he was NATO Secretary General. « During these years every morning I received a briefing on US foreign policy in different areas. Every year I went to Washington several times for meetings with the State Department, Pentagon and White House. All these discussions were carefully prepared and when, at the end of my visit, the President received me, he had been briefed on the issues which would have to be submitted to him. Similar arrangements were always made in other capitals, but nothing of the kind ever happened in France. On the contrary, on taking office, my initial request to pay my respects to President de Gaulle went unanswered for three months. » It was only through the intervention of Chancellor Adenauer, who was concerned about the fate of the alliance, that Stikker's one and only interview with de Gaulle was brought about. « I was summoned, after three months, to the Elysée at short notice », he relates, « just when I was about to take a plane for London ». In the blunt exchange that followed, de Gaulle touched on several topics. Did Stikker believe in integration, de Gaulle asked. The Secretary General replied : « Undoubtedly modern war or defense is no longer possible without integration ». De Gaulle disagreed. « But we are fighting for our joint freedom. » I replied, « we can only remain free if we all join our forces. Separate efforts of the small countries, or of Germany, have no meaning ». De Gaulle disagreed : he wanted to be « independent » (20).

Other prominent French leaders who have considered de Gaulle's proposed reform of the alliance have come to different conclusions.

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(20) Dirk U. STIKKER, « The Role of the Secretary General of NATO », *Internationale Spectator*, April 8, 1965, pp. 675, 677, 679. See also, STIKKER, *Men of Responsibility*, pp. 364-365.

Maurice Faure, for example, noted that it would be difficult not to subscribe to the idea of a single strategy for the West, especially if « strategy » went beyond military considerations to include those of psychological warfare, diplomacy and economics. « But », he asked, « how is one to devise a « *global strategy* » without alienating sovereignty, without transferring responsibilities and competences to common authorities ? The question is self-evident, and can only be given one response. This answer is the political strengthening of NATO » (21). Indeed, the way to arrive at common answers to common problems is by strengthening common institutions like NATO that increasingly become supranational in character. De Gaulle's nationalist approach to the solution of common world problems is no more possible than his attempt to create a cohesive Europe out of self-consciously sovereign national states. When applied to NATO, de Gaulle's nationalist approach consisted of two alternate plans : either downgrade NATO by creating an exclusive triumvirate within it, or if that failed, destroy NATO by other means.

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(21) Maurice FAURE, « Politique et défense », in Claude Delmas *et al.*, *L'avenir de l'Alliance Atlantique* (Paris, 1961), p. 215.

