

The German Social Party Democratic and European Integration, 1949-1952⁽¹⁾

A study of « Opposition » in Foreign Affairs.

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« There is nothing the Socialists nationalize as quickly as socialism ».

Ignazio Silone, following Borkenau.

INTRODUCTION

A study of the SPD and European Integration in this period is interesting not only for the questions they raised about European integration but also for the two following reasons :

Firstly, the present studies on political parties and European integration, such as Ernst Haas' « the Uniting of Europe » in delineating the reactions of the parties of the six to the successive attempts at constructing European institutions fail to pay adequate attention to the domestic political arenas of which these parties form a part. In these studies, parties are analysed in terms of their place in International rather than domestic politics. In the case of the SPD I hope to show that domestic factors within the German political system were as important in shaping the attitudes of the party to these institutions as the form which these institutions took. By domestic factors I mean not only inter-party but also intra-party factors such as the relations between various groups within the party. In particular I shall examine the divergence in attitudes between what was called the « Bürgermeisterflügel » and the party executive. The neglect of

(1) E.B. HAAS, *The Uniting of Europe*, Political Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957. London, Stevens, 1958.

this aspect in some other studies where the SPD was treated as a monolithic unity has seriously impaired a realistic appraisal of the party's position.

The attempt by writers like Haas to isolate and analyse an integration process while neglecting the domestic political dimension leads them to treat the SPD opposition to the development of European institutions as purely obstructionist. (See « the Uniting of Europe » p. 131-140). Apart from denying the right of an opposition to oppose this seems to me to reflect a bias in favour of the integration phenomenon in Western Europe. An examination of the SPD policy towards European integration in terms of what it was intended to achieve politically and how effective it was in this sphere is more apposite than an analysis concerned exclusively with the degree to which this policy deviates from the given end point of European integration.

Secondly, the study of the SPD in this period in relation to European integration provides an almost classical case study in opposition. Otto Kirchheimer in his article « The waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes » (Social Research, summer 1957, 127-157) isolated three basic models of opposition. These are the classic English model of the loyal opposition, where although political competition involves some form of goal differentiation between available candidates it is still in harmony with the constitutional requirements of a given system. The opposition of principle, e.g. the position of the Nazi party in the Weimar period, and cartel arrangements operating within the framework of parliamentary institutions, e.g. the coalition in post-war Austria. During the period covered by this study the SPD policy on European integration appeared to approximate successively to these three models.

Kurt Schumacher, the first post-war leader, consciously attempted to establish an opposition on the classic English pattern despite his rhetorical attachment to a « Politik der Intransigenz ».

After his death in 1952 his conception of opposition was at first adhered to. The division of Germany rendered the ideal of « loyal opposition » very difficult to achieve, however, since any opposition, especially in foreign affairs, could be interpreted as aiding the rival Pankow regime, as being an « opposition of principle ». The choice, therefore, seemed to lie more between « opposition of principle » and coalition explicit or implicit. The SPD opposition to the signature of the Western European Union Treaty, which reached its height in the « Paulskirche Movement » resembled in its utilisation of extra-parliamentary means (a step never countenanced by Schumacher) opposition « of principle ». This was never a viable alternative, for a complex of reasons, and was never wholeheartedly embraced by the SPD.

Conversion to what was in effect the Christian-Democrat policy on European integration and a more co-operative policy on defence was coterminous with the collapse of the « Paulskirche Bewegung » shortly after its foundation in 1955. Since then, the SPD's policy on European affairs has been virtually indistinguishable from that of the CDU, except perhaps for a slightly greater emphasis on the necessity for democracy in community institutions and on association policy. In effect, despite residual opposition on foreign policy and atomic weapons up to the 1959 Deutschland plan, Kirchheimer's third model of no substantive opposition to government measures has been adhered to. In this model, the opposition hope to shape governmental measures by accepting them in principle and confining « opposition » to the tidying up of governmental measures in committees (2).

In the present study I propose to deal only with Schumacher's conduct of « opposition » 1949-1952. I shall not however confine myself solely to demonstrating its concordance with the concept of « loyal opposition » since this is well covered in Otto Kirchheimer's contribution on Dahl's book on oppositions (3).

