

Cold-War ideology: an apologetics for global ethnic conflict?*

by Robert C. TRUNDLE, Jr.

Professor in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at Northern Kentucky University

Introduction

Political scientists have measurable variables for roughly calibrating democratic and authoritarian societies. Herein, the latter are generally called "open" and "closed" societies. Though societal notions of *human nature* are not scientifically measurable, they influence variables that are. The notions also illuminate normative values including the morally-relevant value of pursuing objective scientific truth as opposed to its politicization. A politicization of truth, in early twentieth-century closed societies, typically began with political determinations of human nature. Dismayingly, similar ethnic-laden determinations are now pervasive in open societies that induce conservative-liberal polarizations and global ethnic conflicts. Since it is often supposed that the conflicts have superseded conflicting ideologies, especially those of the Cold War, the misconception needs to be countered by examining methods for obtaining politically-relevant notions of our nature.

Initially, I shall seek to show that, in modern philosophy, Kant had a revolutionary impact on conceptions of human nature by transposing them into notions of behavioral agencies. Whereas moral praise and blame presuppose a *freedom* related to one of Kant's agencies, science presupposes that human behavior is subject to various modes of causal *determinism* in terms of another. These agencies give expression to behavior assumed, but incontrovertibly experienced, by citizens in open societies. This fact becomes clear from judicial processes of weighing a morally-relevant rationality against psycho-biological drives to political policies of pitting voluntary self-restraint against societal "root causes". Subsequently, I will explore how conservative and liberal tensions, in giving way to only one of the agencies, may lead to closed societies. Since such societies are monolithic unities with policies enforced by authoritarian means, ideas of human nature are themselves a means for justifying ends. And because the ends would be usurped by awkward ideas that slow decisions and pose moral concerns, the problem has tended to be resolved historically with one stroke: Politically affirm either a *freedom* of the superior man (an *Ueberschensch*) to willfully create truth by bursting the fetters of myths and conventions or a *determinism* whereby a "new man" and truth are molded progressively by a historical movement of Nature.

*A sobering thought that needs to be kept in mind, while reading the following, comes from *The Oxford History of Western Philosophy*, Edited by Anthony Kenny (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 368: "In the 1970s, paradoxically, Marxism in the East was universally taught and almost universally disbelieved, while Marxism in the West was taught... but to an audience of passionate believers. Now, of course, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Empire... the institutional support for Marxist philosophy in Eastern Europe has almost totally collapsed. That philosophy must depend for its survival on the efforts of its devotees in the universities of the West."

Before connecting such conceptions of our nature to ethnic conflicts and some suggested resolutions to them, we need to consider a modern philosophical backdrop to open societies.

Modern philosophical backdrop to open societies

Given that Kant called his philosophy a "Copernican Revolution" and that the name is generally conceded to denote his modern influence, it is reasonable to suppose he not only provided fertile seeds for future philosophical theorizing but liberal and conservative viewpoints fostered by it. Since at least the time of Plato, with whom Kant is in concordance, a fruitful notion has pertained to political claims: **To claim that political institutions are good is to be able to say what is "good".** The response that a sentence about the "good" is true by virtue of reflecting what it really *is* presupposes its reality as well as theories of reality (ontology) and truth (epistemology). Thus, theories of truth and reality are prior to claims of morality and moral claims to political ones. And hence, politics cannot coherently determine morality and truth, and truth should not be politicized. The politicization is inextricably tied to ideology. Traditionally, ideology has not been systemic in open societies that promote the liberal arts and such critical philosophical questions as what is "truth".

Since truth about reality is related to Nature and human nature, theories of human nature are major considerations. *Pari passu*, their development, often considered part of the metaphysical foundation of philosophy, has underlied the historical development of scientific, moral, and political views; typically in this order. This point underscores an often disregarded relationship between scholarly research, in terms of esoteric metaphysical theories, and the social-political praxis. Praxis-related applied philosophy, from peace studies to women's studies, can be no more *thought through* than the scholarly theories on which the philosophy leans. Having noted Kant's scholarly influence, consider *how* its implications for practical politics have their origin in seemingly pedantic considerations. They essentially involve his notion of the "mind" and can be briefly summarized in several paragraphs.

The mind can be compared to a prism. As a prism receives and diffuses white light, he held that the mind has a structure that receives an undiffused "raw material of experience", understood roughly as physical stimuli, and categorizes it "prior to" our ideas. In this sense, he held that the mind is an *a priori structure* that interprets phenomena. That is, the mind is active in the acquisition of knowledge and the word "interpretation" would have central importance politically as well as philosophically.

On the one hand, there was significant philosophical support for a science-oriented Enlightenment that found expression in d'Holbach's *System de la Nature* (1770) in which unhappiness stems from not knowing Nature. Kant showed that it was part of our cognitive nature to know Nature by virtue of our mind "automatically" interpreting physical events causally.¹ **Here we have an inevitable foundation for social and political science. Scientific inquiry presupposes**

1 Kant's metaphysical judgments, of course, were "*synthetic a priori*". "*Synthetic*" refers to synthesized concepts meaning different things whereby the judgments cannot be logically true (*analytic*). "*A priori*" means they are presupposed "prior to" experience so that they cannot be empirically true (*a posteriori*).

the judgment that all events have causes --- a judgment poignantly acknowledged, as noted shortly, by most eminent philosophers of science.

On the other, the judgment was both inconsistent with moral evaluations and not empirically or logically true. In being generated a priori by the mind's structure, the judgment was *prior to* experience and could not be verified by it. And in being such that its denial results in no self-contradiction, the judgment was not logically true. Judgments that do not have known truth were now called "metaphysical judgments". If the "bad news" was that physical truth-claims of science presupposed a metaphysical judgment, the "good news" was that if such a judgment was accepted in science, then morality and its presupposed judgment of human freedom should be accepted as well.

We need not expand on Kant's moral imperatives to observe that moral truth-claims, say persons ought never commit murder, presupposed the metaphysical judgment that persons are free agents. Again, unless persons were free, it is senseless to claim they ought never do one thing or always another. Further, we can admit of some scholarly disagreement over Kant's moral-minded *Critique of Practical Reason* and theoretical *Critique of Pure Reason* in noting that the latter seems by many historians to weaken the former. Suffice it to say that theoretical reason showed that the mind's structure is only receptive to physical stimuli of material things and that "freedom" is not a thing on which other things act causally. **Ontologically, a metaphysics of causal determinism, presupposed by liberal science-oriented citizens, is *thought* to be more solidly anchored in reality than a metaphysics of freedom by virtue of determinism relating to phenomena.**


Kant gave "prestige" to science over morality and religion insofar as freedom, relevant to religion for the coherence of God's judgment, is not a material reality but a merely possible immaterial one. If freedom is real, it is a "reality in itself" behind phenomenal appearances whereby our inability to physically experience it does not necessarily mean that freedom is not real. The assumption of its reality is necessary for practical moral reasoning. But such "reasoning", akin to an applied philosophical one, can have no more strength than a "theoretical reasoning" that freedom may be unreal. Importantly, as noted shortly, Marx and Nietzsche denied a "reality in itself" for embracing an unqualified determinism and freedom, respectively, with later consequences of morality being determined politically.

At the same time, the mere possible reality of freedom is partly offset by the fact that a metaphysics of determinism is no more strictly true than a metaphysics of freedom. **Epistemologically, a deterministic metaphysics is as questionably true as a metaphysics of freedom and such "equality" supports conservatives who stress moral responsibility.** Kant addressed the morality stressed by conservatives and science by liberals in terms of their emphasizing freely-chosen behavior or behavior caused, though there *seems* to be greater support for causal interpretations of liberals when considerations of truth are joined with those of reality.

Nevertheless, a duality of human agency provides a theoretical backdrop for the norms and institutions of open societies. Citizens in these societies generally acknowledge that persons have bodies subject to internal and external causes or conditions as well as moral natures by virtue of "extra-bodily" rational capacities. In terms of the capacities, individuals may often freely choose to abide by moral laws and will usually be held responsible for doing so despite various psychological drives. And notwithstanding a perennial dilemma of knowing where

such drives "end" and freely-choosing moral capacities "begin", the dual agency has tended to instill political moderation into most citizens. This is not to say that they have studied Kant's thought but rather that it gives expression to, and to some degree comprises an "apologetics" for, their ordinary experience of themselves and others.

