The Origins of International Criminal Law: Its Connection to and Convergence with other Branches of International Law

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1. INTRODUCTION

International law in its infancy is deemed by many to have failed in providing protections to individuals before 1945. However, it did provide such protections more than a hundred years ago, when international protection for individuals and groups was found not only in international humanitarian law, but also in other branches of international law. Human rights protection was provided in areas as diverse as minorities, slavery and piracy. For instance, humanitarian intervention took place where human rights violations were occurring against minorities within other states during the 1800s. These issues are important, particularly for those who seek remedies for events that occurred before 1945, and want to rely on international law in their claims.

This article examines when international law, specifically as international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law came into being, and when the protections accorded by them against various types of conduct, became available. It is submitted that by the turn of the twentieth century many of these laws were already available and in force. While it is commonly held that international protections against human rights violations were activated in the post-World War II era, they actually were accessible much earlier. There were indeed measures protecting minorities, protecting people against slavery and the slave trade and protecting people against certain types of warfare long before the 1940s. In fact, international law originated long before the 1800s, with various authors noting that international law dates back to times before the Peace

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of Westphalia of 1648. International law certainly developed considerably in the nineteenth century in both the fields of humanitarian law as well as international human rights law. The article will also show how the international system of rights protection, even outside the rules of war, was not only present in the nineteenth century, but was developing rapidly. It will therefore be proposed that there was an international system of human rights to protect people, although there was no real mechanism to enforce or realise those protections. This is specifically explored through an examination of the origins of the crime of genocide.

Although it is generally accepted that genocide, as a species of crime, only came into being after World War II, it existed long before the actual term was born. It will be argued that genocide has been classified as a crime for hundreds of years and has had multiple names in other languages — and was, in fact, known albeit by other terminology. Although some believe the historical origins of genocide as a crime go back even further, it dates back to the nineteenth century at least. This article will explore the link between genocide and crimes against humanity as well as their origins in codified law since 1899. However, it will be argued that they are also found independently of these treaties within customary international law.

A specific focus of this article is the Martens Clause adopted into the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 by a unanimous vote. The Martens Clause constitutes an origin of international human rights law in the positivistic sense, and is considered applicable to the whole of international law, and has indeed shaped the development of customary international law. It will be shown that the Martens Clause is a specific and recognised provision giving protection to groups and individuals during both war and peace time. The Martens Clause allowed international law, particularly customary law, to continue to grow and develop progressively, and to deal with emergency situations and crises within the law (such as those arising from the current ‘war on terror’) without having to wait for slow and sometimes fiercely resisted developments within the flawed world of state practice and treaty law. In fact, the Martens Clause is seen as the origin of the international legal concept of ‘crimes against humanity.’

2. THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS FACETS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The idea of ‘war crimes’ has a long history. International humanitarian law would apply generally through the various treaties if a conflict had been deemed

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3 See C. Weeramantry, Universalising International Law 256 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
an international armed conflict. However, non international armed conflict is also covered in various ways, such as that which falls under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Customary international law is also important, beyond what is contained in those various instruments. While customary law often mirrors what is contained within the treaties, there are certain actions that are actionable in terms of customary law that might not be covered by treaty law.

One of the debates within international law is whether individuals are subject to, and can legitimately claim rights under international law. Until relatively recently, it was argued that individuals had no rights or could not bring any actions in international law, and that international law was accordingly no arena for individuals. Dugard, for example, has noted that international law is “a body of rules and principles which are binding upon states in their relations with one another.” Nevertheless, he concedes that although early international law was only concerned with states, this is no longer the case and now other actors fall within its purview. Certainly, there is a commonly held view that when it comes to insurgents and belligerents, international law was relevant a long time ago. The question is rather: If the laws of war were the only body of law that existed then, did they only apply to international armed conflict or also to internal armed conflict? The general consensus is that none of the humanitarian law treaties before the 1949 Geneva Conventions dealt with internal armed conflicts. This view was based on the idea that insurgents should only be entitled to the protection of law when in control of territory and when having sufficient support from the population, which would permit them to “exercise government-type functions.”

Another heavily debated question is whether civilians were protected by humanitarian law before the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Many contend that before then, a member of the armed forces of one state could not commit a war crime against a civilian of another state in the context of an armed conflict. In support of this view, it is argued that the 1907 Regulations did not even mention civilians at all. However, as Plattner notes, “[c] uriously enough, the governments of that time were so sure that it was impossible to intern nationals of a belligerent State who were resident in the territory of the adverse party that they refused to include any such prohibition within those Regulations.” Thus, civilians had not been mentioned because it was deemed unnecessary, as the protections already existed.

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7 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
Another reason why it has been argued that no protections for civilians existed by World War II, is that there was no dissension to a call for an instrument to protect civilians in periods of war. What is clear is that a body of law existed outside the treaty which included protection for individuals. While there were no specific protections spelled out in codified form, they can be found in the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg and the 1899 Hague Convention, these instruments manifestly embracing the idea that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.” In addition, as noted above, customary law to this effect existed as well as opinio juris, therefore the only question that can legitimately affect the provisions of these two instruments is whether the norms of the 1864 Geneva and the 1899 Hague Convention applied to non-international conflicts.

However, it must be remembered that there were various initiatives undertaken during 1864 and 1899 in order to codify international legal principles, including the Brussels Declaration of 1874 as well as the Oxford Manual drafted by the Oxford Institute for International law in 1880. Although the Brussels Declaration was never ratified it can be viewed as an important expression of opinio juris concerning the content of the rules of war.

Regarding permissible conduct during wartime, many argue that restrictions on types of warfare date back to the earliest of times and that these limitations were already found in ancient Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese and other societies, as well as in religious texts. Between 1581 and 1864, European governments signed about 294 treaties regarding wounded soldiers. An early non-war instrument was the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 16 April 1856. However, from 1864 at least, international law in its codified form made certain types of conduct illegal during wartime. This was when the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field entered into force. Crucially, in the Corfu Channel case of 1949, the

14 Declaration of St Petersburg of 1868 to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in Wartime, signed in St. Petersburg, 29 November-11 December 1868.
21 The first Geneva Convention was signed by Baden, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hesse, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Switzerland and Wurtemberg. By 1906 it was signed and
ICJ found that Albania’s obligation to notify others of the presence of mines was “based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No V111, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognised principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war”.22 This decision shows that the notion of humanity came not only from the Martens Clause, but also from customary law, which determines these principles to be equally applicable in times of peace. This has been confirmed by the ICTY, which in a Tadić ruling in 1995, held:

It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflicts. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international law.23

Interestingly, Dugard notes that at the time of the Anglo-Boer War, which took place in South Africa between 1899 and 1901, humanitarian law was in its infancy, but was nevertheless applicable.24 He further observes that both parties to the Anglo-Boer War were not parties to the 1864 Geneva Convention or the 1899 Hague Convention, with customary international law applying instead.25 Humanitarian treaties have only been between states and have often contained si omnes clauses providing that only states party to such a treaty would be governed by that treaty, in other words, the treaty only being applied between those states that had agreed to the treaty. Thus, obligations were based on reciprocity; for such an instrument to apply to a particular conflict, all parties within the conflict had to be state parties to that particular treaty.26 Others argue, however, that while international law itself was based on these notions, human rights and humanitarian law “have been said largely to escape from reciprocity because both essentially aim to protect the interests of individuals rather than states”.27 Furthermore, Eide has suggested that because the laws of war are international in origin and human rights law had emerged in the domestic context and was then internationalised, the reciprocal

22 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 1949 ICJ Reports 4, 22.
25 Id.
obligations of international humanitarian law does not apply to human rights law.\textsuperscript{28} International human rights law is rather about state obligations and does not rest on reciprocal duties. Nationality or national borders are not as relevant as in other branches of international law. A state owes obligations to individuals regardless of where they are. From the nineteenth century states recognised that individuals in other states had rights against their own sovereign and accepted an obligation, at times, to protect those individuals from the state they lived in. Thus, the reach of the \textit{si omnes} clauses in general should not be overstated, as after 1907 these clauses were commonly rejected in treaties.\textsuperscript{29} In addition, while \textit{si omnes} clauses went out of favour in treaties after 1907, this is deemed to have occurred even earlier in customary law. However, while \textit{si omnes} clauses were contained within many international treaties, certain commentators do not regard their provisions as applicable to human rights or humanitarian protections, and therefore do not see them as limiting the effect of the 1899 Hague Convention or other relevant treaties in terms of the protection they provide to those not party to these conventions. It is argued that human rights obligations contrarily guarantee individual rights and are not about the reciprocal relations between states.\textsuperscript{30}

