In dit artikel wordt langs wijsgerige weg de verhouding tussen tijd, identiteit en het verlenen van (sterkere) verblijfsaanspraken aan migranten onderzocht en verhelderd door een nieuwe betekenis van de term worteling voor te stellen. Want wat is worteling nu eigenlijk? Het is de relatie tussen menselijke tijd, worteling en het migratierecht die in dit artikel filosofisch wordt uitgediept. Dit om te verklaren waarom we in het migratierecht vreemdelingen in het algemeen na verloop van tijd sterkere aanspraken verlenen. In dit artikel wordt betoogd dat het verblijf van vreemdelingen op het grondgebied ervoor zorgt dat hun leven aldaar na verloop van tijd een vanzelfsprekend onderdeel uitmaakt van hun identiteit, en van het leven van anderen. Het is dit vanzelfsprekend worden van mensen door de tijd dat de grond is voor het bestaan van formele tijdscriteria voor insluiting in het migratierecht.

Following conflict, considerable effort is often dedicated to legislative reform. This effort includes not only domestic actors but also international actors frequently acting with the aim of establishing the rule of law. This article seeks, first, to provide some context for legislative reform in post-conflict settings and outline some of the criticisms that have been made. Drawing on the work of legislative experts, the article then identifies some of the simple questions that those involved in legislative reform ask and discusses some of the key challenges in answering them. The article suggests that establishing the rule of law is more than putting laws ‘on the books’ and that the way in which legislation is created may itself contribute to developing the rule of law. It suggests that as the rule-of-law community develops new approaches, it might find it useful to draw on the approach of legislative experts and their concern with how effective legislation is created.

This article examines the practice and limits of judicial law reform. In particular, I consider the question of when initiation of a reform is appropriate for the judiciary as opposed to the legislature, an issue which has been a matter of controversy amongst the Justices of the United Kingdom Supreme Court. This question is assessed in the light of the institutional and constitutional competences of the courts, particularly with respect to the structure of common law reasoning. It is also argued that it is important to have regard to perspectives of the relevant judges, in understanding the individual and collective approaches to the judicial development of the law.

The Australian law reform arrangements comprise a ‘crowded field’ of law reformers. These include permanent, semi-permanent and ad hoc commissions, committees and inquiries charged with examining and recommending reform of Commonwealth/federal and state laws. These are supplemented by citizen-led deliberative forums on law reform. The author’s experience in her roles as a commissioner and deputy president of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and also as counsel assigned to advise the Joint Standing Committee on Migration in the Australian Federal Parliament highlighted facets of Australian law reform – the particular role of a law commission working in a federal system and the co-option of legal expertise to scrutinize law reforms proposed within the parliamentary committee system.

The ‘Commission Supérieure de Codification (‘High Commission on Codification’) is a body that was created with the aim of providing support for the process of codifying the texts of positive law. Analysis of both its place in France’s institutional architecture and its working methods highlights certain particularities in the body’s functioning and raises questions as to its degree of proximity to the Law Commissions.

This article sets out the centrality of government to the initiation of law reform in respect of the (England and Wales) Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (and by extension, those law reform agencies based on the British model), and then considers in the light of recent experience how the existing approach works in the unique context of a single jurisdiction – England and Wales – which now has two governments – the UK Government for England, and the devolved Welsh Government. Having identified shortcomings, the article makes suggestions for improved institutional arrangements to meet the particular law reform needs of Wales.

If a religious organisation relies on an exception to the principle of equal treatment to draft rules that differ according to the religion of the employees, this must be subject to judicial review and will be acceptable only if the religion or belief constitutes a genuine and legitimate occupational requirement, justified by the ethos of the organisation concerned and the application of the exception is proportionate. If there are contrary provisions in national law, these must be disapplied.

A worker cannot automatically lose the right to annual leave because s/he did not apply for it. The employer must have informed the employee about the opportunity to take leave adequately and in a timely way, and must be able to prove this has been done.

According to German law, every employee is entitled to paid annual leave. The amount of pay is generally calculated based on the current salary (known as the “principle of loss of pay”) but a reduction of working hours during the year does not lead to a reduction of entitlement to holiday pay for previously acquired holiday entitlements. If the entitlement was already acquired before the reduction of working time (which can happen because in Germany holiday entitlement is acquired at the beginning of the calendar year), pay during leave will be based on the salary agreed between the employer and employee when the holiday entitlement was acquired and thus, based on the ‘old’ salary.

The Czech Supreme Court has ruled that the concept of good moral conduct must be taken into account when assessing whether an employee has breached his or her non-compete obligation and thus whether it is fair to demand that the employee pay a contractual penalty for the breach. The Court annulled the penalty.

A ‘false’ works agreement, which reduces the standard weekly working hours for permanent staff, also applies to leased employees. However, the pay of leased employees remains governed by the applicable collective bargaining agreement, rather than by the ‘false’ works agreement. Therefore, leased (part-time) employees benefitted from the reduced working hours by the ‘false’ works agreement, but received full pay based on the collective bargaining agreement.