Overlapping assumptions of human agencies may be schematized by overlapping circles, akin to Venn Diagrams, where a politically-*Left* black area designates caused behavior, a politically-*Right* white area freely-chosen behavior, and the *Center*-gray area an ambiguous common-sense agency supposed by political moderation:



In being mainly concerned with nurturing their families and pursuing their careers --- in getting on with the business of life, most citizens seem to experience common-sensically both sides of the human-nature coin. For instance, while parents may temper their anger in light of popular books on child psychology, they may sometimes spank their children for what they view as willful disobedience despite psychologists who may discourage it on the ground that it causes this or that behavioral pathology. In the absence of acknowledging human freedom, a distinction between causally-determined behavior and, say, a Skinnerian "operant conditioning" seems largely moot; being mostly a difference of exact and inexact measurement. Or, for example, though corporations may acknowledge that alcoholism is to some extent a disease in terms of which medical treatment is subsidized for employees, the latter may suffer blame for not willfully helping themselves as well. **Though most citizens may identify themselves as conservatives or liberals, a bit more to the right or left of the ambiguous center, they generally seem to seek a well-warranted middle road in the social-political praxis.**

Regardless of relatively extreme "left-" and "right-wing" political groups in open societies, most citizen decision-making appears to reflect a middle ground between those who strongly emphasize our freely-choosing moral capacities and

others the behavioral conditions or causes. The "liberal-left" cannot wholly deny freedom insofar as it morally blames the wealthy for being "mean spirited" nor the "conservative-right" a behavioral-conditioning when it stresses moral values in "formative" childhood years. A danger to political institutions of over-stressing policies reflecting one or the other behavioral agency surfaces in social-political debates. Aired in a news media that ties political practice to theory, the publicized debates reveal that institutions tend to respond to a moderate majority.

Having noted a relevance of news reports to political theory, we may note that E. Bronner's "Liberals See Hope in Court" in the *Boston Globe* (July 7, 1991) illustrated an induced middle spectrum of political-interest groups, in ostensive deference to the public, when it addressed a controversy over Clarence Thomas' nomination to an "increasingly conservative" Supreme Court. In reference to concerns of right- and left-wing strategists, the report noted that "If a court consistently hands down opinions that are at one end of the ideological spectrum, the court thrusts its work into public debate." The debate was said to have attracted attention to decisions that "allow government power to encroach on personal lives." And this was also said to have fostered political-pressure groups that appeal to a public "that supports middle positions." The groups do not relinquish their stronger political persuasions but rather try to weaken the opposite persuasion by appealing to the public's more moderate position.

However, if a metaphysics of causality underlies science and science is increasingly viewed as paradigmatic knowledge in our increasingly "high-tech" culture, we may reasonably suppose that the public's "middle position" might drift leftward. Hilary Putnam goes so far as to argue that a scientific community's "form" of reasoning has already been virtually *institutionalized* in contemporary society.² Also, perhaps the political pendulum has been tilted by "activist" movements since the late 1960s that lean on a quasi-Marxian "science" such as radical feminism and a "sex revolution" influenced by it. Furthermore, such revolutionary movements may be complemented by a "socially-raised consciousness" of white heterosexual businessmen who endorse controversial affirmative actions for public-relations purposes. "To stay out of court and cultivate public relations, white men in the boardroom were willing to sell out due process and equal-protection rights of white men on the assembly line and in the offices. It's an old story..." says sociology professor F.R. Lynch.³ Finally, the momentum may be exacerbated internationally by global organizations.

The 1992 UN Rio-Earth Summit and 1994 Cairo-Population Summit appealed to moral and even to religious sentiments. But besides the Vatican's mainstream Christian input being uninvited and opposed, and undoubtedly opposed in a future 1995 Womens'-Rights Summit that will surely challenge child-bearing practices of families and the traditional family itself, a recently held 1995 Poverty Summit at Copenhagen produced a declaration urging a "more... [activist] social conscience".⁴ The word "conscience" may not merely be more reminiscent of a liberated Marxian theology than of an *unpoliticized* traditional Christianity. It may

2 Hilary Putnam, "Philosophers and Human Understanding," *Scientific Explanation: Herbert Spencer Lecture*, Ed. A.F. Heath (NY: Macmillan Publishers, 1988), p. 100.

3 See F. Lynch's "Willy Loman, Angry White Guy," *Special to the Los Angeles Times*, 22 March 1995, A10. Lynch is a visiting sociology professor at Claremont McKenna College and author of *Invisible Victims: White Males and the Crisis of Affirmative Action* (NY: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1991).

4 See W. Drozdiak's "

suggest that Third-World citizens have no responsibility for their own "conditioned" circumstances, notwithstanding some older politically-moderate developed nations that admonished them "to do more on their own."⁵

Moreover: A difficulty influencing leftward drifts of open societies may involve, what seem to be, subjective prescriptions of what *ought to be* the case as opposed to objective scientific descriptions of what *is* or *will be* the case. Given our basic tendency to view things as causally-related phenomena with no question about *their* reality as opposed to that of "freedom" or "good" or "god", Kant's thought serves to explain why viewing things scientifically is easier -- if not more natural-- than understanding them morally. Any biosocial-science anomalies of anti-social behavior pale before the twentieth-century technology-aided "mysteries of evil" that range from Nazi concentration camps to Soviet gulags and Pol Pot's killing fields. But when Stalin shrewdly suggested that killing a few is a tragedy and murdering millions a mere number, he underscored how mathematized techno-scientific ways of thinking tend to consign notions such as "evil" to irrational religious superstition. In flirting with a scientifically-determined progress of the Left, many Western intellectuals have tended to rationalize its victims.

Still, while a central danger of sliding into closed societies comes from a science-oriented political Left, gravitation to the Right needs serious consideration. It is fueled *inter alia* by real or perceived left-wing threats as tragically evident, at the time of this writing, by Oklahoma bombing suspects who perceived deadly federal assaults on a Waco religious sect and an Idaho recluse's family as attempts to unconstitutionally disarm citizens by a liberal government with self-proclaimed left-wing coalitions. Importantly, the latter are also often perceived as being hostile to a *traditional* religion that is glibly branded "right-wing". Many politically-moderate citizens who called into CNN Television's "Talk Live" on April 20, 1995, after the Oklahoma bombing, noted that unless some genuine grievances were addressed over such things as the Waco deaths of eighteen children and four times as many adults, for which, ironically, the Attorney General took "full responsibility" on the apparently false pretext of the children being harmed, a right-wing paranoia of citizen militias would abound. Furthermore, in this vein, attention to the Right indicates that many of its philosophical ideas have been assimilated into a Left that *survived* much of the Right's condemnation.

A politico-ideological slide to closed societies?

It needs to be noted that an intellectual slide to twentieth-century closed societies involved a disregard, not of "interpretation", but, of the mind's "a priori structure". Undoubtedly, this largely stemmed from its truth not resting on sense experience (*a posteriori*) nor logical analysis (*analytically*) so that it seemed no less metaphysical than the judgments of determinism and freedom. But as concepts necessary *a priori* for the intelligibility of morality and science, freedom and determinism were retained as viable notions. Their tie to political ideology, however, has been largely ignored. Before considering ideology, let me address how the word is being used.

30 Million Social Summit Called Extravagant, Wasteful," *The Washington Post*, 12 March 1995, A14.

5 Ibid., A14.

Herein, "ideology" means a system of social-political belief whose proponents do the following: express intolerance for anything less than fervent "true believers" who pursue some *cause* deemed more important than common civility that is itself employed as a reward for agreement and for achieving ideological ends; unabashedly ignore or suppress evidence counting against the belief; and in open societies, where there is limited power to suppress, silence disagreement and critical analysis with name-calling *ad hominem* attacks. These typically involve calling opposition "right wing" if the ideologists are Left and "left wing" if Right. For example, if conservative disagreement with the Left is due to moral considerations, the latter are politicized by being called "right wing". The name, of course, chills any dialogue. The same goes for labeling liberals "left wing" by the Right. Applying the word "ideology" to all philosophical, scientific, moral, and political views obliterates any distinction between them and the ideologies closed to argument and evidence. Ubiquitous use of the word "ideology" may simply reveal careless speaking, but it may also disguise a thinly-veiled quest for power over rationality as well as a cowardly avoidance of confronting one's own faults and thinking independently. **The late eminent philosopher Gustav Bergmann, having suffered firsthand Nazi and communist ideologies, said that "The ideal of an ideology-free society is... to be desired, if for no other reason than the humanity, the intelligence, and the courage it takes to bear life without support of ideological illusion".⁶**

This brings us back to how liberals and conservatives may slide into ideology. Consider a rightward slide after a leftward one in terms of general perspectives based on human agencies. Simply stated: **If a deterministic agency is stressed, a liberal to left-wing political perspective predominates. It stresses some of the following by degrees: little or no responsibility of citizens for "criminal actions", e.g. dysfunctional and sociopathic behavior; work or its lack being largely caused by things such as economic forces; capitalistic self-interest reflecting the interests of an elite political class that conditions or causes dominated classes to accept its self-serving norms; class struggles, peaceful or violent, increasingly liberating the oppressed from institutionalized norms; and a diminished or denied role of traditional morality and religion in properly influencing family, education, employment, and government institutions.** The latter would be more or less directed by technicians, educators, bureaucrats, and government officials since they have the requisite scientific and technical education. In objecting to parental interference in elementary-school sex education, for instance, a liberal citizen says: "Imagine parents who are not skilled in the *latest educational techniques* wanting to dictate what their children are taught. Just because they pay tuition... does not give

6 From L. Addis' "Memorial Minutes" on Gustav Bergmann, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 61, September 1987, p. 165. Interestingly, in *Political Ideologies* (NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991) p.10, political scientist L.P. Baradat contrasts ideology to philosophy by stating that philosophy encourages introspective analyses of political assumptions. His insight renders poignant Plato's suggestion, in the *Republic* 489c, that philosophy will be likened to ideology by ideologists: "But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to... sailors [on a ship], and those whom these called... stargazing ideologists to the true pilots [philosophers]."

them the right to tell *professional educators* what to do."⁷ Those embracing a liberal to Left perspective would lean toward the directives of a scientific community.