OPPOSITION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

The return of Kurt Schumacher to active politics after his long illness in April 1949 was coterminous with the beginning of the election campaign for the First German Bundestag. The campaign itself revolved largely round economic issues (4). Under the aegis of Professor Erhard industrial production had risen from 54 % of the 1936 level in January 1948 to 84 % in February 1949. The SPD maintained that this increase was illusory and held that the increase in unemployment from 450,000 to 1,300,000 during the same period was much the more significant figure. Schumacher knew little of economics however, and relied heavily on the advice of Professors Baade and Nölting and Doctor Agartz.

During the campaign Schumacher made a disastrous tactical mistake during a speech in Gelsenkirchen on 23rd January 1949, when he said : « We shall not buckle under either to a French General or to a Roman

(2) Cf. G. LEHMBRUCH, *The Ambiguous Coalition, Government and Opposition*, April, 1968.

(3) O. KIRCHHEIMER, *Germany The Vanishing Opposition*, in R. Dahl ed. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, N. Haven and London, 1964, pp. 237-260.

(4) Cf. A. HEIDENHEIMER, *Adenauer and the CDU, The rise of the leader and the Integration of the Party*. (The Hague, 1960, pp. 174-175).

Cardinal. We respect the Church but we are determined not to subject the German people to a fifth occupying power » (5).

Many observers regard this blunder as decisive for the result of the election. There had been some reconciliation after the war between individual Catholics and the SPD if not between the hierarchy and the SPD. It had for instance been possible to form a united trade union movement. Catholic workers and refugees were as badly affected by Erhard's policies as other workers — indeed the only workers really to profit from the reforms the skilled workers were traditionally the strongest SPD supporters. Schumacher's attack, skilfully exploited by the CDU, who had been on the defensive after Schumacher's success in the constitutional crisis, left Catholic workers no alternative but to vote CDU.

Immediately after the election there was a great deal of speculation about a possible « grand coalition » between the CDU and the SPD. A number of leading personalities in both parties, largely Länder politicians like Karl Arnold of NRW, Min-Pres Altmeier of Rheinland-Pfalz, Werner Hilpert of Hesse and Guenther Gereke of N.-Sachsen in the CDU and Paul Löbe (Berlin), Max Brauer (Hamburg) and Wilhelm Kaisen (Bremen) of the SPD were in favour of such a course. Coalition was however always extremely unlikely given the personal antipathy between Adenauer and Schumacher, Schumacher's conception of « opposition » and their mutual desire to curb the power in their respective parties of the proponents of coalition — the Länder leaders. Adenauer in fact ruled out any possibility of coalition by calling a meeting of leading CDU/CSU politicians at his house in Rhöndorf on 21st August 1949. (Vide Adenauer Memoirs pp. 177-181). Although according to Adenauer's own testimony the partisans of coalition were very determined, he succeeded in dissuading them by emphasising the difference on economic policy between the two parties. He was very much helped in this by the absence of Karl Arnold and the early departure of Gereke and Hilpert who had to return to South Germany (6).

Fritz Heine had already made the position of the protagonists of coalition wellnigh impossible by declaring on behalf of the SPD on election night that possession of the economic ministry would be a minimum condition of SPD participation in a CDU lead coalition — a condition which was known to be unacceptable to the CDU/CSU leadership. A similar demand had brought about the breakdown of the crucial negotiations at the establishment of the Economic Council in 1947. (F. Allgemeine 15th August, 1949).

(5) Cited, *Adenauer Memoirs*, Vol. I. (London, 1964, p. 170).

(6) HEIDENHEIMER A.J., *op. cit.*, 179-181.

Schumacher had in any case announced as early as election night that the SPD policy would be one of « intransigent opposition » (Frankfurter Allgemeine August 15th, 1949). (7). This policy was based on the belief that given the small majority enjoyed by the CDU led coalition they « zwar verwalten aber nicht regieren könnten » (would be able to administer but not govern) and would need SPD support to carry out any major measures. The SPD would therefore exert most influence by a policy of opposition. The Partei Vorstand met in Bad Dürkheim from 29th to 30th August 1949, to work out future policy. They produced a series of resolutions described characteristically by Schumacher as « the Dokument der Opposition ». These resolutions were formulated by Schumacher and a group of close colleagues Carlo Schmid, Willi Eichler, Otto Suhr, Waldemar von Knoeringen and Erwin Schoettle. These resolutions proved to be untypical of the actual conduct of opposition since of the sixteen resolutions only three could be construed as affecting foreign policy.

