Ever since it was published in 2015, the judgment of the The Hague court in the so-called Urgenda-case, and the subsequent decisions of the appellate and cassation courts confirming it, have been met with repeated and vivid critiques. By recognizing the necessity of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and furthermore imposing a certain reduction level on the Dutch state, the judgments in the cases at hand gave rise to many questions concerning the position of the judiciary in the matter, and in Dutch society as a whole. This article attempts in the first place to situate the positions of the different actors intervening in the Urgenda-case within a legal-theoretical framework. The contribution subsequently explores the strategic possibilities that an alternative understanding of law could offer to the judges, focusing specifically on the use of legal instruments stemming from international law, brought into the reasoning of the national judge.

This article is part of a broader discussion about attaining a full-fledged child-friendly (criminal) justice. Attaining that goal is particularly challenging in cases of international parental abduction, due to the involvement of two branches of law. It is examined to what extent the current interaction guarantees a decision in the best interests of the child. More specifically, the implications of the adage le criminel tient le civil en état are scrutinised from a children’s rights perspective.
The central research question reads: “to what extent can the adage le criminal tient le civil and état be upheld when further elaborating the best interests of the child in criminal law, more specifically in the interaction between civil and criminal law?” The research wants to contribute to the debate of the difficult triangular relationship between civil law, criminal law and children's rights law.
In cases of child abduction, the link and interaction between the two procedures goes beyond the traditionally accepted scope of civil damages arising from a criminal offense. Nevertheless, both procedures following a parental abduction are based on the same facts and are inextricably linked, which means that they have to be assessed together, which means that they should be judged together. The question arises as to how the two parallel procedures can be coordinated better, now that it is clear that they may significantly influence each other.
A full-fledged application of the adage means that a decision concerning the return of the child can only be handed down from the moment when the criminal proceeding (concerning the prosecution of the parent) is completed. It is immediately clear that this cannot be in the best interests of the child.
It is argued that the adage must be abandoned or reversed to guarantee article 3 CRC. This statement is substantiated with arguments of both practical (referring to the time course) and fundamental (importance of the child best interets as a first consideration) nature. Thereby counterarguments are anticipated.
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Dit artikel kadert binnen de bredere discussie inzake het streven naar een kindvriendelijk (straf)rechtssysteem. In zaken van internationale parentale ontvoering, waarbij twee rechtstakken betrokken zijn, is dit bijzonder uitdagend. Er wordt onderzocht in welke mate de huidige interactie tussen beide rechtstakken het belang van het kind waarborgt. Concreet wordt het adagium le criminel tient le civil en état vanuit een kinderrechten-perspectief aan een kritische blik onderworpen.
De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: “in welke mate is het adagium le criminel tient le civil and état houdbaar in de verdere uitwerking van het belang van het kind in het strafrecht, meer bepaald in de wisselwerking tussen burgerlijk en strafrecht?” Het artikel wil aan het belang van het kind een duidelijkere positie geven in de moeilijke driehoeksverhouding tussen burgerlijk recht, strafrecht en kinderrechten.
In zaken van kinderontvoering gaat het de toepassing van het adagium verder dan de traditioneel aanvaarde reikwijdte van civielrechtelijke schadevergoedingen die voortvloeien uit een strafbaar feit. Niettemin zijn beide procedures, volgend op een parentale ontvoering, gebaseerd op dezelfde feiten en onlosmakelijk verbonden met elkaar, wat betekent dat ze samen moeten worden beoordeeld. De vraag rijst hoe de twee parallelle procedures beter gecoördineerd kunnen worden, nu duidelijk is dat ze elkaar op een significante manier kunnen beïnvloeden.
Onverkorte toepassing van het adagium betekent dat de burgerlijke beslissing betreffende de terugkeer van het kind pas kan plaatsvinden vanaf het moment dat de strafrechtelijke procedure (betreffende de vervolging van de ouder) is voltooid. Het is meteen duidelijk dat dit niet in het belang van het kind kan zijn.
Er wordt geargumenteerd dat het adagium moet worden verlaten dan wel omgedraaid om artikel 3 IVRK te garanderen. Argumenten van zowel praktische (verwijzend naar de tijdsverloop) als fundamentele (belang van het kind als eerste overweging) aard onderbouwen dit standpunt. Daarbij wordt geanticipeerd op tegenargumenten.