Crucially, customary international law also applied to the events of the time and there was certainly the notion that civilians were protected, regardless of the type of conflict. In fact, in 1900, Baty stated:

\begin{quote}
[T]he standard in customary law falls somewhat short of the provisions of the Conventions, otherwise no Conventions would have been needed; though it is probably true to say that since the date of the earlier agreements, and to a certain extent in consequence of it, the general law has been sensibly instigated.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

Baty’s observation about the shortcomings of customary law came months after the drafting of the 1899 Convention, yet currently it is generally recognised that treaty law and customary law converge substantially and that customary law was more advanced, in certain respects. At the very least, as Shelton has stated, “it should be noted that both Hague Conventions declared or stated principles and rules that, in essence, represented then existing customary international law”.\textsuperscript{32}

While many suggest that civilians, as a category of protected ‘victims’ of armed conflict, were brought rather slowly into the ambit of modern international

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] T. Baty, International Law in South Africa 79 (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1900).
\end{footnotes}
humanitarian law\textsuperscript{33} and protecting civilians was generally kept off the agenda until the 1930s,\textsuperscript{34} the origins of their protection can be found right back in at least the nineteenth century.

However, the right of individuals to claim compensation for violations committed during wartime has been in existence for a long time. In 1796, for example, the United States Supreme Court found that private individuals had the right to compensation for acts that had occurred during war.\textsuperscript{35} The Court reasoned that rights were “fully acquired by private persons during the war, especially if derived from the laws of war against the enemy alone, and in that case the individual might have been entitled to compensation from the public (...).”\textsuperscript{36} In 1891, in the 6th edition of a treatise on international law, Theodore Woolsey stated that a right of redress and compensation for individuals that suffered injury existed.\textsuperscript{37} Woolsey also noted a “duty to humanity” and his commentary recognised that cruelty “beyond the sphere of humanity” violated certain rights and demanded redress.\textsuperscript{38}

The protection of the victims of war was the basis of the laws of Geneva and The Hague. While the Hague Conventions are primarily concerned with the way war is conducted and the methods of war, the distinctions between them and the laws of Geneva have become blurred, both having their origins in the protection of those involved in warfare and those considered victims from certain types of conduct.

The International Court of Justice has noted that these nineteenth century processes have developed and reflected the customary international law position, the \textit{Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons} of July 8, 1996 finding:

\begin{quote}
A large number of customary rules have been developed by the practice of States and are an integral part of the international law relevant to the question posed. The “laws and customs of war” as they were traditionally called were the subject of efforts at codification undertaken in The Hague (including the Conventions of 1899 and 1907), and were based partly upon the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 as well as the results of the Brussels Conference of 1874.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{33} H. McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law (2nd ed) 26 (Vermont, USA: Ashgate, 1998).
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ware v Hylton}, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The court reports Dall are named for court reporter Alexander J. Dallas.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.}, at 279. .
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{39} Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, 1996 ICJ Reports, para. 75.
3. WHICH CRIMES WERE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY?

It is clear that a whole range of crimes related to what could be done by warring
parties were already violations of international law in the nineteenth century. In
treaty law one finds many of these proscriptions from 1864, and one can argue
that some rules outlawing certain types of conduct during wartime were found
even earlier through the acceptance by states that certain types of conduct were
unacceptable. One of the earliest prohibitions was that no quarter was to be given,
its prohibition found in the United States of America’s Lieber Code. That in itself
does not mean that it was a universal or widely accepted set of principles, but the
fact that it was copied by many other countries, however, was very important
and thus is probably indicative of customary law at the time. That it was so widely
accepted is reflected in the fact that the prohibition was also included in the Land
Warfare Regulations annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention (Articles 4 - 20).
Now, while the 1899 Convention, which had been adopted unanimously
at the time, was replaced in 1907, its provisions were incorporated. And the 1907
Convention which it supplanted remains very much part of international law today
and is still often referred to. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 1483
called on States to observe their obligations under the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. A number of provisions in the
1899 Convention had proscribed certain types of actions and activities, Article
3 of the Regulations annexed to the Convention stating that the “armed forces of
the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants, where in
the case of capture by the enemy both have a right to be treated as prisoners of
war”; Article 4 stipulating that prisoners of war “are in the power of the hostile
Government, but not in that of the individuals or corps who captured them. They
must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings, except arms, horses,
and military papers remain their property”; Article 6 holding that while prisoners
of war could be made to work, the work could not be excessive and they had
to be paid for it and Article 7 noting that the “Government into whose hands
prisoners of war have fallen is bound to maintain them,” and that “[f]ailing a

40 Instruction for the Government of the United States in the Field by Order of the Secretary of
41 M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd rev ed) 64
International Review of the Red Cross 300, 310 (1996).
45 See further D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of
special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated as regards food, quarters, and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the Government which has captured them.”

It is clear that the conduct described in the various articles was already deemed to be criminal and proscribed by international agreement long before the treaties. The treaties were reflective of what customary law was, yet not entirely, as those treaties reflected the specific agreements that could be reached between states, and where there was no agreement the treaty remained silent on the point. This does not mean that international law was silent on these questions but simply that it could not be agreed as to how the specific issue or rule ought to be codified. Regardless of whether treaty law contained provisions on the issues, international customary law recognised these violations as transgressions of international law.

4. THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

It is often argued that international human rights law before the twentieth century did not appear as a distinct set of rules within the law of nations, and that it was not recognised as a branch of international law, although this is an extremely narrow view. International human rights law considerably predates World War II and it can be found in various non-war agreements before World War II.46 The clearest examples of international criminal law in the nineteenth century were the prohibitions against piracy and the slave trade47 and the international protection for minorities.48 There was an acceptance that piracy and the slave trade were prohibited and that punishment for such transgressions could and should, occur. It is also clear that civilians were brought under the protection available at an international law level in the law of armed conflict, but also outside it. Standards and norms had developed before the end of the nineteenth century outside of the law of armed conflict to protect individuals where a state was unwilling or unable to. Treaties were adopted on a range of issues and various specific steps were taken to actually provide such protection. It was not simply the rhetoric of states but the actual practice itself.

The argument that, given the absence of the recognition of individual rights, human rights did not exist in international law before World War I does not hold.49 There were protections available in international customary law as well as in state practice as far as both individuals and groups are concerned. Individuals were

already able to take steps to enforce these protections themselves and not obliged to rely on their own state to take such steps, or come to an agreement with a violator state for the individuals concerned.

One of the arguments commonly raised is that there was no enforcement mechanism to enable individuals to secure their rights in international law before the end of World War II. However, there were a few prosecutions at a domestic level of crimes deemed violations of both Conventions. This does not mean that international law on these issues did not exist, but rather that the prevalence of a strong philosophy of nation-state sovereignty meant that individual states were expected to deal with the crimes of their own nationals and those in their custody who had committed crimes against them. That there were no international prosecutions is due to the lack of an international mechanism for the enforcement against such crimes.

The supposed absence of international enforcement machinery does not negate the existence of the law itself. Before the establishment of the ICTR, the ICTY, and more recently the ICC, the rules of customary international law and the Hague Conventions had been recognised and applied in domestic courts. Thus, international law and more specifically international criminal law relying on the Hague Convention, was applied shortly after the early Hague Conventions had come into being. That the Hague Convention contained no enforcement mechanism was not even deemed a hindrance to prosecuting or punishing those found guilty of crimes under these bodies of law at the time.\footnote{G.I.A.D. Draper, \textit{The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of the Armed Conflicts}, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 191 (1971).}

The rights of individuals in international law and their right to claim compensation or reparation had however received recognition in 1907, when individuals were even given standing before the International Prize Court in terms of the Convention on an International Prize Court of October 18, 1907, where individuals were to be able to approach the court in relation to property. However, insufficient ratifications occurred and the treaty did not come into effect. In 1907, a Central American Court of Justice was also established by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The Court operated from 1908 to 1918 and permitted a range of actors, including individuals, to bring complaints against states other than their own country.\footnote{A. Randelzhofer, \textit{The Legal Position of the Individual under Present International Law}, in: A. Randelzhofer & C. Tomuschat, (eds.), \textit{State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparations in Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights} 231, 238-239 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1999).} This was no aberration in granting rights and providing procedures to individuals to claim reparations from states in international law.