More important than the precise content of the resolutions was the style of opposition established by Schumacher at Bad Dürkheim. Opposition, in Schumacher's view, demanded a clear distinct programme and constant initiatives — a policy which has been revealingly characterised by the German expert Pirker as Schumacher's « als ob » policy, i.e. carrying on the opposition as if he were the government, but would be regarded by an Anglo-American political scientist as falling more in the classic parliamentary tradition. Perhaps the strongest evidence that Schumacher saw his role in the classic parliamentary tradition was contained in speech immediately after the electoral defeat on 20th September 1949 : « The essence of opposition is a permanent attempt to force the government and its parties by concrete proposals tuned to concrete situations to pursue the political line outlined by the opposition ». B. stg. Slêno Bevichte 1949, p. 32.

The result of the First federal election had implied a rejection of the SPD's critique of the Christian Democratic social market economy (8). Henceforth Schumacher was to pursue his notion of *Alternativepolitik* in

(7) Despite the opposition of both Schumacher and Adenauer the Länder Minister-Presidents of both parties remained in favour of coalition ; see their declaration at Koblenz, Die Welt Aug. 26th 1949.

(8) The SPD had traditionally conformed to the West European socialist tradition of according primacy to domestic rather than foreign policy. On foreign policy issues it had broadly adhered to the principles stressed by Richard Rose in his 1961 D. Phil. « The Relation of Socialist Principles to British Labour Foreign Policy 1945-1951 » i.e. a belief in international co-operation, class consciousness in foreign affairs, supranationalism and anti-militarism. In line with these principles the SPD had favoured European integration in the Weimar Period.

the field of foreign affairs and defense (9). (Wolfgang Kralewski and Karlheinz Neureither).

« Oppositionelles Verhalten im ersten Deutschen Bundestag (1949-1953) Köln 1963, p. 92.

(Statutes passed against SPD opposition at final vote Budget 78.9 (purely formal) Foreign Affairs 55 %, Finance 15.4 %, Economics 7.4 %).

This opposition was directed primarily against Adenauer's efforts to make West Germany a partner in the various attempts at European Integration.

An analysis of Schumacher's objections to German entry into these institutions reveals three main themes — his national consciousness, a strong anti-clericalism and a commitment to socialism and democracy (10). Such an analysis will also reveal some of the domestic factors which influenced Schumacher's attitude.

Schumacher's nationalism implied that German re-unification rather than Western European Integration be regarded as the primary goal of German policy. This nationalist strain offered a chance of appealing to the large number of refugees in West Germany who might otherwise be attracted to a new totalitarian movement and would prevent the SPD being identified with *Erfüllungspolitik* (11). Although he was later often to use the demand for « Gleichberechtigung » (parity of rights) as a tactical weapon there is little doubt that he genuinely believed in « Gleichberechtigung » as a precondition for action at the international level, without which the most likely result would be the creation of an aggressive nationalism. Acceptance of the unjust situation in the Saar for instance could be enough to bring such a movement into being.

A nationalist policy would he felt give the SPD some hope of breaking out of the traditional minority « Turm ». The danger of their being confined to a permanent minority position having been increased by the loss of former SPD strongholds in the East.

« He (Schumacher) sought to use his self-assigned role as democratic spokesman for German national interest to move the allies to concessions

(9) Though of course the question of Germany's entry into the International Ruhr Authority and the ECSC involved debate about their economic effects and domestic repercussions.

(10) On Schumacher's nationalism see especially, W. Ritter, Kurt Schumacher. Eine Untersuchung seiner politischen Konzeption, Hannover, Dietz, 1964, and author's « Die Europapolitik der SPD in der Emigration und in der ersten Phase nach 1945. Bonn, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1967. Bergeustadt conference.

(11) This policy was calculated also to appeal to the even larger proportion of refugees among the SPD's own ranks. For a political scientist's view of S. Neumann « The New Crisis Strata in German Society » in Morgenthau H.J. (ed.) *Germany and the Future of Europe*, Chicago, 1950.

for fear of nationalism and the Germans to loyalty to the SPD to prove their genuineness as democrats ». Heidenheimer A.J. p. 153. Adenauer and the CDU. The Hague 1960.