If there eventuates an acute view of a deterministic human agency, the political vision of a scientific community may itself come to be governed by a "scientific" visionary such as Marx. He continually compared himself to a scientist as when, for instance, he proclaimed in his *Capital*: "the *physicist* either observes natural processes where they occur... or, wherever possible, he makes experiments. What I have to examine in this work is the capitalist mode of production".⁸ **Now it is imperative for Marx's identification with the physicist to incorporate morality into science whereby scientifically described change becomes morally desirable progress.**

A brief articulation of Marx's indebtedness to Kant may illuminate a peculiar "morality"; one characteristic of ideological tendencies to cast extraordinary meanings on ordinary words for making acceptable what is often heinous and senseless. Marx parlays Kant's notion of scientific determinism into an account of morality. Thus, Marx ascribed a "morality" to determinism *itself* by understanding it dialectically rather than mechanistically. A mechanistic determinism, given critical expression by Kant, fostered a view of the material world as a purposeless mechanism. But if the mechanism were itself understood as a scientific conception that was caused through a dialectically determined history, where "history" is a manifestation of matter unfolding progressively, then science and "morality" might be affirmed simultaneously. A material-historical progress, which is grasped scientifically, even indicates that Marx's own conception of a "progressive history" was one of history's causally determined products at a historical moment. Thus, says Marx: "From this moment, science, which is a product of the historical movement... has become revolutionary!"⁹

Political revolutions are the most dramatic way to change societies. As a political science that explains the cause of itself and all other sciences, Marxian science is a "science of sciences" that supersedes a classical-medieval understanding of the science as "metaphysics". In a word, metaphysics becomes "physics". And because the "physics" is political, there arises a politicization of truth and relativism whereby what is true in one historical epoch, dominated by a political class, may be false in another as classes and epochs move historically through revolutions. "Truth" comes from members of the epochal classes, radically separated by revolutions, who are caused to have their conceptions. It does not come from a historical continuity of developing theories, based on experiments or corroborated predictions, in a modern scientific tradition.

7 Celsus Griese, "No Right to Dictate," *The Cincinnati Enquirer (TCE)*, 1 April 1995, A7 (emphasis added). In regard to the same sex-education program on the same page, Joseph Spitzig gives expression to a "conservative-Right" perspective discussed below. In "Sin Encouraged by Sex-Ed Class," he says of the program: "Instead of morality...it serves up a gloppy melange of *social psychology* to engender a warm-and-fuzzy comfort level toward sexuality...The hell with making our kids comfortable with their sexuality'... get them into heaven" (emphasis added).

8 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. I, From Marx, Ed. Allen Wood (NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1988), p. 205.

9 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, From *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, Ed. David McLellan (NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 212.

Many post-cold war intellectuals, within parameters of a liberal to Left perspective, will want to object that "truth" is not relative but dialectically truer. If there is no truer "truth", what becomes of a progressive scientific vision? But consider an epoch of the Greek Sophist Thrasymachus. His assertion that the "just" may be "unjust" at different times, by virtue of whoever rules, ironically brings to mind the Marxian idea that domination determines truth. For this reason, paradoxically, it will become clear that the same intellectuals tend to embrace such a relativism. The relativism evoked Socrates' response, in the *Republic* 337b, that "twice six" may then absurdly become a false answer to "how many are twelve?". These possibilities imply that there is no truer "truth". Both the claim that there is none and its denial are, for the Marxist, equally determined so that each claim being incoherently both true and false is avoided only by another claim *sub specie aeternitatis* (relating to "eternal things" where truth about changing "truth" is from an extra-epochal standpoint). This point will be strengthened shortly.

The response that Thrasymachus was not a member of a dominating class ignores the question of Sophism comprising a dominant Greek Enlightenment. Also, it overlooks that Marx was not such a member, though it is precisely "elitest" extra-epochal claims that Marx adopted for himself. His sympathizers now speak of their "raised consciousness" regarding science and morality.

A Sophistic relativism seems morally preferable to the dialectic, despite the dialectic and relativism being both embraced surreptitiously, since the dialectic engenders a systematically sinister meaning of "morality". Whatever furthers the historico-material utopian end is "progressive" or "good" and whatever impedes it is "reactionary" or "bad". All science, morality, politics, and art become ideologies for propagandistic ends of the state. This gives a radical spin to the "end justifying the mean". The "peasants' cries" during Mao's and Stalin's "great leaps forward" come to mind because terror and mass murder are, *by definition*, not only justified but positively good when they expedite the ends. The ends are also furthered by *politicized* sciences. Their prestige in a post-modern scientific culture may be exploited for rejecting traditional morality and religion as well as for ignoring "reactionary" facts of science that conflict with the mother science of Marxism.

The very logogram of "hammer and sickle" has symbolized science as labor in communist countries where dissidents, especially in the former USSR, either underwent *political* "treatment" in psychiatric hospitals for not grasping "reality" with *correctness* or placed in "reeducation camps" and executed if counter-conditioning ("brainwashing") processes were ineffective. The centers for higher education, called "technical" or "scientific" institutes, also emphasize that attention is to science and not to liberal arts or philosophy which were the very disciplines that gave rise to Marx's chimerical creativity in the first place.

That uncreative dogma was still enforced in closed communist societies even after the worldwide events of the late 1980s, is evidenced by the *International Directory of Philosophy & Philosophers* (BGSU Documentation Center, 1990-1992) where there was either absent any listings for the remaining societies or "areas of scholarship" that included only scholarship on Marx. And that there are practical implications that still affect post-communist Eastern European societies is evidenced by the statements of Marianne Birthler, Brandenburg's Minister of Education, in what was formerly part of communist East Germany. In an interview with *The Baltimore Sun* (June 30, 1991), she asserted that rashes of youth violence - triggered by intellectual intolerance - were attributable to the "communists' empty anti-fascism" that was just part of the country's loathed authoritarian educational system that did not tolerate questions, doubts, or problems' ".

Surely, youth violence is rife in open societies. However, most statistics seem to indicate that its dramatic rise began in the 1960s when an influential part of the Vietnam-War opposition was transposed into loosely-knitted splinter ideologies within a general ideology called the "New Left": "anti-establishment" student activists portraying the war as one waged on "oppressed peoples" by dominating *capitalist* classes; radical feminists, united with anti-war protesters, viewing the same classes as historically composed of *males* dominating females; black militants decrying the political domination of "*elite white classes*" in our culture's history; a sex revolution politicized by criticizing white heterosexual males for exploiting marital structures that are mini power structures of a larger patriarchal political hierarchy; and a sex revolution also not only fostering sex outside of marriage for undermining its religio-social status but lesbianism as well until chauvinistic male attitudes became "liberated." Such a liberation, in turn, triggered an *ideological justification* for both male homosexuality and, what had been traditionally called, "fornication". Besides an unparalleled epidemic of sexual diseases exacerbated by a new anti-establishment drug culture for "dropping out" of the established one, there ensued a divorce epidemic, out-of-wedlock child-births, nontraditional single-parent families, and escalating poverty and teen violence.

The Population Council in New York, which analyzes population trends and fund-related research, recently released a report that the "Western family model long idealized as the gold standard... is now clearly a myth... Children are at a greater risk of being poor and often are left to fend for themselves without adult supervision."¹⁰ That the family dissolutions have impacted globally is evidenced by a further statement that, beginning in the West in the 1970s, they are now "true whether one is talking about North America, Europe, South America or southern Africa."¹¹ Finally, there was an influx into universities of, what many persons have called, "tenured radicals" who were either sympathetic with, or part of, a "New-Left" student movement.

