Naar aanleiding van het optreden van Paul Cliteur in het Wilders II-proces rijst de vraag hoe de inzet van een rechtsgang zich verhoudt tot de eigen aard van de filosofie. Aan de ene kant vertolkt filosofie precies dat register van waarheid dat in het recht aan de orde is. Aan de andere kant is die vertolking zo oneindig open dat ze strijdt met het gesloten karakter van het recht als een proces dat conflicten moet beëindigen door gezagvolle beslissingen. Socrates’ optreden in zijn eigen proces toont aan: de slechtste dienst die de filosofie het recht kan bewijzen, is het verlengstuk te worden van het positieve recht en zich bij voorbaat beschikbaar te stellen als een vindplaats van argumenten wanneer de juridische argumenten op zijn. De slotparagraaf argumenteert dat Cliteur deze socratische les terzijde legt. Als gevolg daarvan geeft hij een geforceerde lezing van het Felter-arrest en mist hij de kern van het begrip ‘onverdraagzaamheid’.

An alleged ‘return to religion’ in contemporary western politics (and science) prompted the Trustees of the Hans Kelsen Institut to posthumously publish Kelsen’s critique of the concept of ‘secular religion’ advanced by his early student Eric Voegelin. This paper identifies, firstly, what concept of transcendence is targeted by Kelsen, and argues that his analysis leaves scope for other conceptions. It does so in two steps: it summarizes the arguments against ‘secular religion’ (section 2) and it gives an account of the differences between Voegelin’s and Schmitt’s conception of transcendence – both under attack from Kelsen (section 3). It then submits an alternative account of the relationship between politics and religion in Modernity, building on the concept of a ‘civil religion’ as found in Rousseau’s Social Contract. Giving a Rousseauist slant to Claude Lefort’s analysis of political theology (section 4) it concludes that a thin concept of transcendence is part and parcel of every, in particular a democratic, account of politics. It should be a stronghold against any resurgence of religion that feeds on hypostatized transcendence. In closing (section 5), it is argued that two key concepts in Kelsen’s legal philosophy may well be understood as paradigms of thin transcendence, namely ‘the people’ and ‘the Grundnorm’.

Does populism add value to the political debate by showing that the ideals of Enlightenment are too abstract and rationalist to understand politics in democratic terms? The paper argues two theses, critically engaging Lefort’s work: (i) instead of offering valuable criticism, populism feeds on the very principle that Enlightenment has introduced: a polity rests on self-inclusion with reference to a quasi-transcendent realm; (ii) populism’s appeal to simple emotions feeds on the vitalist (rather than merely institutionalist) pulse in any polity. Both dimensions of politics are inevitable as well as elusive. In particular with regard to the vitalist pulse we have no response to the half-truths of populism, as both national and constitutional patriotism seem on the wrong track.

Responsibility disappears into the background of private law as it deals with imputation of liability. Fitness to be held liable is determined by normative viewpoints different from moral ones, in particular by convictions on how society ought to be organized so as to avoid or end conflict between private citizens. Modes of discursive control are geared to making authoritative decisions in view of the same end, and corporate agency is created, restricted or enlarged to undercut or to impose individual liability.