This nationalism was in no danger of being outbid from the right since any extreme nationalist groups were likely to be outlawed either by the Federal Constitutional Court or directly by the allies (12). It also had the advantage of distinguishing the SPD from the KPD who although pursuing an opposition line on foreign policy were seen by Schumacher as the agents of a foreign power — an opposition of principle.

Schumacher's nationalistic opposition to European integration was expressed in two contradictory demands, namely the assertion of the priority of German re-unification by which he understood also the return of the Saar over W. European integration and the insistence that the new institutions must accord West Germany parity — Emphasis on one or other objection varied according to the tactical situation. The emphasis on German unity as the prime goal tending to be replaced by the demand for parity once the details of a particular plan became known. This flexibility enabled him to express his disapproval in principle of any move which endangered German reunification without being prevented from putting forward « concrete proposals tuned to concrete situations ».

His opposition to German entry into the Council of Europe coinciding as it did with the signature of new Franco-Saar conventions concentrated on the simultaneous entry of the Saar into the Council of Europe. Acceptance of the status quo in the Saar would he felt predjudge the final peace treaty and therefore establish a harmful precedent vis-à-vis the German position on the lands beyond the Oder.

His statements about German membership in the International Ruhr Authority, the ECSC and the EDC accorded more importance to the failure by these institutions to concede German « Gleichberechtigung » (parity). The concept of « Gleichberechtigung » (parity) did not mean more constitutional parity but was sufficiently elastic to be used to describe Schumacher's request for a massive infusion of capital to restore the pre-war ratio of German steel production to French as a preliminary to the establishment of the ECSC as well as his request for a massive increase in allied troops stationed in Germany so that in the event of war

(12) It was thus possible for the SPD to pursue a national opposition, a policy that had been denied them in the Weimar Republic by the ever present danger of being outbid from the right. In Alfred Grosser's terms to develop « a preventive nationalism », A nationalism which would at one and the same time prevent the newly declassée refugees from going right and the workers of West Germany from going left. (cf Schumacher's speech at the Hamburg Party Congress of May 1950).

all the allies would have « Gleiches Risiko Gleiche Chance » i.e. the front would be on the Vistula rather than the Elbe (13).

Schumacher also invoked « Gleichberechtigung » to reject what he called the « Politik der Junktim » in the allied policy of tying liberalisation of the occupation regime to the acceptance of the new institutions. Apart from being unfair to Germany Schumacher felt that this would create the wrong climate to integrate Europe which must be seen as a desirable end in itself.

Schumacher's estimation of the international situation differed from that of Adenauer in that he believed that the Western powers would be prepared to concede this « Gleichberechtigung » if only Germany were firm (14). He was therefore continually incensed by the Adenauer tactic of offering German concessions in advance. Adenauer's view was that while alignment with the West did demand the acceptance by Germany of a junior status and the recognition of the status quo in the Saar these concessions would pay rich dividends. In the present situation Germany was not yielding any rights she possessed but merely theoretical claims. Their sacrifice would in any case be only a temporary one since a progressive acceptance of Germany would induce the Western powers to give them up voluntarily. Schumacher felt that premature acceptance of a junior status for Germany and the recognition of the status quo in the Saar, which was the precondition of entry into these European institutions would mean that the final peace treaty as agreed at Postdam would be unable to do anything but ratify these ostensibly provisional agreements. Schumacher's anticlericalism meant that he was suspicious not only of the Christian Democratic governments of the « Six » but also of MacCloy and François Poncet who exerted considerable influence in favour of German membership of the various European institutions (15).

His opposition based on his attachment to democracy had two focii of attack, the authoritarian nature of Adenauer's conduct of foreign policy and the nature of the institutions themselves. His opposition to German entry into the International Ruhr Authority was heightened by his opposition to the style of Adenauer's foreign policy, particularly his neglect

(13) His opposition to rearmament is a very good example of his « Loyal opposition ». He was prepared for rearmament once certain conditions had been satisfied unlike many SPD leaders who were in favour of a more pacifist line in accord with the prevailing opinion.

(14) He had been confirmed in this belief by his success at extracting concessions in the direction of a more centralised West Germany in the constitutional crisis of 1949 (see Waldemar Ritter, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-107, Interview A.M. Renger).

(15) Schumacher's anticlericalism like his nationalism has been related by Ritter to his place of origin, Kulm near Danzig, c.j. Ritter W., *op. cit.*

of parliament (16). « A Government which does not possess the democratic legitimation of a standpoint that has been discussed in parliament is in a very weak position vis-à-vis foreign powers » (K. Schumacher B. Stag, 15th November Steno Berichte 1949, page 401).

