This article brings together an analysis about international agreements, highlighting their importance to States, either separately or in groups, considering aspects of the universal nature of their content, as well as regional aspects, stressing some particularities of the Brazilian legal system. It is based on the assumption that it is interesting for nation-States to participate in the elaboration of international agreements, although it is not always possible to implement them, their validity is not refuted or their efficacy denied. It is also relevant to reflect upon the international commitments internally, even more so when we see that the State will have to deal with a series of variables to validate such international commitments. At times when States are interdependent, the study about the participation of the State in the elaboration of international agreements is more than relevant, and is divided here in three perspectives. First, the participation of the State in regional agreements, highlighting the European experience of integration. Then, the Latin-American attempts at integration, from which MERCOSUL stands out, and, finally, matters unique to Brazil in light of international and regional challenges. At the end of this study, some answers as to how and why Brazil incorporates and implements its international agreements will be presented as final considerations.

The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil provides two procedures for incorporating treaties into domestic law. Human rights treaties must be approved by a special quorum: it is necessary that of three-fifths of the members of each legislative house vote in favour, with two rounds in each chamber. This proceeding is similar to a constitutional amendment. Treaties on other subjects need only the approval of the majority. This system has been in place since 2004. The Brazilian Supreme Court decided that human rights treaties incorporated after 2004 have the same hierarchical level of constitutional provisions but human rights treaties enacted before that have the same hierarchical position of ordinary statutory laws. This system needs to be reformed in order to allow an easier integration with international law. All human rights treaties should have the same position as constitutional provisions.

This study aims to demonstrate that the legislative reform of Private International Law is one of the most complex subjects to be understood in terms of the Law in Brazil. With this objective, the point of reference of this study will be the controversy, which involves willingness as a connecting element, and is also known as the controversy around Article 9 of LINDB. By analyzing willingness as a connecting element within Brazilian legislation, a general panorama of the aforementioned Law is developed, as well as the debate of a doctrine nature about willingness as a connecting element and its insertion in the legal system in effect in Brazil. Finally, the difficulties encountered considering Brazil’s position towards international treaties and conventions, as well as the many attempts to reform Private International Law legislation will be analyzed.

This article examines the relationship between federalism and the legislature in Brazil. It examines distortions that occur in the structure of the federal legislature, in the powers conferred constitutionally and in the dynamics of legislative activity. It discusses how the role of the Senate as a house of representation of Member States has been mitigated, highlights the excessive concentration of legislative powers at the federal level and the suffocation of the autonomy of the state and municipal legislatures by the influx of the principle of symmetry.

The Constitutional Amendment 45/2004 emphasized the need for efficiency in both administrative and judicial judgments in Brazil and introduced the right of a trial within reasonable time (Art. 5, item LXXVIII) in the 1988 Federal Constitution. Although more judges are needed to comply with this constitutional requirement, no statutory regulation was enacted to date to conform to it, particularly to allow judges to delegate administrative and enforcement functions to civil servants. However, given that fundamental rights have immediate applicability, the principle of efficiency must be implemented regardless of further regulation. In Portugal, judges are not required to order executive acts, which are conferred to an enforcement agent. A similar system should be adopted in Brazil, leaving judges time for decision-making. An efficient judicial service is essential to strengthen the image of the Judiciary and depends on this type of reforms.