Whereas pioneering feminist Germaine Greer concedes that "the forging-house of most of the younger women's liberation groups was the university left-wing,"¹² political science professor L.T. Sargent - himself trying to write with textbook impartiality - notes that the wing consisted of liberal Marxists centered around the *New Left Review* whereby the name "New Left" was "appropriated by the growing world student movement and mass media in the mid-1960s."¹³ If the New Left does influence our society with roots in the notion that politically dominating genders or races determine truth where "truth" may be relative to whoever

10 See F. Vrazo, "Breakup of Family is Global Problem," *Knight-Ridder News Service*, TCE (30 May 1995) A5. The Population Council's Social-Science Director, Cynthia Lloyd, noted that "with mothers working and fathers working or absent, children are roaming around on their own."

11 Ibid, p. A5. The West's influence on family dissolutions may also be augmented by rising public crudeness of language and behavioral rudeness. Professor of Anthropology Alexander Moore, at the University of Southern California, noted that "One reason is the legitimization of protest movements in North America and the West in general [since the 1960s]... Protests have gone from the gentle nonviolence of Martin Luther King to the antics of ACT-UP and Queer Nation and others that use rudeness as a way of gaining attention" [TCE (24 Nov 1994) H14].

12 See Germaine Greer, *The Female Eunuch* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 313-29.

13 L.T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, 7th Ed. (Ill: The Dorsey Press, 1987), p. 149.

ver has power, we may reasonably suppose that open societies are faced with serious problems. Not the least of these would be increasing ethnic conflicts. While not comparable to recent atrocities around the world, the conflicts have philosophical assumptions and *ideological* support. **At the very apex of growing dissatisfaction in politicized communist societies in the late 1980s, the eminent philosopher Sidney Hook, himself a former Marxist scholar, warned that the greatest danger "to freedom of philosophical inquiry and... freedom generally... [was] the growing politicization of the university."**¹⁴

These considerations are not merely significant in view of former Harvard philosopher Santayana's warning that those who do not know history are doomed to relive it. They are poignantly relevant to President Harry Truman's 1945 speech in which he lamented the relative ease of killing the dictators who started World War II in comparison to "killing the ideas" that made them possible.¹⁵ And having endured the implemented ideas of both Nazis and communists in occupied Poland - an experience few Western intellectuals have undergone, Pope John Paul II was quoted almost exactly fifty years later by the *Associated Press* (16 May 1995) as warning that a "culture of war" threatens the destruction of mankind because it has failed to learn the "bitter lessons" of the war. "Sadly, the end of the war did not lead to the disappearance of... policies and ideologies which were its cause".

Causes of both Left and Right need reexamination in view of atrocious similarities in ideological behavior. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact reminds us that occupying Soviet troops mass murdered Polish military officers and that this deed, though blamed on the Nazis, was first publically admitted in August 1989. And whereas the Nazis used the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB) as a model for their *Geheime Staatspolizei* (Gestapo), Soviet troops were ordered by Stalin to not help Poland fight the remaining Nazi occupiers in 1945 because the Poles were a "criminal people". The order did not evidence communist eschewal of reinterpreting "criminality" as caused or conditioned political behavior. It reflected allied talk of axis "crimes" as a cover for the hope that Poland would not have the will and resources to resist communist occupation after fighting the fascists.

Understanding causes of a fascist Right might begin with a "conservative-Right" based on assumptions of human freedom. Simply put: **If the world is viewed in terms of a human agency in which freedom is stressed, there prevails a conservative to right-wing perspective that emphasizes the following: the responsibility of citizens for criminal behavior and successful employment; a possible pursuit of self-interest that is coordinated ideally with the collective moral interests of society; and attempts to conserve traditional moral guidelines for family, education, and government.** Though minimal government intervention is typically tolerated in order to ensure certain standards in education and industry, conservative to right-wing adherents tend to be centrifugal forces for patriotism and preservation of a society's cultural heritage. The notion of preserving such a heritage, if not the survival of a nation per se, is especially significant for understanding the rise of a more acute rightward perspective. It reinterprets morality in light of a post-Kantian human nature.

14 Sydney Hook, "Invited Address," *Proceedings And Addresses Of The American Philosophical Association* 60, No. 3, 1987, pp. 511-12.

15 Harry S. Truman, *Years of Decisions*, Vol. I (NY: Doubleday & Co., 1955), p. 411.

An acute perspective may arise because of political instability, threats to individual autonomy, or a nation's people feeling its national honor is demeaned. If these things occur, it is a short step to the people relinquishing their individual will to a dictator who speaks as "one voice for many" and whose power is amplified dramatically. While the amplification may be exercised initially for peacefully restoring stability, it may come to be harnessed for willfully "shaping" a *new world order* in a dictator's own "image" --- as increasing fear of a nation is interpreted to enhance its honor. The idea of the "human will", including a "will to power", is connected conceptually and existentially to that of "human freedom".

Whereas Kant influenced the idea that *practical freedom* involves a conceptual difficulty beyond the commonly-understood power of exercising behavior one chooses since the freedom is only a possible reality necessary for the intelligibility of morality, *philosophical freedom* might strengthen the concept of "practical freedom" by finding expression in an existential tradition. Having its primary roots in St. Augustine, the tradition includes modern contributors such as Nietzsche. While many contributors view our incontrovertible consciousness of our behavior as comprising the freedom to *choose* behavior even if it cannot be exercised,¹⁶ Nietzsche would not deny behavioral self-conscious even as he goes beyond the idea by understanding organic and inorganic things as having a *will to power* to dominate everything else. Persons are no more free to not will to power, given their nature being part of Nature, than they are free to not feel pain when beaten. This turns a traditional naturalistic morality on its head. Morality is created in an irrationally willful way by our power-seeking nature as opposed to one adopting moral and political laws on the basis of our nature (*lex naturalis*).

These points are important for grasping Nietzsche's revolutionary spin on Kantian freedom and morality as well as for appreciating the awkward position of contemporary conservatives whose traditional morality comes under fire from both a Marxian Left and Nietzschean Right. A controversial link between the political Right and Nietzsche is addressed shortly. It is now noted: **Though moral praise and blame presuppose freedom, Nietzsche saw that freedom does not presuppose either morality or possibly inconsistent moral theories in terms of which praise and blame are understood. Therefore, traditional morality gives way to a primordial freedom, as evident in *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Will to Power*, whereby if Kant's deterministic human agency influenced ideology in one direction, it is reasonable to expect that an agency of freedom would influence ideology in another.**

Moreover, though the direction of nonideological conservatives may reflect attempts to *conserve* traditional moral and religious norms while allowing for the importance of science, Kant's philosophy may explain how there were pejorative practical consequences even here. The consequences did not merely stem from freedom being only a possible reality that did not imply morality during the Enlightenment's scientific revolution and the Reformation's challenge to traditional church authority --- the latter, by inter-denominational conflict, weakening

16 See Robert C. Trundle's *Ancient Greek Philosophy: Its Development & Relevance to Our Time* (London: Ashgate Publishing, Avebury, 1994), p. 249. An indebtedness to Aristotle is noted: Whereas his intuitive certainty of the laws of thought is tied to a "sixth sense" similar to consciousness, "Augustine might add that we are... incontrovertibly conscious of our certainty". Such certainty suggests something to ponder: Does consciousness of our thinking that our *thinking is causally determined* comprise our very freedom to think or not to think it?

coordinated religio-philosophical responses to modern developments. Kant fostered an Anglo-European positivism for which religio-moral truth claims were "meaningless" since they were not *synthetic* (empirically verifiable) or *analytic* (logically true).

These developments may not bode well for conservatism, but, paradoxically, they may for a slide to the Right. Since most conservatives do not know how pre-Kantian classical and medieval notions are grounded, much less how Kant challenged the ground and modern philosophies exacerbated it, they often appeal to tradition *per se*. One thinks of a television reporter who recently interviewed truck drivers about gays and women in the military. When they responded that they had simply always believed it was wrong, the reporter turned smilingly toward the camera and signed-off smugly, "That's the news from here!", as if to confirm what are unenlightened heterosexual white males. The inability to articulate reasons for traditional belief does not, of course, imply there are no reasons. Nevertheless, though mere appeal to the belief may make many conservatives feel "anti-scientific" or "anti-intellectual", if not homophobic or sexist or racist, conservative sympathies might be expected to shift rightward before leftward. And the shift may be facilitated by their feeling humiliated, reminiscent of a nation's honor demeaned, and thus angered in a society where their belief is politicized by the "demonization" of their race or gender and being called "right-wing" anyway.¹⁷

An actual "right wing" may find ideological expression in Nietzsche, despite controversy about his association with fascism. Before expanding on fascism's connections to him, let me briefly address the controversy.