There was some justification for this standpoint. Adenauer wrote of his decision not to refer the question of German entry into the IAR (International Ruhr Authority) to parliamentary ratification. « It must be remembered that the Bundestag was a very young parliament and many of its members were apt to try meddling in the executive where they had no business. The SPD tried to exert a decisive influence on foreign policy by way of the foreign affairs committee whose chairman was a social democrat Carlo Schmid (17). This was the only case in which Schumacher maintained that a government decision would not be binding on any future SPD government since it had been without parliamentary ratification.

In his opposition to the German entry into the Council of Europe Schumacher introduced an argument that was to feature much more prominently in his attack on the Coal and Steel Community, namely that the undemocratic nature of these institutions rendered them useless as a weapon against communism — a communism which would in fact be created by the deleterious economic effects of the Schuman Plan on Germany.

In his major attack on the Schuman Plan in a speech at Gelsenkirchen on 24th May 1951 reprinted by the SPD executive as « 50 Jahr mit Gebundenen Händen » he stressed that democratically by the High Authority would be a liability as it was to an appointed board of capitalist managers rather than an elected authority, a state of affairs which would cripple its effectiveness as an anti-communist force. In this connection he pointed out that Monnets Commissariat du Plan was not subject to any real degree of parliamentary control. Democracy the prime value of the labour movement would be ill served by a High Authority which would be a tool of private capitalist interests and an assembly without powers of control or initiative (50 Jahre mit Gebundenen Händen passim).

Schumacher's socialist objections to European integration were not calculated to win new voters like his emphasis on nationalism but to appeal to party loyalists. Schumacher's view of socialism meant an attachment to the Northern European socialist states of Britain and Scandinavia

(16) A neglect which threatened to frustrate Schumacher's design of demonstrating the SPD's fitness for government by its parliamentary performance.

(17) Adenauer Memoirs, Vol. 1, 1964, p. 22. Adenauer was in fact in a peculiarly delicate situation since authority in foreign affairs at that time still constitutionally rested with the High Commissioners and he was engaged in the necessarily delicate activity of exploiting their differences to his advantage.

and a suspicion of the Christian Democratic Governments of the Six (18). A fear that German entry would inhibit nationalisation of German heavy industry was also particularly prominent in his opposition to entry in the IAR (International Ruhr Authority) and the ECSC. This fear was heightened by what he considered to be the inadequate representation of trade-unionists in both institutions.

These arguments were almost balanced by a very unsocialist defence of cartels.

In many ways, the conflict between Adenauer and Schumacher seemed to be old Weimar one of «Erfüllungspolitik v. Widerstandspolitik». This impression was heightened by the contrast in styles and personalities between Adenauer and Schumacher, a contrast which, as we have noted, made any coalition impossible. Schumacher, with his talk of a «Politik der Intransigenz» (Policy of Intransigence), appeared at times to be carrying on an «opposition of principle». This has been attributed largely to his physical condition. He suffered from an acute circulatory disease and had one leg and one arm amputated (19). He was also very conscious of the fact that he would not have very long to live. Lastly his conviction, derived from his period in the concentration camp that he was the only person morally as well as intellectually qualified to lead Germany (20). These factors gave his policies and even more strikingly his personality a certain harshness and intensity which alienated many who would otherwise have supported him, particularly foreign socialists.

Schumacher deserves much credit for his moderation since not only was West Germany developing a character which he could only regard as restorationist, but the government were also taking decisions which had not been foreseen in the electoral campaign of 1949 or indeed in «The Basic Law», decisions which he felt were not supported by public opinion as evidenced in the Länder elections. In the face of this development instead of repeating the intransigent tactics he had adopted on German

(18) Despite a certain anti-German strain among a section of the labour cabinet Schumacher was usually content to follow the British lead on foreign affairs. His attitude to the Schuman declaration which had been cautiously welcoming hardened considerably after Britain failed to take part in the negotiations. A Europe for him which did not include Britain and the Scandinavian countries could only be a Europe of 4 C's—cartellistic, conservative, capitalistic, catholic.

