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Transitional Constitutional Unamendability?
Gepubliceerd op 01-05-2019
EJLR 2019/3
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Auteursinformatie

Gábor Halmai
Gábor Halmai is Professor and Chair of Comparative Constitutional Law, European University Institute, Florence; email: gabor.halmai@eui.eu.

Citaties in dit artikel

Diamond
Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation , 1999
Diamond
Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries , 1994
Loughlin, Walker
The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form , 2007
Czarnota, Krygier, Sadurski
Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism , 2005
Rosenvallon
Counter-Democracy: Politics in the Age of Distrust , 2008
Macedo
Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism , 1990
Levinson
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment , 1995
Roznai
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Power , 2017
Jacobsohn
Constitutional Identity , 2010
Rubensfeld
Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government , 2001
Eisgruber
Constitutional Self-Government , 2001

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Onderwerpen

Juridisch > Staatsrecht

Samenvatting

This article discusses the pros and cons for a suggestion to use unamendable provisions in transitional constitutions to protect the integrity and identity of constitutions drafted after a democratic transition. The presumption for such a suggestion could be that most democratic constitution-making processes are elite-driven exercises in countries with no or very little constitutional culture. The article tries to answer the question, whether in such situations unamendable constitutional provisions can help to entrench basic principles and values of constitutionalism with the help of constitutional courts reviewing amendments aimed at violating the core of constitutionalism. The article investigates the experiences of some backsliding constitutional democracies, especially Hungary, and raises the question, whether unamendable constitutional provision could have prevented the decline of constitutionalism.In order to discuss the issue of transitional unamendability, the article engages in the scholarly discussion on transitional constitutionalism in general, and deals with the relationship of constitutional law and constitutional culture. Another side topic of the article is whether such transitional unamendability provisions should also contain international or transnational values and principles, and what happens if those are not in conformity with the unamendable provisions that serve to build up a national constitutional identity. Again, the example of Hungary can be important here, how national constitutional identity protected by the Constitutional Court can serve to abandon the European constitutional whole.

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