While it is beyond my scope to fully consider it, we may at least note that a disassociation of fascism and Nietzsche began, largely, after World War II. The disassociation was strengthened by the preeminent Princeton philosopher Walter Kaufmann. He was representative of the trend and his commentaries on his pioneering translations of Nietzsche were influential. Typical of the disassociation is his appeal to one of Nietzsche's drafts for a preface to *The Will to Power*: "A book for *thinking*, nothing else... I wish I had written it in French so that it might not appear to be a confirmation of the aspirations of the German *Reich*..."¹⁸ First, however, with admiration for Kaufmann's scholarly translations, philosophical works are subject to interpretations independently of the author's personal intentions. Nietzschean research was not merely alone honored by Hitler with German taxpayers' money. Recent scholarship, referenced shortly, acknowledges a prewar political Left's reluctance to admit its indebtedness to Nietzsche's thought because of its prevailing association with the Right. Second, a pervading Nietzschean theme, beyond the work in question, is the unabashed conquest of bold leaders who conform reality to their "image" through power. Third, I have previously noted that many post-war intellectuals, with a liberal to Left perspective, would defend Sophism. Kaufmann's defense, in other writings, casts further suspicion on his interpretation of Nietzsche.

17 See, for instance, M. Kerkhop on an article about a gay marriage in a local church, "I David, Take You, Mark," *TCE* (23 March 1995) "Letters to Editor": "I do not want to go into what you would call a *right-wing tirade* on how I find homosexuality a sin... Instead... cancel my subscription" (emphasis added).

18 F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Ed. W. Kaufmann, NY: Random House, 1968, Preface.

Historians of philosophy generally hold that Nietzsche picked up on Sophistic theories.¹⁹ We may reasonably suppose that one who defends them would defend Nietzsche, and that a questionable defense of the former would incur one of the latter. Intriguingly, Kaufmann's *Philosophical Classics* states, without qualification, that the Sophists' unpopularity "made it easy for Plato to picture the Sophists in the darkest colors. One as hostile to Plato as Plato was to the Sophists could easily portray him as a reactionary who sought... sanction in another world for convictions threatened by the Greek enlightenment."²⁰ This passage may not necessarily mean that Kaufmann thought Plato was reactionary. But by ignoring the merits of the arguments between Plato and the Sophists who held that a statement can be both true and false, if not that power determines "truth", the passage suggests more than an identification of relativism with a progressive vision. Since Plato's "hostility" is logically irrelevant to his argument against Sophistic incoherency, it suggests that Kaufmann reduces the arguments to *ad hominem* personal considerations as well as *politicizes* them by calling one party "reactionary" and the other "progressive". These points render questionable Kaufmann's interpretations of Nietzsche and indicate the advisability of reconsidering post-war analyses of him.

Specifically, Nietzsche and Marx both deny a "reality" lying behind its appearances. Their answers of where truth comes from, *if not from a true metaphysics*, may explain similar fascist-related events that are still being suffered in the social-political arenas. Whereas Marx denied a reality of human freedom "hidden behind" the appearances of deterministic behavioral phenomena, Nietzsche denied the reality by affirming that phenomena *were themselves* the very manifestation of a "world in itself". The latter included willful power-seeking creative behavior of the individual, society, or race. Neither ideas embrace an ambiguity or "unknown" that diminishes decisive ideological belief. For example, Nietzsche rejects Kant's "a priori structure of mind" that interprets phenomena deterministically as nothing more than a creation for the "expediency of a certain race".²¹ Thus, it is a foregone conclusion that racial and societal conflict may be seen as expressions of a "will to power" and philosophies as mere ideological means for ends to power. That Nietzsche viewed freedom as a necessary condition for the coherence of a "will to power" is evident in his defense of our "right" to *choose* freedom since, besides its consistency with choice, "determinism is only a modus of permitting ourselves to juggle our [self-created moral] evaluations away once they have no place in a mechanistically conceived world."²²

If not from metaphysics, truth from new "Marxist Hitlers"?

Let us briefly expand upon the problem of a metaphysics of freedom and determinism having no known truth. If scientific truth presupposes that events have causes, and if the presupposition is truth-valueless, then the epistemic significance of scientific truth-claims becomes questionable since they rest upon a pre-

19 Cf. N. Melchert's *The Great Conversation: A Historical Philosophy* (Toronto: Mayfield, 1991) p. 45: "The Sophists produced a theory... picked up in the nineteenth century by Friedrich Nietzsche".

20 Walter Kaufmann, *Philosophical Classics: Thales to Ockham* (NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 53.

21 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, p. 278.

22 Ibid., p. 416.

supposition that is not itself known to be true. The same dilemma holds for a metaphysics of freedom. If moral truth presupposes that persons are free and the presupposition is truth-valueless, the epistemic significance of moral truth-claims is equally in question. They also rest on a presupposition whose truth is unknown. The question ensued: Whence comes truth if not from metaphysics?

An avoidance of metaphysics, if not an anti-metaphysics, of virtually all subsequent Western philosophical movements was largely a response to the problematic question. Pragmatism, logical positivism, analytic philosophy, and phenomenology as well as existentialism were the best known movements, with recent philosophers of science also acknowledging the dilemma in terms of a "K-K Thesis" whereby "if skepticism is to be avoided [about Knowing one Knows], the exploitation of... causal' regularities in obtaining a posteriori knowledge must not require prior knowledge of those regularities".²³ Yet, outside mainstream philosophy, two of the most radical answers came from Marx and Nietzsche. They argued, respectively, that truth comes from dominating classes and from an *Uebermensch* ("Superman") who creates it out of his will to power.

Ideologists who exploit the philosophies of Nietzsche and Marx have much to fear from critical questions. Did Marx alone transcend the material-historical domain in order to know his ideas were true without their being both determined and possibly false in another historical epoch? Is Nietzsche's philosophy a creation for his own will to power as well as a mere ideology for the power of others?

Self-reinforcing circularities also arise. Changing the world by indoctrination and propaganda reinforce Marxian theory by preventing critical analyses of it, and the theory reinforces propaganda by construing the analyses as reactionary expressions of class conflict. By the same token, though propaganda and indoctrination are applicable to less than super-race masses in right-wing fascism, a Nietzschean "apologetics" interprets critical analyses as concealed, and hence inferior, expressions of the will to power; the will to undermine a new found "Copernican" freedom of creating truth by the Uebermensch.²⁴

Practical consequences of the radical Right and Left find poignant expression in an old Soviet woman who sighed despairingly that "In both Stalinism and fascism we see an insatiable thirst for power, a yearning to remake the world according to a particular design and the same contempt for human beings".²⁵ The remaking of human beings begins, with Nietzsche and Marx alike, with emphasis on "interpretation". Again, whereas Kant first raised the specter of "interpretation" with the mind's "a priori structure", Marx understands it in terms of dominating classes and Nietzsche as the creative product of a will to power. "Interpretation," said Nietzsche, "[is] the introduction of meaning... there are no facts", and he adds that "On a yet higher level [interpretation] is to posit a goal and mold

23 See F. Suppe, Editor, *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 721-22. This book stems from an international symposium on the philosophy of science.

24 Ibid., p. 417. Nietzsche references Kant: "Our new freedom'... the *pre-copernican* prison and field of vision, would be something... regressive unless it is merely a bad joke" (emphasis added).

25 See E. H. Methvin's "The Unquiet Ghosts of Stalin's Victims," *Nat. Rev.* 41 (1989) 24-52.

facts according to it; that is, *active interpretation*..."²⁶ The Nietzschean and Marxian notions of "interpretation" are inextricably indebted to Kant's comparison of the mind's "interpretive activity" to the activity of the earth revolving about the sun in the revolutionary theory of Copernicus; hence the "Copernican" philosophical revolution with unintended consequences. But Kant properly distinguished his revolution from one of science as opposed to a chimera of scientific Marxism and an incorporation into it of Nietzschean ideas by the followers of Marx.

We are also reminded in a recent international anthology that praises "Marxian Spirituality", three years after the supposed collapse of communist ideas in 1989, that the *new* Marxian man will "make it his purpose to master his own feelings, to raise his instincts to the heights of consciousness,... to *create* a higher social biological type, or, if you please, a superman".²⁷ This is disquietingly similar to a Nazi *Ueberschensch* and "higher" biological type of human being, along with a "life-affirming positive Christianity". National-Socialist fascism needs its affinity with a fervent religious vision as does Marxism with its well-worn comparisons of Marx to the Savior and utopian end of history to heaven. And an affinity between "heaven" and fascism need not be forced when one considers that Wagner's son-in-law likened himself to John the Baptist in his self-avowed discovery of Hitler as Savior. The Savior in traditional Christianity was the "New Man" who replaced Adam. While Christianity was relegated to mythology by Nazi theorists, some liberal to Marxian social-science professors in America today may ignore the greater applicability of "mythology" to their own politicized beliefs than to traditional ones. Contrary to social-science textbook usage whereby historical accuracy is irrelevant to myth, traditional religious beliefs tend to be treated as inexact unscientific "stories". How could such treatment be conceptually avoided?