(19) For an interpretation of his character which ascribes great importance to his physical condition see Lewis Edinger — Kurt Schumacher — The bibliography of this study cites almost as many medical textbooks as more conventional sources. Edinger rejected the methods employed in more conventional biographies in favour of a study of the psychology of Schumacher and the impact of his personality on others. Unfortunately this presents Schumacher in a more unfavourable light than a study of his thought and political activity would warrant. (Kurt Schumacher A Study in Personality and Political Behaviour. Stanford, 1964).

(20) Particularly evident in his speech to the Comisces Conference at Zurich, 1947.

entry into the IAR he made repeated demands for new elections a tactic which he realized had minimal chances of success rather than as some counselled, going into extra parliamentary opposition.

In reality Schumacher's opposition had something of a rhetorical symbolic quality (21). There was never any danger that the SPD would not accept majority decisions of the Bundestag or carry on extra parliamentary opposition, and when he skirted the bounds of unconstitutionality with his « Bundeskanzler der Alliierten » (Chancellor of the Allies) speech on November 25, 1949, he very quickly apologised and little more was heard of a « Politik der Intrasiganz ».

Although Schumacher laid great stress on reunification the virulence of his anti-communism meant that his loyalty and the loyalty of the SPD to the West and the German state was never really in doubt (22). In the last analysis he would always prefer a separate democratic West Germany to a re-unified Communist Germany.

Given the lack of fundamental difference between Schumacher and Adenauer his opposition resembled the classic English model more than the opposition of principle model in content if not always in style.

Although Schumacher was the monocratic leader par excellence in the history of the SPD with the possible exception of Bebel, his views did not command universal support in the party.

By and large Schumacher was supported by the functionaries, the organisation men (all ex-emigres), Erich Ollenhauer, Fritz Heine and Alfred Nau, economists like Dr. Agartz and almost all of the Bundestag fraktion (parliamentary party). Carlo Schmid, a possible rival, had developed different foreign policy ideas from Schumacher in 1948 and early 1949 but was to be one of his strongest supporters during the rest of Schumacher's lifetime (23).

Schumacher's leadership was securely anchored in his dual position as chairman of the party executive and the Fraktion. The party executive was elected by the delegates of the Party Conference. Schumacher and three of four other salaried members of the committee formed the acting executive committee (Geschäftsführende Vorstand); the acting executive

(21) Cf. His decision despite considerable opposition in the Fraktion to run against Heuss for President as a symbolic Kampfandidat. This symbolic opposition was also demonstrated in the ritual SPD opposition to the Budget despite their general support of the government's economic policy.

(22) See especially Ernst Gniffk (18) «Jahre mit Ulbricht», Bonn, 1966, *passim*. Arnold Heidenheimer correctly points out that Schumacher's resistance to Grotewohl's attempts to force a SPD/KPD merger meant that the SPD was in fact the first German body politic to be torn asunder by the E-W conflict.

(23) See author's « Die Europapolitik der SPD in der Emigration und in der Ersten Phase Nach 1945, Bonn, 1967. Bergneustadt conference.

committee carried on the daily business of the national Party organisation, and its members slightly referred to as « the apparatchiki » by opponents in the party ran the party during Schumacher's frequent illnesses.

The authority of the Parteivorstand had been weakened in comparison with the Weimar period by making the district secretary an employee of the local organisation rather than the national executive. The political neutralisation of the trade unions also made it very dependent on the dues collected by local organisations. On the other hand, the position of the Party executive vis-à-vis the Congress was strengthened by the post-war provision that the Congress only met bi-annually.

The P/V (Party Executive) was formally accountable to the Party Congress and to the Parteidusschuss, which consisted of representatives of the regional district organisations. The P/V (Party Executive) was supposed to summon this group four times a year to discuss important party problems, and in addition the Control Commission (Kontrollkommission) elected by the Party Congress was in theory supposed to keep a close eye on the executives's conduct of party affairs. In fact, all these groups and especially the Party Congress, were fairly unwieldy, and during Schumacher's life-time his dominant position, based on his unshakeable moral authority, was never challenged.

