This study investigates how protest attitudes and ideological considerations affected the 2019 election results in Belgium, and particularly the vote for the radical right-wing populist party Vlaams Belang (VB) and for the radical left-wing populist party Partij van de Arbeid-Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB). Our results confirm that both protest attitudes and ideological considerations play a role to distinguish radical populist voters from mainstream party voters in general. However, when opposed to their second-best choice, we show that particularly protest attitudes matter. Moreover, in comparing radical right- and left-wing populist voters, the article disentangles the respective weight of these drivers on the two ends of the political spectrum. Being able to portray itself as an alternative to mainstream can give these parties an edge among a certain category of voters, albeit this position is also difficult to hold in the long run.

Even though many municipalities use a variety of means to improve turnout in local elections, citizen participation in local elections is a point of concern in many Western countries, including the Netherlands. Our research question is therefore: How effective are municipal efforts to improve turnout in (Dutch) local elections? To this end, we collected data from three sources: (1) a survey sent to the municipal clerks of 389 Dutch municipalities to learn what they do to improve turnout; (2) data from Statistics Netherlands on municipalities’ socio-demographic characteristics; and (3) data on the turnout in local elections from the Dutch Electoral Council database. Using hierarchical multiple regression analysis, we found that the direct impact of local governments’ efforts to improve turnout is low. Nevertheless, some measures seem to be able to make a difference. The relative number of polling stations was especially found to impact turnout.

Lijphart (1999) argued that citizens tend to be more satisfied with democracy in consensual democracies than in majoritarian democracies and that the gap in democratic satisfaction between the winners and the losers of elections is smaller under consensualism. Twenty years on since then, this article takes stock of the literature on consensualism and political support. We find considerable ambiguity in the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence provided in this literature. Finally, we speculate on possible reasons for this ambiguity.

Sinds de invoering van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in 1838 heeft men herhaaldelijk getracht de gronden voor echtscheiding te verruimen. Hoewel deze gronden uiteindelijk pas verruimd werden in 1971, werd de tot die tijd bestaande situatie, waarbij echtscheiding slechts op vier gronden mogelijk was en echtscheiding met wederzijds goedvinden verboden was, als onwenselijk beschouwd. Dit gevoelen werd nog sterker na het arrest van de Hoge Raad uit 1883, de zogenaamde 'Groote Leugen'. Teneinde een einde te maken aan deze 'Groote Leugen' en in een poging het Nederlandse echtscheidingsrecht meer in lijn te brengen met het Duitse recht, heeft de Nederlandse secretaris-generaal voor Justitie, J.J. Schrieke, tussen 1942 en 1944 twee wijzigingsvoorstellen voorgelegd aan de Duitse autoriteiten welke destijds Nederland bezet hielden. Dit artikel analyseert beide wijzigingsvoorstellen en probeert een antwoord te geven op de vraag in hoeverre deze voorstellen het resultaat waren van een mogelijke invloed van het Nationaal Socialisme.
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Since the introduction of the Civil Code in 1838 one has repeatedly tried to extend the grounds for divorce. Although the grounds for divorce were not extended before 1971, the then existing situation, with only four grounds for divorce and a prohibition of divorce with mutual consent, was considered undesirable This sentiment became even stronger after the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of 1883, which became known as the 'Big Lie'. In order to stop this 'Big Lie' and in an attempt to bring Dutch divorce law more in line with German divorce law, the Dutch secretary-general of Justice, J.J. Schrieke, has presented the German authorities, which then occupied the Netherlands, with two draft revisions between 1942 and 1944. This article analyses both drafts and tries to answer the question to what extent these drafts were the result of a possible influence of National Socialism. This article is a summary of a part of the most important conclusions of the dissertation of the author, titled: 'National Socialist Family Law. The influence of National Socialism on marriage and divorce law in Germany and the Netherlands' defended at Maastricht University on 8 November 2012. A commercial edition of the dissertation is forthcoming.

This article explores the themes of injustice and dehumanization in Aeschylus’ Oresteia and Yael Farber’s Molora, in which the story of the Oresteia is dramatized against the backdrop of post-apartheid South Africa. It is argued that both plays depict wrongdoers and victims alike as social outcasts. Thus, they can both be described with Paul Ricoeur as ‘sketches of a man,’ not being able to live up to their full human potential. Borrowing from Ricoeur’s legal philosophy, it is then explained how public trials and hearings help them to reintegrate into society, in which they can regain their full humanity.

This article studies the extent to which Dutch political parties fulfil their electoral mandates. The central question is how collective mandate fulfilment has developed over the last sixty years. Increasing electoral volatility, changes in party organizations and the rise of populist parties could have resulted in a decrease of party mandate fulfilment. Contrary to previous studies, this article studies the mandate in terms of congruence between the electoral and parliamentary party competition. This allows for the study of opposition parties’ mandate fulfilment. Election manifestos and parliamentary debates are studied for six elections and the subsequent parliaments (between 1950-2006). The structure of the party competition is rather congruent before and after elections for all of the cases, except 1972-1977. There is no evidence for a decline of the degree to which parties collectively fulfil their electoral mandates.