Critically, while some doubt the connection between humanitarian law, human rights law and criminal law, it is clear that the humanitarian consideration that infused the law of war contains the ‘parentage’ of human rights law.\footnote{L. Doswald-Beck and S.Vite, \textit{International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law}, 293 International Review of the Red Cross 99 (1993).}
5. The Responsibility of States Under Specific Treaties to Uphold Human Rights

The argument that international human rights law did not exist in the nineteenth century rests on the notion that states by then had not accepted that they were under the obligation to protect individuals, and that the protection in place was not widely acknowledged. However, besides the protection that had already existed in customary law there had been a whole host of treaties which had already prohibited violations against individuals and groups at that time. It has been noted that a study of the historical sources of customary international law indicates that European states, from 1884 to 1915, already had duties to protect colonised peoples under rules of natural law, as well as under treaties such as the General Act of the Berlin Conference, the Anti-Slavery Conventions and the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land.53 There is also evidence that wars of annihilation were violations of international law as early as 1878.54

An important treaty was the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, which provided rights for indigenous peoples. The Treaty has been hailed as the “most important international body concerned with minority rights prior to 1919.”55 It was particularly important from a human rights standpoint, as it permitted states to intervene where there was non-compliance.56 The acceptance of minority rights at this time is also seen to have coincided with the evolving notion of sovereignty, which, while having been vested in the ruler, was shifting towards the people.57 Thus, the conceptualisation and belief in the notions of protection that international law was providing to groups and individuals at this time was on the rise.

A significant treaty was the Berlin Conference Treaty of 1885, where not only the rights of individuals and groups came to the fore, but protection was also being extended to those outside Europe. Various obligations flowed from the General Act, the most important provision with regard to local inhabitants being Article 6, which ran as follows:

Provisions Relative to the Protection of the Natives, of Missionaries and Travellers, as well as to Religious Liberty.

All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade. They shall, without

54 Id.
distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religions, scientific or charitable institutions, and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or with aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilisation.

Freedom of conscience and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than to subjects and to foreigners.

The 1885 Berlin Act therefore promised to “watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery.”58 The agreement contained in the Berlin Treaty was not the only one; the 1890 Anti-Slavery Convention, also known as the Brussels Act of 1890, also noted these concerns and committed 17 nations to “efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africa.”59 The fact that so many states at the time signed these treaties indicates that many states shared the conviction that slavery, as well as other human rights violations, were prohibited under international law.

Although indigenous groups were not signatories to these treaties, they were seen to have been protected by them. Anderson, for example, contends that the various Conventions conferred rights on groups because of the third-party beneficiary doctrine,60 arguing that the parties to these treaties intended to grant specific protections to the African populations. While Anderson does not deal with the questions of reciprocity or *si omnes* clauses (which determine that such treaties are only applicable to the state signatories), the understanding that human rights clauses would not be limited by such questions seems to be implicit. If that is the case, then the notion of a third-party beneficiary doctrine could certainly be relevant, if the notion of a third party beneficiary was known at the time. However, Anderson’s argument that the signatories of these treaties specifically intended to protect the local population and to provide a means for redress, is more relevant. She shows that the drafting process of the 1885 Convention clearly confirmed that the intention of the drafters was to create “a duty of protection under international law that *de facto* criminalizes the intentional annihilation of indigenous peoples of Africa.”61

6. THE ORIGINS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Although many argue that crimes against humanity entered international jurisprudence as a result of the Nuremberg Charter, its origins can be found much earlier. In fact the origins of such a crime, and it being a human rights violation, go back in treaty law at least until 1899, and if not further back in customary law. This is what Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued in 1945. While it could be said that he did this to justify the proscription of such events at the time, and so as not to fall foul of the general

58 General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 26 February 1885.
59 General Act of the Brussels Conference, 2 July 1890.
61 *Id.*
prohibition against retrospective penal legislation, it is clear that it was not his opinion alone. Arguing that the “crimes against humanity” were proscribed long before Nuremberg, Jackson noted that “atrocities and persecutions on racial or religious grounds” were already outlawed under general principles of domestic law of civilised states and that “[t]hese principles [had] been assimilated as a part of International Law since at least 1907.” According to Paust, Jackson relied on the Martens Clause for this assertion. The ICTR, too, has noted that “the concept of crimes against humanity had been recognised long before Nuremberg.”

The roots of crimes against humanity and the protection of individual rights in general have been traced to the teachings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and to the notion of natural law. Thus, it can be argued that the origins date back further than 1864 and 1899. In the Middle Ages, and certainly by the nineteenth century, international law was developing a doctrine of the legitimacy of “humanitarian intervention” in cases in which a State committed atrocities against its own subjects that “shocked the conscience of mankind.” Jorgensen notes that from the Enlightenment on, the principles protecting “humanity began to seep into the international system.” In the sixteenth century, it was stated:

[Taking prisoners] is permissible. This fact is evident by the jus gentium. No (authority) censures this practice, nor does any condemn the captor to make restitution, on the contrary, such captors may retain these men until the latter are ransomed. Secondly (…) it is no longer permissible to slay them, for they are captives; nor is slaughter needful to the attainment of victory.

This is not an isolated example — there is evidence aplenty of generally accepted and respected codes regarding the way war should be conducted and who could be attacked. The same is true for conduct outside what is considered ‘classical war’.

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64 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 565.
68 J.B. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law—Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations App. F, cxxiv (London: Humphrey Milford, 1934). Quoted in L.C. Green, Cicero and Clausewitz or Quincy Wright: The Interplay of Law and War, 9 United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 60 (1998/1999). Green cites many examples indicating the origins and situations in which these norms were stated and upheld.
Linked to this is the fact that the prosecution of those accused of international crimes has occurred for hundreds of years. One example is that of William Wallace, who was tried and convicted in 1305 by an English court for “crimes offending humanity” and “excesses in war, sparing neither age nor sex, monk or nun.”

However, the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 is generally regarded as the earliest known international trial for war crimes or crimes against humanity, Von Hagenbach being prosecuted before judges from various countries for having “trampled underfoot the laws of God and man.” Ögren sees the Articles of War decreed in 1621 by King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden as giving us “an idea of what existed in the way of humanitarian law before the publication of Grotius’ *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* in 1625 and appear to have been inspired by Gentili’s 1612 *De Jure Belli*.”

The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, also represents one of the origins of the international community’s censure for such persecution as well as the origins of international protections for minorities living in other countries. While these events can be seen to fall generally within the boundaries of humanitarian law, there is much which overlaps with human rights law, including specific protection for minority groups. As will be seen, crimes against humanity had already existed inside as well as outside of treaty law, the fact that it had already existed outside meaning it must be located in criminal and human rights law.

That international law already contained human rights as a component part in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be seen by the fact that various treaties had been entered into among European nations agreeing to the protection of the rights of various peoples, including the Treaty of Ausburg of 1555, the Treaty of Olivia of 1660, the Treaty of Nymegen in 1678, the Treaty of Ryswyck in 1697 and the Vienna Congress in 1815. Other similar agreements included the Treaty of Paris of 1856, creating obligations to the people of Walachia, Moldavia, and Serbia, and the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, which included a guarantee by Turkey to protect Armenians and defend religious liberties. The Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ceded Puerto Rico and the Philippines from Spain to the United States, also provided protection to minority groups.

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The nineteenth century saw the notion of the protection of humanity contained in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the Brussels Conference of 1874 subsequently adopting a protocol which repeated and expanded the principles of the Declaration.