Afro-American sociologist Clinton Jean acknowledges "mainstream" liberal-Marxian analyses in social-science studies of a class-structured Eurocentric history and recalls feeling "uncomfortable...." at Columbia as well as Brandeis, "about exactness, at least as liberal social science described it".²⁸ Yet entanglements of a science oriented liberal-Marxism and Nietzsche are revealed by feminist academics. Ofelia Schute notes that Marxian doctrines were enriched by Nietzschean ideas but that socialist intellectuals were loathe to credit him since he was "associated with fascism".²⁹ And Kathryn Parson's pioneering feminist scholarship ties together the virulent ideologies of our time: **While celebrating Frederick Engels' communist insights and creations of a "new human being", conflicting Nietzschean worldviews (*Weltanschauungen*) of different races and genders are joined to Thomas Kuhn's relativistic historical paradigms: "A moral, social, and scientific paradigm... is not merely something**

26 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, p. 327.

27 Leon Trotsky, "Socialism and the Human Future," *Marxism and Spirituality: An International Anthology*, Ed. B.B. Page (CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1993), p. 8.

28 Clinton Jean, *Beyond the Eurocentric Veil: The Search for African Realities* (MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992) p. xvi.

29 O. Schutte, "Nietzsche, Mariategui, and Socialism," *Social Theory and Change* 14 (1988) 71-2.

through which we see the world. It is something which shapes the facts of the human world".³⁰

Present-day academic ideologists in open societies must be relatively cautious if they politicize facts and try to shape them through viewing education as indoctrination, lest they add to an increasing chorus of public concern about "political correctness" and student complaints that affect their teaching evaluations where teaching is still valued as opposed to only research; the research's more subtle "political correctness", at least in mainstream journals and professional meetings, helping allay scholarly criticism of politicized agenda celebrated uncritically in classrooms. "In early April [1995]," says sociologist F.R. Lynch, "600 professional papers will be read at the Pacific Sociological Association Meetings... Though affirmative action is the hottest sociological topic in the United States, not a single paper title directly mentions the issue... Incredibly, sociologists have written few papers and fewer books on affirmative action: Political correctness dictates that the policies are to be applauded, not studied."³¹ This is not to say that those unwilling to risk studying the policies due to a fear of being called "racist" or "sexist" or "elitist" are ideologists. Rather, it is to say that such politicized names are legitimized by Marxian, if not fascist, theory for silencing genuine scientific inquiry.

For example, Herbert Aptheker is a historian on Afro-Americans and a former University of California professor who supported the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. After his approvable quote of Marx that "Theory is capable of gripping the masses when it demonstrates *ad hominem*....", he lets loose the *ad hominem* on those with whom he disagrees with words to which American academics are now numb: "exploitative societies", "anti-scientific" and "elitist".³² A Marxian strategy of academics who perceive *themselves* as an elite is to disavow the philosopher's ability to question "science" and to attack critical questions by names that might, arguably, be better suited to themselves. Interestingly, part of the agenda is multiculturalism and links to Nietzschean terminology are not spurious. Whereas Marxian language prompts ubiquitous references to a "raised consciousness" for uncritically accepting politicized agenda, Nietzschean-induced language fosters appeals to power over knowledge. Anthropologist James Peacock noted recently in a presentation to the Japan-American Society: "Multiculturalism wants to celebrate and to prescribe, and to change, and it really does not have the patience to go through all this... descriptive, analytical fieldwork. Know-

30 Kathryn Payne Parsons, "Nietzsche and Moral Change," *Nietzsche*, Ed. R.C. Solomon (NY: Anchor Press, 1980), pp. 185 -fn. 12, 186, 190. That feminist notions of "dominant male conceptual schemes" are held in ideological fashion is evidenced by Claire Fulenwider's *Feminism in American Politics* (NY: Praeger, 1980) and Daphne Patai's and Noretta Koertge's *Professing Feminism: Cautionary Tales from the Strange World of Women's Studies* (NY: Basic Books, 1995). In following standard social-science methodology for empirically testing feminism as ideology, despite radical or reform or social versions, Fulenwider concludes (56) that feminism "gives clear evidence" of being a "political ideology". Patai and Koertge, who themselves teach Women's Studies, generally note that it subjugates scholarship to political activism and indoctrination; that ideological "policing" to silence disagreement was admitted by their feminist colleagues who speak candidly only on condition of anonymity.

31 F.R. Lynch, "Willy Loman, Angry White Guy," A10.

32 See Herbert Aptheker's quote of Marx (1844c, p. 182) and subsequent remarks in "The Spiritual in Marxism," *Marxism and Spirituality*, pp. 71, 73.

ledge may be a way to *power*, but multiculturalism often wants the *power* right away; as for [any objective] knowledge, you can take it or leave it".³³

The point is not that all forms of multiculturalism and affirmative action are undesirable. Some forms may be needed even if they still need to be studied. Nor is it that ideological modes of expression stem from reading Nietzsche and Marx, though radical feminists, now often called "*gender feminists*" by more moderate "equity" ones, have acknowledged the philosophers in pioneering ideology. The point is that proselytized ideology, since the cold war, has been institutionalized in older Western democracies with far-ranging influences on international attitudes and behavior. The institutionalization in America, parodied in Great Britain, was notoriously reflected by such things as the congressionally-authorized "National US History Standards" and Smithsonian-Museum commemoration for the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

It was revealed in the summer 1994 that US government officials of the Smithsonian museum were planning to portray the Japanese, during World War II, as a nonwhite race defending their unique culture against a racist Western imperialism. Exhibits next to one another were to contrast Hitler's declaration that he wanted no war against women and children to a statement by US General George Marshall that he would not hesitate to bomb civilians. In addition to the difficulty of reconciling an indifference to civilians with the General's massive post-war economic plan for helping them, left out of the Marshall quote was its context in which "all out" war would inevitably cause civilian casualties when they were related to targets, such as factories, whose avoidance would incur even more death by lengthening the war's duration. The Smithsonian's politicized history was both mimicked by one in Great Britain and coupled with another in America.

The British government distributed an educational video for the 1995 V-E Day commemoration in which Winston Churchill was discussed for only 14 seconds to show that his 1945 elective defeat boosted the public by enabling the socialist Labour Party to finance services through state-owned industries, and another video for primary-school children promoted "gender awareness" with comments such as Britain "was quite sexist in the war".³⁴ In America, the skewed Smithsonian history was augmented by the much publicized history standards in the Winter of 1994. Former head of the National Endowment for the Humanities Lynne Cheney noted that, out of 271 pages of an elementary school curriculum guide, there were 19 references to Joe McCarthy and McCarthyism and not one to Thomas Edison or the Wright brothers or Albert Einstein. The document's emphasis on the achievements of preferred minorities and their victimization is entangled *prima facie* with a "political correctness" in which oppressive white males have dominated history and historical "facts" are functions of ideological power. If there is not such an entanglement, the question ensues of why the "new history" parodies the alleged deficiencies of traditional history? The question does not suggest that traditional histories have been independent of values for choosing what are important facts, or that facts about discrimination may have been ignored or unresearched, or that contributions of minorities may have been neglected. The question does suggest that, at best, it is spurious to view political ideologies of groups in power as determinants of history.

33 James Peacock, "Multi-culturalism in the USA," *AnArchaeology Notes II* (Oct. 1994) 4. I am grateful to Professor Charlotte Neely for this article.

34 John O'Sullivan, "The Week," *Nat. Rev.* 47 (1995) 14.

Jean Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the UN, once suggested that all ideological agenda must ultimately appeal to philosophy. In this respect, connections of Nietzsche to fascism and to post-World War II Marxism have been either neglected or deliberately defused. Philosophically, a Nietzschean foundation of freedom for willfully exercising power seems to render coherent a new boldness for taking "responsibility" for agenda, from politicized teaching to atrocities of extremist militant groups. Such "responsibility" conflicts with Marxian determinism and offends any sense of decency in traditional morality. But as fascism personalizes morality for "personality cults" of Marxian god-like prophets who alone willfully transcend history, Marxism makes the prophets more than mere mythological "*Hitlerian Uebermensen*" by viewing history as a scientific phenomenon. As Marxism ties historical classes to opposing worldviews, fascism transposes the views into concurrently conflicting gender- or ethnic-*Weltanschauungen* that shape facts. And as fascism incurs contempt for "inferior races", heirs of cold-war Marxism intellectualize racism --- while propagandizing an egalitarian "equality" --- by demonizing various groups as oppressive historical classes. The early twentieth-century rejections of Einstein's physics as "bourgeois physics" by Marxists and "Jewish physics" by Nazis now find synthesis, with equally deadly assaults on race and reason, in Einstein being a member of historically elite classes of "dead white males".

