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Article

Smart Enforcement

Theory and Practice

Journal European Journal of Law Reform, Issue 4 2018
Keywords regulatory inspections, regulatory enforcement, environmental regulations, smart regulation
Authors Dr. Florentin Blanc and Prof. Michael Faure
AbstractAuthor's information

    There is an increasing attention both on how inspections and enforcement efforts with respect to regulatory breaches can be made as effective as possible. Regulatory breaches refer to violations of norms that have been prescribed in public regulation, such as, for example, environmental regulation, food safety regulation or regulation aiming at occupational health and safety. The enforcement of this regulation is qualified as regulatory enforcement. It has been claimed that inspections should not be random, but based on risk and target-specific violators and violations. Such a “smart” enforcement policy would be able to increase the effectiveness of enforcement policy. Policy makers are enthusiastic about this new strategy, but less is known about the theoretical foundations, nor about the empirical evidence. This article presents the theoretical foundations for smart enforcement as well as some empirics. Moreover, the conditions under which smart enforcement could work are identified, but also a few potential limits are presented.


Dr. Florentin Blanc
Dr. Florentin Blanc is a consultant to the World Bank Group, OECD, and governments on investment climate and business environment.

Prof. Michael Faure
Prof. Michael Faure is Academic Director Maastricht European institute for Transnational Legal Research (METRO), Maastricht University, Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law, Maastricht University and Academic Director of Ius Commune Research School, Maastricht University. He is also Professor of Comparative Law and Economics at Erasmus Law School (Rotterdam).
Article

Access_open Insurance as a Remedy against Financial Crisis

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 1 2014
Keywords financial crisis, systemic risk, insurance
Authors Michael Faure and Klaus Heine
AbstractAuthor's information

    To some extent, the financial crisis could be considered as comparable to a natural catastrophe. We address the question whether it might be possible to insure against financial crisis, similarly as insurance is possible in case of natural catastrophes. Thereby we extend the market mechanism as far as possible by proposing a three-layered insurance model containing self-insurance, insurance by insurance companies and insurance by the government. We argue that an advantage of this multi-layered structure is not only the provision of funds in case of a financial crisis, but also that it helps to prevent financial crisis. The preventive effect is due to market-driven check and balances between the three layers.


Michael Faure
Michael Faure is Professor of Comparative Private Law and Economics at the Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000DR Rotterdam and METRO, Maastricht University, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.

Klaus Heine
Klaus Heine is Jean Monnet Chair of Economic Analysis of European Law at the Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Michael G. Faure
Michael G. Faure is Professor of Law and Economics at the METRO Institute, University of Maastricht and at the Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE), School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. I am grateful to Roger Van den Bergh and to an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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