Even before 1899, the expressions “crimes against humanity” or “laws of humanity” were used in various other contexts, for example in 1775, when in similar wording to the Martens Clause, the Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America, Now Meeting in General Congress at Philadelphia, Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms declared:

[A] reverence for our great Creator, principles of humanity, and the dictates of common sense, must convince all those who reflect upon the subject, that government was instituted to promote the welfare of mankind, and ought to be administered for the attainment of that end.74

Similar language was used in various other contexts in the United States, including in a number of court cases.75

The British Secretary of State, John Thosell, explaining the reasons for the intervention to protect Christians in the Ottoman Empire in 1860, noted: “It is hoped that the measures now taken may vindicate the rights of humanity.”76 In 1874, George Curtis likewise referred to the “the laws of humanity” with respect to slavery in the United States.77 When revolts against misrule and persecution in the Ottoman Empire in the late 1870s were met with killings, looting, rapes, burning, pillaging and torture, it was noted that these were the “most heinous crimes that had stained the history of the present century.”78 William Gladstone, the future British Prime Minister, condemned these actions and used the term “humanity.”79

At least some recognised and accepted crimes against humanity as crimes at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1901, the NGO the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme published its first document for “all humanity.”80

Thus, it is clear that there were accepted and state practised protections available in international law for groups and individuals, which were widespread rather than aberrations. The practices indicate that these protections were not a new phenomenon. Again with “crimes against humanity”, it seems that there

78 Lauren, supra note 76, at 66.
79 Id., at 75.
80 Id.
were prohibitions long before the twentieth century, and the language in use by states and others incorporated the usage of principles of humanity and accepted that what was done in violation of this principle was a transgression of the law.

7. THE MARTENS CLAUSE — CONNECTING WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

The legal origin of the concept of crimes against humanity in codified international law is the Martens Clause of the 1899 Hague Convention II and the 1907 Hague Convention IV. The fact that the Clause was unanimously adopted indicates the agreement of participating states on the matter. The Clause runs as follows:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.

The 1907 version of the Clause saw “populations” replaced by “inhabitants,” “law of nations” replaced by “international law,” and “requirements” changing to “dictates.”81 The “laws of humanity” referred to in earlier versions of the Martens Clause later became the “principles of humanity.”82 Some believe that these terms are not identical or interchangeable. However, De Guzman comments on the link between “laws of humanity” and ‘crimes against humanity,’83 and Ticehurst, among others, has noted that “principles of humanity” is synonymous with “laws of humanity.”84 Orentlicher, too has noted that the Clause is “the most important legal wellspring” of ‘crimes against humanity.’85 Cassese has argued that what the Martens Clause did was to ensure that the notion of laws of humanity was accepted in treaty law, noting that while international treaties and declarations had earlier proclaimed the role of such laws, the Martens Clause accepted that there were laws, principles or rules of customary international law in a specific treaty, that resulted not only from state practice, but also from laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.86 Thus, the Martens Clause

was not the origin of the principles of humanity but rather the specific acceptance by states in treaty form that these rules existed, and did so outside of treaty law. However, the role, meaning, and extent of the Martens Clause have been debated extensively, and it has been described as “ambiguous and evasive,” with various meanings having been ascribed to the Clause and its effects. Primarily due to the wording of the clause, many see the Martens Clause as the official originator in positive conventional or codified international law of the notion of “crimes against humanity.” Before 1899, issues of morality had not been translated into international legal rules in the positivist tradition. This seems to have changed subsequently, with Meron, for instance, stating that the humanising strand within the law of war is epitomised by the Martens Clause, with it having effect and relevance outside of the laws as well. The Clause was also about the international community’s acceptance in treaty form that humanity was protected in different ways from different types of conduct within both treaty law as well as customary law.

The specific link between the Martens Clause, the notion of “crimes against humanity,” and the development of human rights law is apparent from the events of World War I, the May 1915 declaration from Great Britain, France, and Russia about the occurrences in Armenia using the term “crimes against humanity”, and the joint declaration condemning the massacre of Armenians as “crimes against humanity and civilisation for which all members of the Turkish Government will be held responsible together with its agents implicated in the massacre.” The concept was also used by the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties for Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, which also classified the impugned events as criminal, the Commission finding that “in spite of the explicit regulations, of established customs, and of the clear dictates of humanity, Germany and her Allies have piled outrage upon outrage.” Thus, it used the Hague Conventions, the Martens Clause, as well as customary law, as the basis for concluding that prosecutions would be justified. It also saw that violations could be prosecuted as “crimes” within the concept of the “laws of humanity”. Hill, in 1917, noted that “even in the efforts to overcome an armed foe the principles of humanity are considered by all civilised peoples to have a binding authority.”

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87 Ticehurst, supra note 84, at 127.
91 Quoted in E. Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity; 23 (8) British Yearbook of International Law 178, 180 (1946).
The Versailles Treaty provided the prosecution of the Kaiser for these types of crimes, article 227 of the treaty providing the creation of a tribunal and establishing the individual responsibility of the Kaiser for “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” Thus, the provision was not for war crimes, but other international crimes, which the Versailles Treaty did not specify in name. This was due to the opposition of the United States and Japan to the criminalisation of this type of conduct, believing that crimes against the laws of humanity were only violations of moral law and not contained in positive law — and therefore could not be legally defined. This does not mean that such laws did not exist and does not detract from their recognition by these states. In fact, it is clear from the Versailles Treaty that such crimes could, in the eyes of the international community, be prosecuted, although there was no agreement from where they specifically flowed. The only reason for not prosecuting the Kaiser was that the Netherlands, where he was in exile, refused to hand him over.

At a minimum the term ‘crimes against humanity’ was in vogue in 1915 and was seen already then to emanate from the Martens Clause of 1899 and 1907. Hence, if the Martens Clause constituted the basis and was in force at the time, then the notion of these crimes in fact had become operative from 1899.94

The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres also indicates the acceptance of the notion of certain international crimes and the ability to prosecute those responsible for their commission. In Article 230, the Treaty provides the punishment of individuals who have committed crimes on Turkish territory against persons of Turkish citizenship (even if of Armenian or Greek origin). While the Treaty was not ratified, and thus did not enter into force, it was supplanted by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which implicitly recognised these crimes, providing amnesty for offences committed between 1914 and 1922 (which would have been superfluous had these crimes not had been committed). Since the date recognised was 1922, many years after the conclusion of World War I, it also recognised that crimes could be committed outside of war.

Nonetheless, different views are held on the role of the Martens Clause within international law. The ‘narrow’ view holds that it has merely “motivated and inspired” the development of international law.95 The broader view maintains that the Martens Clause ensures that no argument can be made that anything that is not mentioned specifically in the 1899 Convention, regardless of how problematic it was, could be carried out during a war. As Judge Weeramantry stated in his dissent in the ICJ’s Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case: “The Martens Clause clearly indicates that, behind such specific rules as had already been formulated, there lay a body of general principles sufficient to be applied to such situations as had not already been dealt with by a specific rule.”96 Cassese has

94 C.A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 1,16 (1989, Spring).
95 Cassese, supra note 86, at 187-216.
96 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (Weeramantry, J., dissenting), Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports, 41.
criticised this view, arguing that it is meaningless, giving no value to the Clause, because that principle had already existed when it was drafted and discounts the role of custom — therefore making the meaning of the Clause redundant.97

Another view to which some authors subscribe is that of the Clause as an interpretative tool. In their opinion, the Clause means that legal principles should be interpreted in the context of the principles of humanity and public conscience, whereas another comparable view suggests the value of the Clause lies in ensuring that humanitarian principles are taken into account when new rules of international law are considered, this being linked to the view that natural law ought to be considered more often as international law develops, because, as some have pointed out, the Martens Clause reflects the notion that humanitarian law is not only a “positive legal code (...) [but] also provide[s] a moral code,” which guarantees that it is not only the view of the large military nations that determine the growth of the law. Thus, the point of view of other states and individuals would be allowed to have an impact on the development of international law to a significantly higher degree.98 This affords the Clause a vital role in the development of international law and ascribes to it new sources of international law, a moral code — that of the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience — a view various authors have endorsed and which a number of cases have followed.99

