This paper discusses a framework for governmental projects to enhance industrial capabilities through the lessons learned from the Japanese contractual practice of H3 launch vehicle, comparing with the NASA’s Commercial Orbit Transportation Service (COTS). In 1995, the research and development (R&D) of the H-IIA was started by a former body of JAXA, and each manufacturer was responsible for delivery as required. After twelve-times launches, the operation was privatized to Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Ltd. (MHI). Concerning H3, MHI was selected as a R&D contractor and a launch provider. MHI established the H3 rocket system specification and responsible for delivering the first vehicle to JAXA in 2020, and JAXA is responsible for the total system including its launch base and the H3 flight demonstration. Such a framework gives MHI more creative freedom, but there can be a room for further clarification of the responsibilities. Coincidentally, such a framework between public and private entities is similar to that of the European new flagship launch vehicle, Ariane 6.
Meanwhile in NASA’s COTS, partners are responsible for all of the development and operation but they are not required to deliver their vehicles to NASA, contrary to H3. It allows clear role allocation and companies’ maximum creativity. A series of contracts of the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) after COTS is also remarkable to promote private investment, for example, around half of the total R&D cost is borne by private sectors. Also, cost accounting method does not seem to be applied for the price setting.
The framework like H-2A is still necessary for high-risk R&D conducted by governmental agencies. It will be, however, necessary for projects, which aims at enhancing industrial capabilities through transferring the operations to the private sectors and encouraging innovation, to be taken different measures in relation to selection of prime contractor, delivery and payment in the development phase and to procurement of launch services in the operating phase.

The three “global commons (GC)” Antarctica, outer space and the high seas/deep seabed, which do not fall under the sovereignty of States (“State-free”), have become a symbol of peaceful cooperation and coordination of the international community. The international treaties which have already been negotiated from the 1950s show an astonishing degree of foresight concerning common public interest. Today, however, each of the three spaces is at risk in at least one of the following areas: peace and arms control, sustainability of use, and just and fair distribution of resources and benefits. This has gone so far that States have begun questioning the concept of nonappropriation. Could this potentially lead to conflicts – even armed conflicts? A new approach to the preservation and fair management of the GC is therefore necessary and requires appropriate political and diplomatic action. This paper intends to tackle the three GC together in order to identify steps for further developing their governance and to investigate, whether joint diplomatic initiatives for the three GC could be more effective than isolated efforts to deal with single hotspots. It will be argued that the future of the GC lies in the establishment of comparable moratoria, thresholds, fees and codes of conduct drawing from best practices in one or more of the three GC.

Currently, the space industry is witnessing a commercialisation wave which, at least in parts, can be considered as disruptive. New technology and market trends associated to this commercialisation wave are circumscribed by the term NewSpace. Along with the NewSpace trend, there is a wave of investment in commercial space activities. Favourable framework conditions supporting commercialisation are key factors for investment decisions and the commercial success of companies along the entire value chain.
Laws and regulations concerning commercial space activities are established in many countries, but they are currently reviewed and amended in the light of technology and market trends. Certain new services and applications are not yet addressed under national laws, or there is no consensus on their treatment at international level. Overall, there are significant uncertainties and/or evolutions regarding the legal framework in which space companies are operating. Companies along the value chain require different types of governmental approvals, including licenses under national space legislation, licenses under national telecommunications or media law, frequency assignments, market access authorizations, or export/import licenses. Delays in authorisation procedures and/or the denial/revocation of governmental approvals may have serious impacts on investments in space ventures.
So far, investment treaties have not been extensively employed by the space industry for ensuring favourable political and legal conditions supporting their activities. However, the wave of commercial space companies and activities around the globe raises questions on the potential future role of public investment law.

From ESA’s Moon Village to Elon Musk’s Martian cities, there is increasing talk of establishing permanent human settlements or outposts in outer space. November 2018 will mark 18 years of continuous human presence in space via the International Space Station (ISS). However, these new proposals are different for several reasons. They are intended to have a permanence never envisioned for the ISS, they are intended to be ‘home’ to more than professional astronauts and fewer than a handful of space tourists, and they will be located on the Moon and other celestial bodies. The ISS is treated by the existing space law regime as a space object, or an assembly of separate space objects, regarded as functionally no different from any other space object. However, whether this approach could be taken for facilities on the Moon and other celestial bodies is the proposed focus of this paper. None of the space law treaties provide a precise definition of the term ‘space object’, however the generally accepted understanding is that “space objects may be defined as artificial man made objects that are brought into space and are designed for use in outer space.” That is not to lament the lack of a specific definition, as it would most likely be disadvantageous to have been lumbered with the 1967 conception of ‘space object’. The nonspecificity of the treaties allow scope for development and adaptation to deal with the uses now proposed. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty potentially provides aid in this quest as it indicates that ‘objects constructed on a celestial body’ fall within the scope of ‘space object’. Therefore, it is most likely possible to construct a regime providing a legal basis for governance of space settlements and outposts utilizing the existing ‘space object’ concept. However, there will still be potential issue around the nonappropriation principle codified in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Which this paper will also explore. This is a topic which is vital for the maintenance of the existing space law regime and is of growing relevance as more proposals for permanent human presence are made.