Like virulent germinations of a bacterial irrationalism, an adapting and developing fascist Marxism both defies social-political antidotes and renders moot traditional distinctions between basic political perspectives:

Irrationalism permeates the approach of fascism... but, most importantly, irrationalism entails the rejection of the approach of the 19th century to social problems. This approach was fundamentally rationalist, whether Marxist or liberal democratic. It saw... problems that could be solved by... reason and science. In opposition... fascism and national socialism ... appeal to the emotions and hate as tools for manipulating man.³⁵

But it is perfectly clear that *ad hominem* attacks are shamelessly used by a current Left for manipulating academics and ordinary citizens. No pretense can be made to either science when it is politicized or rationality when it is viewed as an ethnic- or gender-dominated notion whereby power willfully shapes conceptions of reality, if not Nature and human nature themselves.

The central danger to open societies and to general global prospects for peace comes *ceteris paribus* from the influence of a radical Left. This observation is not a defense of a Right that has been criticized with equal severity. Fascism will remain a threat by way of threats of the Left as well as a quick solution for societal disarray. The threat might especially hold in societies having millennial religious traditions whose spirituality conflicts with a materialistic determinism, though religion would come to be politicized. Having noted the threat of the Right, the observation stems from the following considerations: (i) the Right's not pretending to be "science" in increasingly scientific societies; (ii) its not assimilating

35 Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, p. 116. For further foreboding of an irrational fascism but none of socialism or Marxism, see Renata Saleci's *The Spoils of Freedom* (NY: Routledge, 1995) as well as L. Birken's *Hitler as Philosophe*. Whereas Birken warns that "our current failure to provide a post-modern substitute for [fascist] nationalism invites the reassertion of... obsessions of nation and race" in his own summary in *GPC Book News* (May 1995) 1, Saleci cautions that the "rise of nationalist, racist, and anti-feminist ideologies is one of the most frightening repercussions of the collapse of socialism" in her summary in Routledge's *Feminist Philosophy* (Spring 1995) 42013.

Marxian notions as the Left has elements of fascist philosophy and ideology; (iii) fascist ideology's greater condemnation since WW II when the Soviet Union sat in judgment on fascist war crimes along with the allies; (iv) the other allied societies having an increasingly influential minority of activists, especially in America since the 1960s, sympathetic to various forms of a Marxian vision; and (v) the vision's increasing institutionalization in open societies that, in fostering race-gender controversies and ideological policy-making, influence international organizations and garner attention through worldwide news reports. Given the policies and reports, one can only wonder if it was partly out of embarrassment — not entirely out of timid foreign policy — that the Clinton Administration maintained that the strife between tribes in Bosnia and Rwanda was merely a civil war as opposed to a genocidal ethnic conflict begging for intervention. Is there not revealed an alarming level of politicized ethnicity when one must add that the wonder arises philosophically, and not from right-wing ideological antagonism to a given administration?

There can be little doubt that a current Left, in influential open societies, is infused with old elements of fascist-induced ethnic identifications as well as that it provides ideological aid and comfort to various groups behind pernicious worldwide events. There is danger in the former Soviet Union of the old ideological thinking, with KGB relatively intact, augmenting fascist anti-semitic demagogues as well as ethnic genocide rivaling communist-Nazi mass murders in places far apart in ethos and distance. Besides Rwanda where Hutus exterminated Tutsis and the former Yugoslavia where post-communist Serbian leaders defy war-crime trials with some current Russian support, there are the following with recent past and potential significance: a news report at the Hague, the Netherlands, on 25 August 1994 of Rwanda's 30,000 Batwan pygmies being hated by both Hutus and Tutsis as well as being targeted by death squads; Iraq's liquidation of Kurds, at times in the presence of Gulf War troops helpless to aid them; Cambodia's peasants fearful of a communist Khmer Rouge that still flourishes; the Middle East with a continuing terrorism formerly tied to communist-bloc countries; Kenya's Luo-Nandi tribal wars with random murders of tribal women and children; Burundi's largely unreported genocidal toll of possibly 400,000; parts of South America where liberation and Khmer Rouge-like (*Sandero-Luminoso*) terrorists fight injustice with countryside eviscerations having death-squad responses; and the Sudan where Arabs have exerted "superiority over black Africans" by enslaving over 7,000 in 1987 alone.³⁶ Certainly, Anglo-European societies play a blameworthy historical role. But the influence of ideology is evidenced by many Third-World leaders who, while often responsible for an incendiary tribular favoritism, blame *all* "evil" on a historical "devil" of racist colonialism.

In Western Europe and America thus far, ethnic and gender conflict has not gravitated to systematic murder, though increasing "hate crimes" warrant special legislation. Citizens may speak quaintly of the "war between the sexes" as if it were a coy battle between Spencer Tracy and Katharine Hepburn. Yet there is nagging concern over a battered-wife syndrome, its exploitation to justify murdering husbands, and a husband's much publicized sexual mutilation diagnosed as either an acute symptom of "male bashing" or a radical remedy for males bashing

36 For Sudanese slavery, see CSU professor Augustine Lado, himself a Sudanese refugee, and Betty Hinds, "Africans Remain Victims of Slavery," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 20 June 1993, 1-4C, and corroborating scholarly analysis in R.O. Collins' "The Nilotic Slave Trade: Past and Present," *Slavery & Abolition* 13 (1992) 140-61.

females. We are beyond the naive belief that major World Wars will end all wars. But many suppose now, with the end of the cold war, that new global conflict is merely tribal. This thinking plays into the hands of an ideological politics with significant explanatory origin in Kant's notion of human nature. Therefore, I suggest further critical analysis of it in view of a metaphysics of freedom and determinism. Maneuvered into ideologies that undermine morality and science in the name of "science", several points may be made about the ideologies that transpose Kantian "interpretation" into conflicting tribal "worldviews" or *Weltanschauungen*.

Theoretical considerations with practical import

First, the *Weltanschauungen* ignore what are actually complementary human agencies only by imposing unnatural political policies on citizens that result in their psycho-biological dysfunction, unhappiness, and lack of productivity; precisely the things, ironically, that lead to the inevitable collapse of closed societies. Scientists may no more deny that the free will of persons to fall is consistent with calculating their falling velocities than ethicists may deny that gravity causally determines the velocities of suicides whose behavior is evaluated morally. Certainly, assessments in Newtonian mechanics may disregard the free will of persons falling, where the fall, kinematically, is $mg = m d^2/s dt^2$. At the same time, forensic investigations of criminal science acknowledge free will since, with no intention of being facetious, cries of "No, no, no!" or "My problems are over!" evidence, respectively, unchosen homicide or freely-chosen suicide. Thus, free will is not merely relevant to morality but to the human sciences as well: **Viewing persons ideologically as mere causally determined phenomena, whether mechanically or dialectically, is as senseless as viewing phenomena to be merely subject to our free will. Accordingly, both metaphysical freedom and determinism, as ambiguous as they are, must be acknowledged by political theorists for the intelligibility of morality and science without which societies cannot be sustained.**

Second, political theories that rest on a metaphysics of determinism and freedom cannot simply be advanced. Though the metaphysics is a *necessary condition* for science and morality, it is *insufficient* for evaluating morally-relevant rights and responsibilities. For although they presuppose freedom, freedom does not presuppose or imply them; a point exploited by Nietzsche for turning Kant's revolutionary "interpreted knowledge" into a "*new found freedom*" to creatively reinterpret morality and, by his followers, to prescribe that revolutionaries make the "unscientific" scientific as well. When such revolutionaries prescribe whatever enhances the political power of ethnic groups, there can be no appeal to any unpoliticized morality for ameliorating conflict, much less genocidal "ethnic cleanings" that promise future revenge. **The difference between now and a pre-Nietzschean Marxism is that earlier conflicts had no globally-voiced ideology inflaming tribal identifications and incompatible worldviews in a euphemistic name of "diversity".**