The Martens Clause has been discussed in several decisions emanating from Nuremberg100 and the International Court of Justice. The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons mentions the Martens Clause a number of times in its decision,101 in one instance noting that “[i]n particular, the Court recalls that all States are bound by those rules in Additional Protocol I which, when adopted, were merely the expression of the pre-existing customary law, such as the Martens Clause, reaffirmed in the first article of Additional Protocol I.”102 Commenting on the case, Cassese argues that the “reference to the Clause is far from illuminating”, and that the Court does not give reasons for finding that the Martens Clause is part of customary law. Nonetheless he accepts by implication that this is the finding of the ICJ.103 He examines and rejects the notion that the Martens Clause only applies to international armed conflict and not to internal armed conflict, yet it may be argued that although this distinction was applicable at the beginning of the twentieth century, the current views do not necessarily reflect the historical position regarding the Martens Clause. Even in the dissenting opinion in Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons it was held that:

97 Cassese, supra note 86, at 192-193.
98 Ticehurst, supra note 84, at 130.
99 See the discussion in section X below.
100 See for example United States of America v. Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (The Krupp Trial), 10 Law Reports of the War Commission 69.
101 Paras. 78, 84, and 87.
102 Para. 84.
The Martens Clause provided authority for treating the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience as principles of international law, leaving the precise content of the standard implied by these principles of international law to be ascertained in the light of changing conditions, inclusive of changes in the means and methods of warfare and the outlook and tolerance levels of the international community. The principles would remain constant, but their practical effect would vary from time to time: they could justify a method of warfare in one age and prohibit it in another.104

The relevance and role of the Clause is also found in the decisions of human rights bodies, as well as in many treaties, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols and the Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. It also forms the basis, in paraphrased form, for Resolution XXIII of the Tehran Conference on Human Rights of 1968.105 In fact, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols additional thereto of 1977 reaffirmed the Martens Clause. In addition, the 1977 Diplomatic Conference that drafted Additional Protocol I emphasised the ongoing significance of the Martens Clause by shifting it from the preamble and making it a specific provision of the Protocol.106 It is also significant that the ICTY in its decision in the Kupreškić trial referred to the Martens Clause and held:

[it] enjoins, as a minimum, reference to those principles and dictates any time a rule of international humanitarian law is not sufficiently rigorous or precise: in those instances the scope and purport of the rule must be defined with reference to those principles and dictates.107 In the light of the way States and courts have implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.108

In the Martić case, the ICTY, in its ruling on procedural matters in 1996, found that “the prohibition against attacking the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, and the general principle limiting the means and methods of warfare also derive from the ‘Martens clause’.”109 The tribunal went on to state that “these norms also emanate from the elementary considerations of humanity which constitute the foundation of the entire body of international humanitarian law applicable to all armed conflicts.” Thus, the ICTY’s view was clearly that the Martens Clause constituted a source of law, and that protection for civilians had existed since at least 1899. Although it may be disputed, international practice

105 Meron, supra note 81, at 78.
106 Ticehurst, supra note 84, at 126.
108 Id. para. 527.
therefore seems to confirm that the Martens Clause is a part of customary international law and has been recognised as such for many years. The concept of crimes against humanity has also been acknowledged since at least 1899. Hence, even though the exact terms had not yet been used, the notions of crimes against humanity and genocide were recognised from the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Martens Clause has played and continues to play an important role. As Allen remarks, “[t]he crucial core of principles of civilian protection are often described as flowing directly from the principle of humanity.”110 One instance of the way the Clause is seen to influence international law was noted by the International Military Tribunal after World War II in the Krupp decision, the Court stated that the Martens Clause:

is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages established among civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provisions of the Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare.111

Thus, certain activities had already been regarded as objectionable to humanity, and crimes against humanity had emerged out of what were deemed unacceptable types of conduct during wartime. The issue here was whether this conduct was also unacceptable in the absence of war, which seems somewhat contradictory; it does not seem logical to argue that certain types of conduct were not accepted during war but were permitted during times of peace. If anything, one would expect there to be greater scope for harmful activities during wartime than during times of peace. In fact, in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ ruled that certain principles existing in the Hague Conventions were also to be found in the general principles regarding humanity. The Court found that these were “based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No VIII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war.”112 Thus, while it is clear that the laws of war provided protection of various classes of persons, not everyone was covered by those provisions. However, it is clear it had already been accepted that for those not covered by those principles during wartime or times of peace, customary law already provided some measure of protection. This was recognised by the ICJ,113 crimes against humanity beginning as an extension of war crimes, according to Bassiouni. He thus recognises that these types of violations were initially seen as part of the law of war, but then became part of international law in general, through the Martens Clause and customary international law.114

112 *Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania)*, 1949 ICJ Reports 4, 22.
113 *Id.*
114 M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd rev ed) 48
notes that the Nuremberg Charter’s crime against humanity articles come from the preambles to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and, thus, the Martens Clause is critical. It is, however, possible to argue legitimately that the origins of these crimes predate these conventions in the context of customary law. There is, therefore, a clear link between crimes committed during wartime and crimes against humanity committed in peacetime.

Crimes against humanity seem to have been recognised as such even before the 1899 Convention. In his treatise on international law in 1891, Woolsey included the duty of humanity. The treatise argued that individuals, “suffering nations or parts of nations may also call for its exercise,” and that:

The awakened sentiment of humanity in modern times is manifested in a variety of ways, as by efforts to suppress the slave trade, by greater care for captives, by protection of the inhabitants of a country from invading armies, by the facility of removing into a new country, by the greater security of strangers. Formerly, the individual was treated as a part of the nation on whom its wrongs might be wreaked. Now this spirit of war against private individuals is passing away. In general any decided want of humanity arouses the indignation even of third parties, excites remonstrances, and may call for interposition. (…) But cruelty may also reach beyond the sphere of humanity; it may violate right, and justify self-protection and demand for redress.115

President Theodore Roosevelt in his 1904 State of the Union Address asserted:

[T]here are occasional crimes committed on a vast scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavour at the least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it (…).116

In the same year, the United States reacted against the practice of crimes against humanity and genocide when the American Secretary of State complained to Romania – “in the name of humanity” – about Jewish persecutions that were happening there, arguing that the US government “would not be a tacit party to such international wrongs.” 117 Thus, the concept of crimes against humanity had clearly formed part of the international vocabulary, even before World War I.118 The activity that is currently regarded as genocide was specifically determined to be a crime in a report by an international commission of inquiry about atrocities committed against national minorities during the Balkan wars.119

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119 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan
identifies these acts as violations, and Schabas points out that the section of the report entitled “Extermination, Emigration, Assimilation” indicates these acts would be categorised as genocide or crimes against humanity today.

The aforementioned 1915 declaration by the governments of France, Britain and Russia, condemning the Armenian atrocities as “crimes against humanity and civilization,”120 shows that these powers recognised that international crimes were being committed, and that the individuals involved would be held accountable. As a result, some postulate that this declaration brought about the appearance of the category of “crimes against humanity” as separate from “war crimes”, Bassiouni stating that this declaration was “responsible for the origin of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ as the label for a category of international crimes.”121

Despite the controversy regarding the interpretation of the Martens Clause and its relevance for international law, it is indisputable that the 1899 Convention took important steps in humanising the laws of war and extending the Geneva Convention of 1864, showing that the participating states were in agreement that further protection was needed during wartime.122 As a result it has often been argued that “crimes against humanity,”123 unlike genocide, “must take place during an armed conflict in order to constitute prosecutable acts.”124 That certainly seems to have been the case in the past.

8. DEFINING GENOCIDE

It is usually argued that genocide as a crime did not exist until the adoption of the Genocide Convention by the United Nations in 1948. It is also argued that the word itself was only coined in the early 1940s, and as a result genocide as a concept has no relevance with regard to human rights violations perpetrated before World War II. However, it will be shown that the notion of genocide is a very old concept and that it has been a crime for a long time. It will also be indicated that while the word may be new, the concept has been known in various languages for more than two hundred years, and it’s possible it can even be traced back to biblical times. It will also be indicated that genocide is closely connected to crimes against humanity, and flows from the origin of this concept in both international criminal law as well as international human rights law.