This paper presents an overview of recent developments in Poland from a regulatory and institutional point of view, as well as at a programme level. Though Poles played an active part in setting out the foundations of the international space law, largely through the pioneer of space law – Polish Professor Manfred Lachs – for many years the Polish space industry barely existed, consisting only of the activities of a few engineers brave enough to set up start-ups and cooperate with big international players. The situation changed in 2012, when Poland joined ESA as a full member. Joining ESA and opening up the space industry to small players can be perceived as a significant trigger for the boost of Polish space projects. The first results came quickly. The number of Polish companies active in the sector is growing rapidly, already reaching 300 companies, forming a consistent, consolidated group of large, medium and small enterprises. Over the last five years, the attitude of the government has also been changing.
Concerning regulatory challenges, Poland has still not adopted comprehensive space legislation, though in July 2017, a draft law on space activity was published by the government. The legal concept adopted in the national space law, especially about risk management, may influence the development of the whole national space activity, which still suffers from insufficient capital to bear the high level of risk related to ultra-hazardous activity such as space activity. The recent tendencies covering small sats, New Space, suborbital flight and space mining are also the subject of pending legislative discussions.

This article deals the issues concerning the hosted payload under international space law. To understand the hosted payload projects, the types of the contracts for such projects are discussed, but the harmonization between the risk allocation of the parties concerned and liability issues for damage caused by the hosted payload is mainly studied.
The hosted payload satellite is said to be the one that the main owner of the satellite spares some space on it for the other party. The details of the projects can be agreed between the parties depending on the projects. Such details are mostly confidential, but the author tries to show the types of collaboration by using the actual examples.
As the hosted payload satellite has more than two parties that have interests in the satellite, it is very important to agree in advance how to allocate the risks between the parties. On this, especially for the projects between the non-governmental entities, the indemnification against the damage of the third parties caused by such satellite should be included. Notwithstanding such allocation, since the damage from the space activities may become enormous and the financial ability of the non-governmental entities may be limited, the State should be the final bearer of the liability against victims as international space law has in mind.
Under international space law, the launching State is liable for the damage caused by space activities. The definition of the launching State under international space law could be found in the Liability Convention or the Registration Convention. When the hosted payload project is driven by the non-governmental entities, the identification of the launching State becomes difficult; such definition involves States, and makes it difficult to determine the launching State for activities of the non-governmental entities. As international space law has focused on the protection of the victims, the relief of the victims of the hosted payload projects should be dealt accordingly. In this respect, it would be ideal that the owner or the operator of the hosted payload (or the State which such owner or operator belongs to) should be regarded as the launching State. Through the discussion at UNCOPUOS or the changes found in the State liability under general international law, the possibility to include such party as the launching State is to be examined.

Registration is the sole basis for “jurisdiction and control” in outer space (Art. VIII OST) and also constitutes the basis for responsibility over a space object. It is therefore evident that ambiguities regarding registration are crucial for the safety of space operations. The discussion about registration has been escalating lately as space is becoming increasingly accessible with the diversification of space subjects. Simultaneously the practice of States indicates reduced diligence in registering their space objects. Initially, the present paper briefly recapitulates the different registries and processes based on the general rule that a launching State shall register a space object set by Art. II of the 1976 Registration Convention. It then turns to current challenges concerning the registration procedure as well as its consequences. Firstly, the term “launching State” is scrutinized, aiming to address several cases of private launches where registration was omitted. Subsequently, the challenges posed by the transfer of ownership of in-orbit space objects are discussed. In this context, it is examined whether there is a rule of international law allowing for the transfer of registration where the registering State has no effective control over an object. Secondly, the paper analyses the notion of “launching State” in light of joint launching and launchings realized by international organizations. It further attempts to answer the relevant question of registration of mega-constellations. The paper concludes by reviewing the possibility of the desirable harmonization and standardization of the registration regime under the Registration Convention, the UNGA Resolution 62/101 and the newly added Guideline 6 of the Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities in light of the aforementioned developments.