Opposition to Schumacher was grouped around the so-called « Burgermeisterflügel » of the SPD, the Länder politicians (24), though small in number this group was rich in prestige and experience including as it did men like Ernst Reuter, Max Brauer, Wilhelm Kaisen and Wilhelm Hoegner. These men in power in the regions were affected by different factors from those that affected Schumacher. Unlike him, they were prepared to go into coalition Governments, because their primary interest was in local and regional problems or reconstruction. They held that the solution of these problems required co-operation with the bourgeois parties and the occupation authorities. They were much less suspicious of conservative forces because they were not as powerful in their areas as in West Germany as a whole, cf partic. Bremen and West Berlin. Co-operation with the Allies was a sine qua non for Reuter and also for Kaisen ; Bremen was the largest U.S. port. Schumacher had taken the view that too close an identification with Allied policies would be electorally disastrous, and had gone into opposition as early as 1947. These regional leaders benefitted

(24) One member of the Fraktion Hermann Brill, was totally opposed to Schumacher's policy on European integration, but although he wrote many angry letters (see Schumacher Korrespondenz SPD, Vorstands Archiv) he never in fact voted with the government. That there were others in the Fraktion who agreed with Brill can be substantiated by the parliamentary party minutes. This « opposition » was however only expressed when Schumacher was ill and never in parliamentary voting.

from the dramatic change in Allied policy towards Germany in 1948 as the cold war was intensified. This was particularly important for Reuter in Berlin because of Allied help against the Soviet blockade, but was true in varying degrees for the other leaders as the Allies (especially the Americans) poured money into West Germany under the Marshall Plan.

The general position adopted by these regional leaders was better adapted to post 1945 German realities than Schumacher's posture of opposition. Nearly all observers have commented on what Kirchheimer has called « the privatisation of German life », i.e. concentration on individual advancement and neglect of public questions. Votes generally went to the party which best succeeded in maximising economic welfare, rather than the party with a more coherent ideology.

By and large, these leaders were more cosmopolitan than Schumacher. All these leaders had very good contacts with the United States which provided much of the impetus for post-war attempts at European integration. Reuter had very good contacts with Britain, France and the United States (cf. Willy Brandt und Richard Lowenthal's « Ernst Reuter — Ein Leben für Freiheit ». Munich, 1957) (25). They were idealistic Europeans in a way that Schumacher was not. Most of them had joined SMUSE, the United States of Europe in 1947. Kaisen took part in the Hague Congress for the United States of Europe in 1948, although the SPD did not officially attend.

These men were « Grosse Persönlichkeiten » in their own districts, and although Kurt Schumacher tried continually to remove them, they managed, with the exception of Hoegner for a short time, to stay in power (26). The Berlin SPD for example, in contrast to the national organisation, was a « voters » party, dependent therefore on strong public personalities. By contrast the CDU in Berlin, like the national SPD was a « members » party dependent for its appeal on an alternative programme (27). These men were thus in a position to oppose the line taken by Schumacher, whereas ordinary deputies were too dependent on the party list, owing to the paucity of safe seats, to make opposition either likely or profitable. Their opposition to Schumacher was limited by the need to take into account the views of the local party members and parliamentary deputies; which were usually identical with those of the Party Executive, and an uneasy *modus vivendi* was arrived at in which neither side agreed to press its disagreement too far. As in most disciplined parties, dissent was expres-

(25) On Reuter see A. Ashkenasi, *Reformpartei und Aussenpolitik. Die Aussenpolitik der SPD*. Berlin-Bonn, 1968, Westdeutschen Verlag.

(26) On Schumacher's relations with the Regional leaders. Cf. Edinger, *op. cit.*, Ch. 6, pp. 126-137.

(27) Cf. « Berlin-City on Leave », P. Windsor, p. 162.

sed primarily at party conferences, more rarely in the party executive, and hardly ever in parliamentary voting, though the federal structure of West Germany meant that Brauer and Kaisen could vote in the Bundesrat where their favourable votes on European integration seriously weakened the credibility of Schumacher's « opposition » course (28). Kaisen's attempt in January 1950 to use his position on the Party Executive to challenge Schumacher was an ignominious failure.

In contrast to the right oriented « *Burgemeisterflügel* » the son of one member of the post-war executive, Willy Knothe Jr., an important South German socialist, tried to oppose Schumacher's European policy from the left, but this was fatally handicapped in that a left-wing alternative was identified with the Communist Party (electoral suicide of Germany).

Schumacher's position in this period was also weakened by the position taken by the DGB (German TUC). Although the DGB was ostensibly politically neutral, there was still an extensive interpenetration with the SPD in terms of membership. The SPD relied heavily on the Trade Unions to get the vote out, as 90 % of SPD voters were manual workers at this time.