Electoral behavior has changed considerably over the last few decades. The Netherlands are exemplary of how the cleavage structure has waned and how this has led to a weakening of the bonds between parties and voters and to higher levels of electoral volatility. Christian democratic and social democratic parties are most affected by these changes, because of their strong roots in the cleavage structure. The alterations in electoral behavior are generally assumed to be evolving gradually through a process of generational replacement. Composition effects on the one hand and a weakening of the impact of socio-structural factors, partly caused by cognitive mobilization on the other hand are considered to be the mechanisms behind this generational change. This paper tests these assumptions with regard to the Netherlands on the basis of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys, 1971-2010. The findings indicate that while some variation between different birth cohorts is visible, most of the differences in voting for both of these parties, however, are situated at the level of election years. Furthermore, with regard to what drives change over time, the analyses indicate that while composition effects and changes in the effects of socio-structural variables are of some importance, cognitive mobilization is not causing the change observed.

If the impact of party leaders on the electoral fate of their parties may be called first order personalization, this paper addresses second order personalization: a preference for an individual candidate having to do with that person embedded in a prior choice for the candidate’s party. Using survey data and election results with respect to intraparty preference voting in The Netherlands, this study explores the characteristics of both voters casting a vote for a candidate other than the party leader and candidates receiving preference votes. Given the increase in intraparty preference voting, second order personalization has increased considerably in recent decades. Moreover, the correlates of second order personalization differ from those identified for first order personalization: intraparty preference votes are cast more often by higher educated, politically interested and efficacious female voters. Intraparty preference voting also seems to be a form of expressive rather than instrumental electoral behaviour: female candidates, and to a lesser extent ethnic candidates, receive more preference votes, but such votes are cast predominantly for the highest placed female (or ethnic) candidate on the list – candidates who would be elected on the basis of their position on the party list anyway.

Using literature, documents and parliamentary debates in Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, nine arguments for and against lowering the voting age to sixteen are distinguished and critically assessed. The assessment is based on criteria such as logical consistency and empirical validity. It is argued that most arguments can hardly be defended with these criteria. However, this does not mean that the case for lowering the voting age is weak. This would only be the case if a voting age of eighteen is considered as valuable in its own right.

Political parties normally compete in elections individually. Yet, sometimes they join forces and form pre-electoral alliances. This rather unusual strategy contains both costs and benefits. In this article we try to identify those costs and benefits by opening up the black box of internal party decision making in considering pre-electoral alliance formation. We start by assuming that parties of different electoral sizes could have different motives to face the voter as one electoral list. Through in-depth interviews at the local level in Flanders, we have studied pre-electoral alliance formation for the municipal elections in 2006. We find that the arguments of large parties mainly focus on becoming the leading formation and thus claiming the initiative in coalition formation. Small parties have more varied motives for forming or failing to form a pre-electoral alliance.

Jerker Spits, book review of Marc de Wilde, Verwantschap in extremen. Politieke theologie bij Walter Benjamin en Carl Schmitt

Bertjan Wolthuis’ book review of Luuk van Middelaar, De passage naar Europa. Geschiedenis van een begin

This article draws on Hans Kelsen’s theory of democracy to argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the democratic legitimacy of either the European Union (EU) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The legitimacy problems from which the EU in general and the ECJ in particular are alleged to suffer seem to result mainly from our rigid adherence to the outdated conception of democracy as popular self-legislation. Because we tend to approach the Union’s political and judicial practice from the perspective of this democracy conception, we are not able to observe what is blindingly obvious, that is, the viability and persistence of both this mega-leviathan and the highest court thereof. It is, therefore, imperative that we modernize and adjust our conception of democracy in order to comprehend the new reality to which these bodies have given rise, rather than to call for ‘reforms’ in a futile attempt to bring this reality into accordance with our ancient preconceptions about what democratic governance ought to be. Kelsen is the democratic theorist whose work has enabled us to venture into that direction.

Political parties are the building blocks of representative democracy since they traditionally perform roles that are considered essential for the functioning and well-being of democracy. In the study and evaluation of the democratic system as a whole, as a general rule, parties are treated as unitary actors. Most political parties, however, are membership organizations and their external functioning is partly dependent on internal affairs, including the behavior and opinions of their members. In this paper we open the black box of parties and show on the basis of a 2008 survey among seven political parties how united or divided ordinary Dutch party members are with respect to various political issues and orientations. It is shown that most parties are rather united on most issues. They are least united on two of the most pertinent issues of today’s politics, i.e. the integration of ethnic minorities and European integration.

Arend Lijphart has generated recent discussion on the topic of compulsory voting within political science. He also notes that there was not a broad discussion in The Netherlands concerning the repeal of compulsory voting in 1970 and asks whether there would have been more discussion if the members of Parliament had been aware of the consequences of repeal (i.e. lower turnout, class and age discrepancies in turnout). And could political scientists have warned members of parliament of these consequences? Our contribution examines the contents of the parliamentary debates over compulsory voting, in particular at the time of repeal. It concludes that the arguments in Parliament centered on the rights and duties of a citizen in the state and that there was little or no discussion of the consequences of repeal. Data were available that could have made it possible for political scientists to make fairly accurate predictions concerning the consequences of appeal. This, however, was not an element of the parliamentary debate.