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The definition of genocide is an intensely contested terrain, possibly with the exception of its legal content. In a range of disciplines, authors have arrived at countless definitions of what genocide is or ought to be. As a result, “[t]he term and its underlying concepts have been subject to a bewildering array of misrepresentations and distortions, both unintentional and deliberate.” What is indisputable is that war is not a precondition for genocide to be perpetrated. The legal definition of genocide can be found in international customary law, the Genocide Convention and the Statute of the two international criminal tribunals (ICTR, ICTY), as well as in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute). While the legal definition of genocide is settled in treaty law, its definition in customary law is not, many regarding the treaty definitions as insufficient and in need of amendment due to the concept of genocide in the Genocide Convention being overly narrow (although expanded by the ICTR and ICTY statutes). The legal definition is considered to be too limited because political groups are excluded and therefore remain outside the ambit of the Convention. The limited scope with regard to the groups that are included within the Genocide Convention has even been criticised by the ICTR, who, in examining the Tutsi group, found that they did not constitute a racial or ethnic group separate from the Hutu, hence the ICTR argued that the definition of the term “group” includes “permanent and stable groups.” This view has been criticised by, among others, William Schabas, who argues unconvincingly that it would amount to a watering down and overuse of the term genocide, thus leading to a trivialisation of the horror of actual genocide. As a result of the above criticisms, numerous other definitions from a range of diverse scholars have been offered to overcome the perceived problems and limitations of the legal definition.

130 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998.
131 Id., at para. 701.
9. GENOCIDE AS A SPECIES OF CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

Crimes against humanity and genocide are part of the same “species” of crime. Genocide has been viewed as part of crimes against humanity, and a number of scholars have pointed out that it shares a source with crimes against humanity. Greenawalt observes that those who have analysed these questions have often viewed genocide as a special type of crime against humanity, and not as an entirely separate crime. Fenrick notes that genocide is the “supreme crime against humanity”, others similarly describing it as the gravest form of crime against humanity, Lippman, for instance, calling genocide “an aggravated crime against humanity,” and according to Stoett “mass murder and/or genocide are, of course, the principal and most outrageous crimes against humanity .( . . . ).” Schabas also cites a whole host of authorities supporting the overlap between these crimes and Theodor Meron, one of the most respected international criminal law academics and a member of the ICTY, has similarly written that “crimes against humanity overlap to a considerable extent with the crime of genocide.” Indeed, he notes that “the latter can be regarded as a species and particular progeny of the broader genus of crimes against humanity.”

Likewise the ICTR noted in the Kayishema case:

The crime of genocide is a type of crime against humanity. Genocide, however, is different from other crimes against humanity. The essential difference is that genocide requires the aforementioned specific intent to exterminate a protected group (in whole or in part) while crimes against humanity require the civilian population to be targeted as part of a widespread or systematic attack. There are instances where the discriminatory grounds coincide and overlap.

In the Tadić decision the ICTY found that “genocide [is] itself a specific form of crime against humanity.” In the Sikirica decision, the ICTY noted that

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141 Id.
142 Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para. 89.
“Genocide is a crime against humanity, and it is easy to confuse it with other crimes against humanity, notably, persecution.” Thus, the ICTY clearly states that genocide is a crime against humanity, but also indicates that there is an affinity between genocide and persecution. Persecution is also a type of crime against humanity and can in fact amount to genocide (as shown in the Kupreškić citation above).

Schabas notes that “for fifty years, crimes against humanity and genocide co-existed in parallel” and that “[m]ost authorities have treated genocide as a sub-category of crimes against humanity.” This can also be seen in various decisions of the international ad hoc tribunals, although Schabas points out that recent cases emerging from the tribunals have “tended to insist upon the distinctions rather than the affinities between the two categories.”

Frulli notes that the “crime of genocide belongs to the class of crimes against humanity but may now also be considered as a separate crime.” Thus, she seems to argue that they have derived from the same origin, but due to developments over the last few years and their codifications in various instruments, they are now different crimes. Green, by contrast, has argued that the distinctions between genocide, “grave breaches” and war crimes ought to be abolished as they are all “but examples of the more generically termed ‘crimes against humanity.’” Thus, while distinctions between the crimes are made today, the international tribunals have recognised that in some cases they are interconnected and that they have the same roots, deriving from prohibitions about the ways in which to engage in war. It is, and will be, difficult to determine which specific act constitutes one of these crimes. The ICTR noted the close relationship and transposable nature of crimes against humanity and genocide. In the Kayishema case, for example, it made the following observation:

Indeed, the terms extermination and destroy are interchangeable in the context of these two crimes [genocide and crimes against humanity]. Thus, the element could be the same, given the right factual circumstances (...). In some factual scenarios where the victims are members of the civilian population only, the element would be the same.

144 Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen and Dragan Kolundzija, Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, Case No. IT-95-8, 3 September 2001, para. 58.
10. GENOCIDE: A NEW TERM FOR AN OLD CRIME OR A NEW CONCEPT?

Genocide is not a new concept or new crime. Jean-Paul Sartre noted that “the fact of genocide is as old as humanity.”150 Yet, importantly, it not just “the fact” of it having occurred for ages; it has also been recognised as a crime for centuries. Some arguments from Greek and Roman times still resonate today, namely that a universal law of nature exists by which individuals have to abide. The origins of specific international law here criminalising the persecution of individuals because of their ethnic, national, racial or religious origins certainly date back at least 350 years.151

While the word genocide is relatively new, the concept is not, neither is the fact that the conduct constitutes a crime. As the United Nations 1985 Whitaker report on genocide noted, the word “is a comparatively recent neologism for an old crime.” 5152 Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term, stated: “Deliberately wiping out whole peoples is not utterly new in the world. It is only new in the civilized world as we have come to think of it.”153 Roger Smith agrees that the phenomenon is ancient, but disagrees that it was always a crime. He states that “[a] recent study of genocide begins with the statement ‘The word is new, the crime ancient.’ This should read ‘The word is new, the phenomenon ancient.’”154 According to Smith, it is only in the last few centuries that genocide has produced a sense of “moral horror.”155 He continues to argue that there has certainly been an implicit admission of the criminality of the conduct in the twentieth century, because not one state engaged in such conduct has admitted to it.156 Thus, even though Smith


156 Id.
Jeremy Sarkin

disagrees about how long ago genocide became a crime, his acknowledgment that it evoked “moral horror” over the last few centuries suggests that he recognises it as a crime within customary international law.

Many have argued that genocide only became a crime when Raphael Lemkin defined it in the 1940s. However, genocide was recognised as a crime long before Lemkin, the conduct proscribed by custom from the Middle Ages and Lemkin merely giving it a name. He coined the term “genocide” because he regarded the term “mass murder” (in use at the time) as insufficient. Lemkin felt the latter expression failed to account for the motive for the crime of genocide, which arose solely from racial, national, or religious considerations, and had nothing to do with the conduct of war. He believed that the crime of genocide required a separate definition, as this was “not only a crime against the rules of war, but a crime against humanity itself,” affecting not just the individual or nation in question, but humanity as a whole. Even he recognised that the atrocities constituting genocide that had been committed until then were indeed crimes, and a genus and part of crimes against humanity. Thus, Lemkin had coined a new name for something that had been subsumed under the general mantle of “crimes against humanity” for many years. In fact, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg in Article 6(c) described crimes against humanity as:

[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Thus, the notion of genocide had already existed in codified form at the time of the Nuremberg trials, and was seen to have been part of crimes against humanity. In this regard, Nagan and Rodin have noted that “the Charter of Nuremberg defined crimes against humanity as covering many of the circumstances that today would fall under the legal label of genocide.”

Some Nazis, such as Hermann Goering, were convicted at Nuremberg for conduct aimed at exterminating Jewish people, which amounted to genocide.


160 Id., at 24-44.


162 Although the convictions were not based on findings of genocide, various indictments used the term. See W. A. Schabas, *National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the “Crime of Crimes”*, 1(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice Fn 2 (2003, April).