In recent years, there has been growing policy support for expanding worker ownership of businesses in the European Union. Debates on stimulating worker ownership are a regular feature of discussions on the collaborative economy and the future of work, given anxieties regarding the reconfiguration of the nature of work and the decline of standardised employment contracts. Yet, worker ownership, in the form of labour-managed firms such as worker cooperatives, remains marginal. This article explains the appeal of worker cooperatives and examines the reasons why they continue to be relatively scarce. Taking its cue from Henry Hansmann’s hypothesis that organisational innovations can make worker ownership of firms viable in previously untenable circumstances, this article explores how organisational innovations, such as those embodied in the capital and governance structure of Decentralised (Autonomous) Organisations (D(A)Os), can potentially facilitate the growth of LMFs. It does so by undertaking a case study of a blockchain project, Colony, which seeks to create decentralised, self-organising companies where decision-making power derives from high-quality work. For worker cooperatives, seeking to connect globally dispersed workers through an online workplace, Colony’s proposed capital and governance structure, based on technological and game theoretic insight may offer useful lessons. Drawing from this pre-figurative structure, self-imposed institutional rules may be deployed by worker cooperatives in their by-laws to avoid some of the main pitfalls associated with labour management and thereby, potentially, vitalise the formation of the cooperative form.

At first glance, the adventure of restorative justice (RJ) in Belgium can be considered a real success story. At the turn of the 21st century, programmes oriented towards this justice model officially determined the criminal justice agenda. What were the key ideas that led to the conceptualisation of restorative justice in Belgium? Who were the main actors and agencies that carried them out? What were the main issues that led to the institutionalisation of restorative justice? What are the effects of its implementation on the Belgian criminal justice system in general? This article strives to present the main findings of a study on the basis of an extensive data collection effort and analysis targeting discourses and practices created by actors from the Belgian academic, scientific, political, administrative, social work and judicial spheres from the 1980s to 2015.

This article discusses hedge funds activism based on Hirschman’s classic. It is argued that hedge funds do not create the loyalty concerns underlying the usual short-termism critique of their activism, because the arbiters of such activism are typically indexed funds, which cannot choose short-term exit. Nevertheless, the voice activated by hedge funds can be excessive for a particular company. Furthermore, this article claims that the short-termism debate cannot shed light on the desirability of hedge funds activism. Neither theory nor empirical evidence can tell whether hedge funds activism leads to short-termism or long-termism. The real issue with activism is a conflict of entrepreneurship, namely a conflict between the opposing views of the activists and the incumbent management regarding in how long an individual company should be profitable. Leaving the choice between these views to institutional investors is not efficient for every company at every point in time. Consequently, this article argues that regulation should enable individual companies to choose whether to curb hedge funds activism depending on what is efficient for them. The recent European experience reveals that loyalty shares enable such choice, even in the midstream, operating as dual-class shares in disguise. However, loyalty shares can often be introduced without institutional investors’ consent. This outcome could be improved by allowing dual-class recapitalisations, instead of loyalty shares, but only with a majority of minority vote. This solution would screen for the companies for which temporarily curbing activism is efficient, and induce these companies to negotiate sunset clauses with institutional investors.

Negotiation can be thought of as the tool that facilitates conflict engagement and resolution. As part of, and yet different from, conflict theory, negotiation theory has had a separate parallel development in the last 30 years. The challenges for negotiation theory in the future are similar to those found in the broader conflict theory – ensuring that negotiation theory can be implemented by practitioners; making sure that negotiation theory draws upon a multitude of disciplines; and includes theories, experiences and culture from around the world. The development of negotiation theories in law schools – where communication to resolve disputes is part of the job description – highlights the importance of pracademics and demonstrates how we need effective theories to engage in conflict.

The doctrine of offer and acceptance forms the basis of the rules of contract formation in most western legal systems. However, if parties enter into elaborate negotiations, these rules may become difficult to apply. This paper addresses the application of the doctrine of offer and acceptance to the formation of contract in the context of negotiations. The paper argues that while the doctrine of offer and acceptance is designed to assess the issues related to the substance of the future eventual contract (the substantive constituent of negotiations), these issues overlap within the context of negotiations with the strategic and tactical behaviour of the negotiators (dynamic constituent of negotiations). Analysis of these two constituents can be found in negotiation studies, a field which has developed over the last decades. Using the rules of offer and acceptance of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts as an example, this paper shows that the demarcation between the substantive and the dynamic constituents of negotiations can be used as the criterion to distinguish between, on the one hand, the documents and conduct forming a contract, and, on the other hand, other precontractual documents and conduct. Furthermore, the paper discusses the possibility of using the structure of negotiation described by negotiation studies as an additional tool in the usual analysis of facts in order to assess the existence of a contract and the moment of contract formation.

Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing argue in their book, Governing Security, that the state has lost its monopoly on the governance of security. Private security arrangements have formed a networked governance of security in which the criminal law of the state is just one of the many knots or ‘nodes’ of the security network. Johnston and Shearing consider On Crimes and Punishment, written by Cesare Beccaria in the 18th century, as the most important statement of the classical security program which has withered away in the networked governance of the risk society. This article critizes the way Johnston and Shearing analyze Beccaria’s social contract theory and it formulates a Beccarian theory of the criminal law and nodal governance which explains the causes of crime and the rise of nodal governance and defends the central role of the state in anchoring security arrangements based on private contracts and property rights.