Furthermore, the new "freedom" to shape human nature is equally at odds with science. Transpositions of Marxian "teleology" or a Nietzschean "*telos*" (desire) into scientific descriptions for evoking prescriptions, by a progressive dialectics or organismic desire for power, has no affinity with a traditional naturalism. The latter *rests* on scientific descriptions of our nature for arguing that our obvious morphological design, natural instincts, and capacities springing from them evoke natural desires for sexual relationships between males and females, their

bio³⁷logical offspring being bonded by families, and familial unities evolving into communities and nations that result in more than national institutions merely enhancing tribal dominance. **Traditionally, our institutions foster international moral, judicial, and scientific endeavors that, reflecting our natural capacities and desires, need not be forced by any national or international securitate parasitic upon a productivity it destroys.**

By contrast, prescribing now what had been called "unnatural" sexual behavior, at a foundational psycho-biological level, has led biologically to epidemics of virulent diseases and socially to disintegrating families with morally-relevant national consequences. Afro-American pulitzer-prize winning columnist William Raspberry reveals that his self-avowed liberalism is not blind ideology when he refers to empirical studies showing that politicized theories of sex and family are leading to "cultural suicide": "... a decrease in individual happiness - growing economic insecurity for women, increased isolation for men and sadness, rage and neglect for children".³⁷

In short, whereas traditional naturalism bases moral claims of how we evidently ought to fulfill our nature on how it is (*pace* a "naturalistic fallacy"), post-Kantian ideologies base how our nature is on a politicized "teleology" that shapes facts rather than acknowledges them.³⁸ A Nietzschean ideology makes no pretense to any scientific objectivity whatsoever and well-defended criticisms of scientific Marxism note that, unlike empirically tested theories, it allows no facts to count against it: the Marxian "auxiliary hypotheses were all cooked up after the event [falsely predicted] to protect Marxian theory from the facts. The Newtonian programme led to novel facts; the Marxian lagged behind the facts and has been running to catch up with them".³⁹ The upshot of my second point is: **If evaluating what persons ought to do begs for the idea of a morally-relevant nature, then political theories must subscribe to a relevant moral metaphysics as well as to a metaphysics of freedom and determinism.**

Third, the inability to strictly ascribe empirical truth to a given metaphysics, does not imply that it is not true. Hence, regarding also a modern moral metaphysics, deontologists typically presuppose that moral reasons have their status as *reasons* by virtue of our rational nature; Consequentialists that moral rules have a status of *utility* in virtue of producing happiness; and theologians, without inconsistency with consequentialism and deontology, that *God's moral laws* are written in our hearts. Though the assumptions are not empirically or logically true, it is difficult to see how they could be adopted perennially for effective moral evaluations unless they limitedly reflected a moral nature of persons.

The objection that the effectiveness stems from societal indoctrination is peculiar. The question would ensue of why the contumacious propaganda and

37 W. Raspberry, "Divorce Revolution is a Failure", *TCE* (1 Apr. 1995) G2.

38 For example, an Aristotelian naturalism posits *formal* causal descriptions that are conceptually connected to a *Form* of the world's substance *qua* *Nous* whose thinking produces morally-relevant motion (*Metaphysics* 1072a). With no circularity or "naturalistic fallacy" *prima facie*, descriptions permit prescriptions with an integrity of laws intact even in physics yield a historically generated sequence of nested domains whereby Newton's laws were indebted to Galileo's and they to Aristotle's. For such physical and metaphysical continuity, see Cornell physicists F. Rohrlich and L. Hardin, "Established Theories," *Philosophy of Science* 50 (1983) 603-17.

39 I. Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, Vol. I, Ed. J. Worrall and G. Currie (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 6.

"reeducation" of ideological communism, not to mention the Watsonian psychology of Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, failed in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. The knee-jerk response that such countries are not "genuinely" Marxist is irrelevant to their having systematically employed an "indoctrination" that pales any putative one of open societies in the West. Many "*Marxist Hitlers*", to use words applied to Rumania's Ceausescu and East Germany's Hener Hoxa, were charged by their own citizens with crimes against humanity in terms of the traditional morality denied ideologically. **This invites the idea that traditional moral theories, in a manner rivaling theories of the social sciences, might predict the probable fate of societies by virtue of a morally-relevant history or, in Aristotelian terms, an "experience of ages". Could well-established moral theories, in addressing a moral nature that complements a physical one, have been consulted not only for human-rights violations but predictions regarding the "great leaps forward" of closed societies now collapsed?**

Finally, this consideration leads to one about science. As it seems more than reasonable to ascribe limited truth to theories of physics by virtue of their systematic predictive success, since it could not be explained unless the theories reflect what physical reality is approximately like, it seems equally reasonable to ascribe limited truth to a causal principle since its truth is a necessary condition for the coherence of accepted theoretical truth. How could we coherently *affirm* the theoretical truth and *deny* the truth of a causal principle presupposed by the theories?⁴⁰ **While social-science theories have not been formalized, it would be some success in explicating and predicting human behavior that makes tenable a deterministic element of our nature. But besides the senselessness of exhaustively construing our nature in this manner, these sciences are unable to determine what persons *should do* apart from the assumption of a morally-relevant nature and moral theories applicable to it.**

Alas, a defense of traditional moral theories may seem clouded by Michael Polanyi, among others, since a "free and liberal society" is also "conservative... a subscription to a kind of orthodoxy" and, therefore, "manifestly imperfect, if not *immoral*".⁴¹ But in addition to an *immorality* of liberalism that may ensue by acknowledging only one side of human nature, there is a question of whether conservatism can be relegated to mere orthodoxy any more than liberalism. And a defense of objective scientific truth may be challenged by, among others, Thomas Kuhn who stresses *Weltanschauungen* that render scientific ---if not moral, truth--- relative to different historical paradigms. But besides his presumable wish to argue for his *own nonrelativist* position in an open society where Marxian-oriented feminists appeal to it, my analysis finds support in eminent philosophers of science: Kuhn's *Weltanschauungen* are "heir to the philosophical tradi-

40 See a forthcoming article by Robert Trundle, Jr., "St. Thomas' Second Way: A Defense by Modal Scientific Reasoning," *Logique et Analyse* 37 (1996) issue 145-146, where it is more than reasonable to accept the truth of a causal principle when there is acceptance of theoretical truth.

41 See M. Polanyi's *Meaning* (Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 214. I am indebted to Professor Terry Pence for directing my attention to Polanyi.

tion which includes *Nietzsche*... Accordingly, it conveniently can be viewed as a kind of *neo-Kantian pragmatic position*".⁴²

To conclude: Early twentieth-century fascist and communist, and then cold-war communist, societies resembled attempts to squeeze a size ten foot of human nature into a size five ideological shoe. That the shoe increasingly fits in Western societies is evidenced by mounting ideology-laden *ad hominem* attacks and ethnic conflicts. They politicize truth, corrupt universities that alone among institutions proclaim the pursuit of truth, erode political processes once models for communist societies seeking reform, and provide an ideological apologetics for global ethnic conflict. The first step in solving a problem is to acknowledge it. By acknowledging a common moral and physical human nature, the moral and physical sciences may determine what are political systems that fulfill our nature rather than our nature being irrationally determined by the systems.

Summary: Cold-War ideology: an apologetics for global ethnic conflict

*Kant had a notion of our determined and freely-choosing behavior which illuminates basic assumptions of contemporary ideologies. A myopic embracement of only one or the other behavior has been superseded by a new entanglement which renders moot ordinary political classifications. Fascism had typically affirmed the radical freedom of an *Uebermensch* (Superman) as well as a superior race and racism; Marxist communism a radical determinism as well as inevitable class warfare. But during the Cold War, especially since the 1960s, there arose in open societies a virulent assimilation of the two ideologies. Understood as a species of the "New Left", the ideology has effectively combined name-calling *ad hominem* attacks of "racism" with "elite white classes" to politicize dialogue and to suppress objective pursuits of truth as well as to foster ethnic identity and provide an unprecedented apologetics for global conflict.*

42 See Suppe's "Weltanschauungen Analyses", *Structure of Scientific Theories*, 126-27, fn. 258 (emphasis added), for the symposium's summary of Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend to whom feminists also appeal. For a feminist's appeal to both them and Frederick Engels' communist writing on the family, see Parsons' "Nietzsche and Moral Change", p. 183 and p. 185, fn. 12. For general feminist support of communist "ideals" in the former USSR, consider Michel Levin's well-documented *Feminism and Freedom*, (NJ: Transaction Books, Rutgers- The State University, 1987), p. 26. Levin notes: "To be sure, feminists are attracted primarily to the ideas that the Soviet state proclaim[ed]... rather than to the Soviet regime itself, but with that understood, a great many well-known feminists, including de Beauvoir, Millett, Firestone, Bleier, Mitchell, Chodorow, MacKinnon, Steinem, Sheila, Rowbotham, Margaret Benston, Angela Davis, Eli Zaretsky, Evelyn Reed, Barbara Ehrenreich, Vivian Howe, and Rayna Rapp identify themselves as socialists or Marxists of some sort".