163 See further E. Davidson, *The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-Two Defendants*
The judgment in the *Justice* Case described genocide as “the prime illustration of a crime against humanity.”164 Schabas notes that while genocide was not charged at Nuremberg, since it was not enumerated in the Charter, it was dealt with indirectly as a crime against humanity.165 In fact, at the time Winston Churchill called it “a crime without a name,”166 recognising that although it was not specifically identified, it was indeed a crime.167 At a domestic level some individuals were prosecuted and convicted for genocide even before the Genocide Convention came into force, Poland convicting Amon Goeth, Rudolf Hoess and Arthur Greiser for genocide under Polish law,168 specifically using the term genocide.169

However, the question is whether there could be genocide if the word itself was only coined by Raphael Lemkin170 in 1943 and was only legally defined by the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.171 Howard-Hassman and others have argued that there were no international legal rules prohibiting genocide and ethnic cleansing in “the early modern capitalist world”.172 It is maintained by at least some that, at a time when even in Europe very few people enjoyed human rights protections, there was little concern about what had happened in the colonies. While this is true to some extent, the question arises of what is meant by the “early modern capitalist world,” and whether the indifference of Europe towards the colonies meant that international law did not apply to the colonies. In fact, by the 1860s, the laws of war had been formulated within international law, and human rights issues from 1899 were incorporated into international law through the Martens Clause and in customary law through the acceptance by many states that such protections were available. Therefore, not only is the contention that international law solely

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164 *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, IV* (Washington, DC, 1949), II, 773, 797.


applied to humanitarian law erroneous, it also represents a myopic view of treaty law and does not account for customary law, which was also well developed at the time.

There is additional evidence that genocide as a term existed before Lemkin defined the concept. In this regard, the debate about the origin of the word itself is problematic; the term genocide itself is certainly new, but the concept was well known in a multitude of languages. In English, there was the term “murder of a nation” that had been used since 1918; in French, the term *populicide* or the killing of a population was coined by Gracchus Babeuf in 1795, describing the massacre of 117,000 farmers in the Vendée region during the French Revolution; in German, the term *Völkermord* was used from 1831 to describe the killing of a people; in Polish, the term *ludobójstwo* means killing of a people; in Armenian, *tseghaspanutium* means to kill a race; in Greek, *genoktonia* is an ancient term, denoting the killing or death of a nation. The word is even known in indigenous languages; and in the South African Zulu language the word *izwekufa* means “death of the nation”, a word known in the 1830s when there was huge turmoil in the region and hundreds of thousands fled because of the violence caused by Zulu leader Shaka. The word *izwekufa* comes from two words ‘izwe’ (nation, people, polity) and ‘ukufa’ (death, dying, to die). The term is thus identical to ‘genocide’ in both meaning and etymology.

The word genocide comes from the Greek word *genos*, connoting race, tribe or species, and the Latin suffix *cide*, meaning killing. Although the term ‘Holocaust’, which was used to describe the killing of Jewish people during the Nazi era, could have been used to denote the same notions that are incorporated into the concept of genocide, this would have been highly contentious. However, the word Holocaust stems from the Latin term *Holocaustrum*, used in biblical times to refer to the killing of Jew, hence the word genocide is a new term but not a new concept or a new crime. The word itself only emerged in the 1940s because the widespread mass killings by states required new terminology to describe these occurrences. Thus while the term is new, it is a new name for something that was very well known before, except not by that specific name.

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179 F.G. Dufour, Toward a Socio-Historical Theory of Persecution and an Analytical Concept of Genocide, Occasional Paper No. 67 2 (Toronto: York University Centre for German & European Studies, 2001, October).
180 R. Gellately and B. Kiernan, *The Study of Mass Murder and Genocide* in: R. Gellately and
As to the question of whether genocide was proscribed before the 1940s, it must be noted that genocide was subsumed within the notion of crimes against humanity, and within the protections available for civilians from the 1860s. The ICTR recognises that the crime of genocide was inherent in the laws defining war crimes and crimes against humanity but had not been given a specific name before the 1940s.

There is ample evidence that in the nineteenth century at least the killing of peoples for their cultural makeup or religious preference was legally prohibited. Despite this, some still debate whether this applies only in the context of war, arguing that the prohibitions exist in laws governing the act of war and apply to those peoples outside the sovereign realm of a nation, or those actively joining in a rebellion. However, it is clear that genocide and crimes against humanity were accepted by the time of the Armenian genocide. That these types of activities had been prohibited was clear from the statements of many states that reacted with outrage to those events in 1915 and at other times.\textsuperscript{181} These types of acts had probably been outlawed even earlier, however, if one examines the position of many states on what was occurring in the world in the nineteenth century.

11. GENOCIDE BEFORE THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Many debate the application of genocide to crimes before the 1940s, on the basis that there was no international law barring such conduct before the Genocide Convention of 1948. However, it is clear that the crime and its proscription in international human rights law and international criminal law can be found much further back. While it is true that the Genocide Convention had proscribed such conduct in that form in a treaty from 1948, it is clear that there was acceptance of its criminality before it came to be a violation of international law. Certainly, the laws of war made certain types of conduct illegal and it was known that individuals could be held accountable for these types of violations.

In 1946, before the Genocide Convention was even drafted\textsuperscript{182} (or acceded to by any states), genocide had already been recognised as an international crime. This is clear from the text of the 1946 General Assembly resolution discussing the topic, which stated:

\begin{quote}
The General Assembly therefore: Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilised world condemns (…).\textsuperscript{183}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{181} These included Great Britain, France, and Russia. J. Shamsey, Comment: 80 Years Too Late: The International Criminal Court and the 20th Century’s First Genocide, 11 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 327, 369 (2002, Spring).


\textsuperscript{183} General Assembly Resolution 96 (I), (U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1) (1946). See further P.C. Jessup,
That the origins of the proscriptions against genocide predate the Convention can be seen in the preamble of the Genocide Convention. The preamble states that “at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity.” Thus, in 1948, it was recognised that genocide was already a crime and had been a crime for a long time. During the drafting process of the Convention, many delegates from various states agreed that the Convention was merely codifying genocide and not drafting a treaty that proscribed it for the first time. Thus, the delegate from Saudi Arabia described genocide as “an international crime against humanity.”

By 1946, it had already been accepted that genocide was a crime and was seen by some to be linked to crimes against humanity. The 1948 Convention did not “create” the crime, but merely codified and clarified this type of criminal conduct. According to Freeman, it was only with the adoption of the Genocide Convention that the crime had become dissociated with “its original military context.” In other words, genocide before the Convention had been linked to the issue of war, and its separation from the laws of war had only occurred from 1948. However, genocide and crimes against humanity were recognised, and there had been protection against such conduct outside the context of armed conflict from at least 1899, if not before (see supra).

Genocide as a crime pre-1948 is corroborated in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, which states that “[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in times of peace or in war, is a crime under international law (...).” The word “confirm” indicates that genocide was deemed to be a pre-existing crime, and putting it into the treaty merely formalised its prohibition. This was accepted by the many states that have ratified the Convention, and the fact that this was the case has also been recognised by the ICJ in the Reservations to the Convention on the Protection and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case in 1951. The ICJ held that genocide was a crime beyond the Convention, and noted “the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.” In fact, as genocide was a crime in customary law, it could be argued that the Convention has valid retrospective effect, because it simply restated that genocide was even a crime before the Convention, and it could therefore be applied to any events predating its coming into force.

However, the Convention does not need to have retrospective effect for genocide to be actionable before the Convention. Genocide exists in customary law and therefore the Convention does not have to apply to issues that had occurred before the Convention came into effect. Retroactivity in itself is not unknown in

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184 W. A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the “Crime of Crimes”, 1(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003, April), at note 73.


either international or national law; whereas, generally speaking, it is frowned upon and seen to be in violation of the rights of an accused, in certain cases there are accepted exceptions to this position. In human rights law, retroactivity is seen to be less of a problem with regard to international crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide. This is the case as it is argued that these are not new laws and therefore they are not being retroactively applied and in any case there are means to examine matters before a statute came into force, or before a state ratified a treaty. While there has been no international court ruling on this matter, this position is widely accepted; courts in Australia\(^\text{187}\) and Canada\(^\text{188}\) have found that the prosecutions of such cases, even before legislation on these crimes had been adopted, are not retrospective as they were crimes in international law even before a new law had been adopted.\(^\text{189}\)

While retroactivity is seen to have been controversially used in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, which established the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the counter view of its use then was that no new crimes were enacted but the Charter merely codified existing international customary law. Notably, retroactivity is contained today in modern international treaties, including the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity of 1968 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. While it could be argued that *nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege praevia* (no crime without law, no penalty without previous law) is a basis for non-retroactivity and a reason for not pursuing events that had occurred before the treaty came into force, this norm is not always applicable. For example, while this norm is contained in Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is limited in its operation by Article 15(2), which states:

> Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.