Unfortunately for Schumacher, the first head of the DGB, Hans Böckler, had very close relations with Adenauer (cf. Adenauer « *Memoirs 1945-1953* » page 55). They also had very good relations with the Allies. There was a harmony of interest ; the Allies wanted practical men, untainted by Nazism, to run things, and the Trade Unions wanted reconstruction with the maximum possible speed. In contrast to the SPD no prominent DGB leaders were refugees, and consequently they were less interested in re-unification (29). They were therefore prepared to support German participation in the new European institutions if it meant a relaxation of production ceilings. The significance that Schumacher attached to Trade Union support for his views is testified to by his unfeigned rage over the DGB support of Adenauer's position on the International Authority of the Ruhr, a rage which led to his « *Chancellor of the Allies* » speech and the fact that his speech at Gelsenkirchen by far the fullest he made on ECSC was to a TU audience in an effort to win them round.

In the opposition between Schumacher and Adenauer a clear pattern was apparent. Adenauer was almost exclusively preoccupied with the effect any measure would have on international, especially French, opinion.

(28) Cf. particularly Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 132, where Haas mistakenly argues that the fact that Brauer and Kaisen voted for the ECSC in the Bundesrat indicates that the SPD parliamentary party's opposition was a sham.

(29) Deutsch K. and Edinger L. « *Germany Rejoins the Powers, Mass Opinion Interest Groups and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy* », p. 134, Stanford, 1959.

His primary concern was to assuage allied demands for security. Schumacher's calculations were based primarily on its effect on opinion inside Germany. This contrast almost endemic in government/opposition roles on foreign policy affairs was especially marked in Schumacher's case since Schumacher unusually for a socialist had particularly poor international contacts.

In one sense the confrontation between Adenauer and Schumacher can be viewed as a conflict between two differing views of pragmatism in foreign affairs. Adenauer was concerned to maximise Germany's international standing by accepting requests to join European institutions or by making offers on his own initiative, e.g. his offer to let French capital participate in the German coal and steel industry. It was almost a Laval tactic-winning freedom of manoeuvre by doing favours for the occupying powers.

Schumacher held Adenauer's policy to be the reverse of pragmatic what Adenauer was actually doing was closing « options » for Germany before he had to by entering into a series of binding commitments. Schumacher, like de Gaulle, maintained that it is precisely when one is weak that one ought not to enter into commitments.

The question remains as to how real these options were. Schumacher's fanatical anti-communism and refusal to accept a neutralist role for Germany weakened the credibility of his role as the defender of German unity. While his « opposition » to West European integration meant that the policy of the SPD coincided embarrassingly with that of the KPD, a situation which made Schumacher attack it more vehemently than the CDU.

Schumacher's policy of appealing to the nationalism of the refugees although effective for instance in Schleswig Holstein, proved much less effective in the long run than Adenauer's financial inducements (the Equalization of the Bunden Laws) to help them integrate into West Germany. Schumacher had also underestimated the government advantage in relation to the Trade Unions. Adenauer was able to play off the Trade Union leaders against the SPD by offering them concessions on co-determination, their primary concern in return for support on foreign policy.

Schumacher's early hope that the coalition would not be strong enough to push through a programme was partly falsified by his conduct of opposition. Heidenheimer maintains in an article on « Foreign Policy and Party Discipline in the CDU » that socialist attacks were instrumental in uniting the party behind Adenauer (30). In this situation the SPD

(30) *Foreign Policy and Party Discipline in the CDU*. Heidenheimer A.J., 1959, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70-84.

after being outvoted on any issue either had to accept the majority verdict or irks complete isolation. As Schumacher was not prepared to carry on an « opposition of principle » there was no alternative but to accept the majority verdict and the consequent loss of face (one of the few arguments in the SPD Executive during this period took place on the question of the SPD sending representatives to the Council of Europe after having voted against it). Despite some notable success in Länder election of November 1950, the SPD hopes of electoral success as a result of the presumed unpopularity of Adenauer's foreign policy proved illusory and the SPD sustained a crushing electoral defeat in the Second Federal Election of October 1953, a defeat which marked the very gradual beginning of a reappraisal of the ideas and policies bequeathed by Schumacher — a reappraisal which eventually involved the abandonment of Schumacher's noble dream that it was possible for the SPD to become a credible alternative government simply by being a « loyal opposition ».