In other words, if a crime was criminal in customary law, it is not limited by the retrospective nature of the operation of the treaty. The same limitation on the operation of *nullum crimen* is contained in Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that retrospective application of the criminal law is not prohibited if the event which is the basis of the prosecution was a crime in national or international law.\(^\text{190}\) As regards the question of retroactivity and the Genocide Convention, it has been noted that:


The language of the Genocide Convention neither excludes nor requires its retroactive application. In other words — there is nothing in the language of the Convention that would prohibit its retroactive application. By contrast, there are numerous international treaties that specifically state that they will not apply retroactively.\footnote{A. De Zayas, Memorandum on the Genocide Against the Armenians 1915–1923 and the Application of the 1948 Genocide Convention, in: European Armenian Federation for Justice & Democracy (EAFJD) (ed.), at: <http://www.groong.com/dezayas-memorandum.html>.
ICTJ Legal Analysis on Applicability of UN Convention on Genocides prior to January 12, 1951.
Report of the ad hoc working group of experts established under Resolution 2(XXIII) and 2(XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights, (Doc.E/CN.4/984/Add.18).

It is precisely because some statutes stipulate that they are not retrospective that this possibility might not be excluded for others.

As noted above, it may not even be necessary to apply the Convention retrospectively. The travaux préparatoires of the Convention has numerous references to genocide as a crime before the Convention. In this respect it has been noted that many delegates argued that genocide was not a new crime during the drafting process.\footnote{ICTJ Legal Analysis on Applicability of UN Convention on Genocides prior to January 12, 1951.} Lyn Berat has written that “genocide always constituted an international crime.”\footnote{L. Berat, Genocide: The Namibian Case Against Germany, 5 Pace International Law Review 165, 207(1993).} In 1955 Professor Hersch Lauterpacht stated in his treatise that “[i]t is clear that as a matter of law the Genocide Convention cannot impair the effectiveness of existing international obligations.”\footnote{H. Lauterpacht, in: H. Oppenheim, International Law: A treatise, Vol. 1: Peace (8th ed) 751 (New York: David Mackay, 1955).} In other words, genocide already existed outside the Genocide Convention, a view that has been supported by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which, in 1969, stated as follows: “It is therefore taken for granted that as a codification of existing international law the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide did neither extend nor restrain the notion of genocide, but that it only defined it more precisely.”\footnote{Report of the ad hoc working group of experts established under Resolution 2(XXIII) and 2(XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights, (Doc.E/CN.4/984/Add.18).} This should not be taken to imply that the Genocide Convention itself in its treaty form applies retrospectively – it probably does not – it simply codifies what was in existence before 1948. But genocide as a prohibited legal act had existed before 1948, even though there was no Convention. According to Steinmetz, it “remains to be seen whether courts and publics find the U.N. genocide convention to be retroactively applicable to various events (…).”\footnote{G. Steinmetz, From “Native Policy” to Exterminationism: German Southwest Africa, 1904 in Comparative Perspective, Theory and Research in Comparative Social Analysis, Paper 30, 1, 4–5 (Los Angeles: Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2005). At: <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=uclascoc> Last visited 20 March 2006.} However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.197

Though the Vienna Convention did not enter into force until 1980, it is accepted that its provisions mostly delineate what customary international law was and is, and that, unless the notion of genocide as a punishable crime before the entry into force of the Convention is read into it by a court, it will not apply retrospectively. Before the Vienna Convention came into force, the ICJ noted in the *Ambatielos* case:

To accept [the Greek Government’s] theory would mean giving retroactive effect to Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926, whereas Article 32 of this Treaty states that the Treaty, which must mean all the provisions of the Treaty, shall come into force immediately upon ratification. Such a conclusion might have been rebutted if there had been any special clause or any special object necessitating retroactive interpretation. There is no such clause or object in the present case. It is therefore impossible to hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to have been in force earlier.198

However, while the Convention itself may not be retroactive in its effect, this does not mean that prohibitions of genocide did not apply before the Convention — they did, as the principles predate the Convention. As was found in the ICJ decision, the “principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognised by civilised nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation”.199 While the ICJ decision is mostly read as viewing the Convention as a codification of customary norms, Schabas argues this not to be the case.200 His point is that the Court does not say that the entire Genocide Convention codifies customary norms, but that the prohibition of genocide is a norm of customary law, also admitting that the Convention indicates that genocide was a crime before the Convention was drafted or even before the General Assembly Resolution of 1946. Thus, it is clear that genocide was a crime before then, and the Convention recorded and clarified international opinion on it at that time.

However, the ICTR has gone further on this point and stated in its Akayesu decision that the “Genocide Convention is undeniably considered part of customary international law.”201 This was also the view of the United Nations’ Secretary-General in his 1993 Report on the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.202

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198 Ambatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom) Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 July 1952. Cited in ICTJ Legal Analysis on Applicability of UN Convention on Genocides prior to January 12, 1951.
201 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 495.
202 Secretary-General’s Report pursuant to para. 2 of Resolution 808 (1993) of the Security Council,
This is important as the United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity\textsuperscript{203} plainly and consciously pronounces its retroactive application, Article 1 stipulating: “No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, \textit{irrespective of the date of their commission} (…) the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention (…).” Thus, as has been shown, genocide was considered a crime before the Convention and can therefore even now form the basis of prosecution for events that were legally deemed to have been genocide in customary law when committed.

One of the real effects of the drafting of the Convention is that from the late 1940s crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide were defined in distinctive ways because of the various instruments that had been drafted.\textsuperscript{204} This is not to say that there was or remains any degree of overlap between some of these crimes in the sense that a person could be guilty of one or more of these different crimes for the same act.\textsuperscript{205} There was overlap, and thus the roots of both must be found at least in the nineteenth century. De Guzman, for example, accepts that the foundations of crimes against humanity are found in the laws of war.\textsuperscript{206} As a necessary extension of this the same is true of genocide.

\textsuperscript{203} Adopted November 26, 1968, and entered in force on November 11, 1970.
\textsuperscript{204} The Whitaker report notes:

\begin{quote}
In the wake of the Nazi atrocities, the Genocide Convention provided a permanent definition for part of the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ contained in the Nuremberg principles, which themselves were an extension of international criminal jurisdiction regarding war crimes. The convention, which sought to codify a fundamental principle of civilization, in addition extended liability for such crimes to times of peace and not only to wartime.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{205} It is for this reason that scholars are interested in the re-characterisation process in terms of which the same facts are characterised under different crimes or the same facts give rise to cumulative charges. As was noted by Judge Robinson at the ICTY in the \textit{Tadić} decision:

\begin{quote}
It is a fair comment that the Tribunal’s approach to cumulative charging is relatively flexible and liberal. Trial Chambers have on several occasions dismissed preliminary objections to the form of an indictment on the ground of cumulative charging by holding that such objections would only be relevant at the sentencing stage. One way of dealing with this issue is by imposing concurrent sentences; another way is to impose the same sentence for two crimes when they are constituted by the same acts. The Tribunal, in the future, may yet have to confront at a preliminary stage, more squarely than it has in the past, the issue of cumulative charges.
\end{quote}


12. CONCLUSION

Many scholars argue that international law had not provided protection against human rights violations to individuals until World War II. However, this narrow view fails to take into account the protections provided by both customary international law and treaty law in the many years prior to the war, numerous situations indicating there was widespread international practice on a range of fronts before World War II, and in fact by the nineteenth century, which provided human rights protection. These were no exceptions, as has been stated by some, but rather a much wider and developed system of international human rights protection that existed within customary international law. The post-World War II era simply codified and defined the acts that had been occurring, and specifically proscribed them in written form.

International law in general can be traced back to ancient times and at least as far back as the nineteenth century, and international law norms based on humanity and dignity have guided the treatment of individuals during times of war and times of peace. In the nineteenth century, states began entering into countless treaties prohibiting crimes against humanity inflicted upon minority groups.

The prohibition of genocide provides an example of a customary law norm in place for centuries but not codified or defined until the middle of the 20th century. While the term did not exist until the World War II era, the act is ancient and has been proscribed for hundreds of years. Though not codified until the Genocide Convention, the act of genocide was long recognised and is a violation of international law even if it was committed prior to the Genocide Convention.