With unfaltering determination, China continues to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This article focuses on the preference that is given to mediation for the resolution of BRI-related disputes. China, Hong Kong and Singapore proclaim that this approach better fits with ‘Asian’ cultural values than adversarial processes like arbitration and litigation. The BRI can be seen as an innovative field lab where mechanisms for international commercial conflict management and resolution are being developed and put to action - and where legitimacy is tested.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced courts around the world to embrace technology and other innovative measures in order to continue functioning. This article explores how Australian courts have approached this challenge. We show how adaptations in response to the pandemic have sometimes been in tension with principles of open justice, procedural fairness and access to justice, and consider how courts have attempted to resolve that tension.

This article was written with the intention of figuring out why the Seychelles has been unable to douse the drug epidemic despite apparent vigorous efforts on the part of the government and of finding a new way of curtailing drug abuse without relying entirely on legislation, which although in some ways are necessary, has on its own, been incapable serving efficacy.
The article introduces a four step pyramid giving effect to a responsive approach which Braithwaite suggests lays ‘emphasis on the pyramidal regulatory structure, on regulation through engagement and dialogue rather than by dictat, on bringing third parties into what had been previously characterized as a binary regulator/regulatee interaction, and on the concept of the benign big gun.’
Thus, by building a drug user’s capacity and providing the apt restorative treatment before labelling him as an offender and subjecting him to incapacitation, the drug user is offered an opportunity at restoration.
The criteria featuring in the pyramid must work in conjunction with the law as this combination and the use of various actors at each tier is a significant way to effectively execute government policies without that strict and direct regulator/regulatee relationship whereby the former would otherwise lord it over the latter.

Various of our academic board analysed employment law cases from last year. However, first, we start with some general remarks.

This case involved an employer who claimed that a trade union organised an unlawful warning strike. The Curia (the highest judicial authority in Hungary) found that the trade union violated its obligation to cooperate with the employer according to Act No. 7 of 1989 on Strikes. The Curia and also the Regional Courts made some clear points on the question of the timing of a warning strike. The employer must be notified of a planned strike in sufficient time, which requirement also applies in the case of warning strikes. The time can be considered as sufficient if the employer is able to fulfil its rights to protect its property, prevent damage resulting from the strike, to carry out its duties to protect life and property, and to organise work accordingly. Failing this obligation, the warning strike is unlawful. The notice shall state the date and time that such action will commence.

In a summary proceeding, the Court of Rotterdam has held that it is not clear whether the Non-Seafarers Work Clause, prohibiting lashing work on board of container ships being carried out by the crew, does indeed contribute to better employment and/or working conditions of seafarers. As a result of which the Clause – at this time – cannot be held to be outside the scope of competition law and the claim for compliance with the provision has been rejected. In the media, unions have stated that they will continue to enforce compliance with the Non-Seafarers Work Clause. It remains to be seen whether a court in main proceedings will reach a similar verdict.

This article explains the functioning of smart contracts and technology underlying blockchain. This contribution aims to compare smart contracts with traditional contracts and discuss their situation under the present contract law. It further discusses possible issues that may arise out of the application of smart contracts, for instance, coding errors and programming defects. It studies the possible application of smart contracts to specific fields, such as e-commerce and consumer transactions and possible disputes arising out of this application. It divides the smart contracts into categories based on their form and discusses legal issues in regard to their application.
Against the common perception that smart contracts will replace the judicial enforcement of traditional contracts, it argues that smart contracts will not replace the system but are rather another form of contracts to be governed by it. In fact, the interplay of smart contracts and contractual law creates possible legal issues as to their validity, recognition and enforcement. It provides possible solutions as to the legal issues arising out of the application of smart contracts under present contract law. The study concludes that a robust and ‘smart’ dispute resolution mechanism is required for dealing with disputes arising out of the application of new technology. Online or blockchain arbitration and other online dispute resolution mechanisms are argued to be better suited to dealing with such disputes.

Remote sensing satellites are applying in different fields for a long time. The last two decades have shown a growing trend towards an application of the remote sensing results in the litigation. In territorial, maritime and other disputes parties start using images acquired by remote sensing satellite as an evidence. Unfortunately, not all international judicial institutions take the remote sensing results into account in its decisions. One of the main obstacles is probability of providing falsified information by the numerous service providers in the remote sensing area. On the one hand remote sensing technologies are available to everyone, on the other hand, quality of such images or credibility can be challenged by the disputing party or by the Court itself. To resolve this problem a special universal independent organization-provider of the “pure data” can be created. Also, international space law is silent about possible ways how to share of the remote sensing data or whether it is necessary to establish a special fund. By contrast, States have already started to make governmental funds of remote sensing results at the national level. This paper attempts to suggest the best way of the consolidating results which have been made by the governmental, international non- and intergovernmental organizations for creating the world fund of remote sensing data. The article consists of 3 parts: analysis of the case study, forms of international cooperation of the States and organizations on the sharing/buying of the remote sensing date and international legal aspects of this issue.

Jamming and spoofing can pose significant threats to space-based assets and the services provided by them. Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are specifically vulnerable in this respect, considering the very low power of their signals and services. Numerous incidents of GNSS jamming and spoofing have already been reported. Cases of jamming are often not intentional and regularly have only short-term and geographically limited impacts. However, there are also intentional cases of jamming and spoofing is intentional by default. Due to their importance for military operations, for critical national infrastructure and key economic sectors, GNSS constitute primary targets of intentional jamming and spoofing. The paper analyses remedies in response to jamming and spoofing under international law as well as aspects of national law in relation to jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals.

Cyber space is not Outer Space and cyber activities are different to space activities. But where are the dividing lines? Space law applies to cyber activities when they are space activities. This leads to the question how we define space activities in the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty. With increasingly refined space applications, including satellite communication, remote sensing and navigation and networked environments that span from the Earth into Outer Space, space activities need to be defined more precisely. The other term that needs to be defined are cyber activities. They depend on network connectivity and this is the possible connecting point with space activities. However, in a computer networked environment, not every signal that traverses through Outer Space becomes a space activity. Based on the definition of both, space and cyber activities, this article attempts to delineate their intersection for a practicable understanding about when a cyber activity is a space activity. Following this approach, additional terms and concepts in connection with unauthorized cyber activities need to be more precisely distinguished, including jamming, spoofing, interference and attack. More precise definitions are key to the understanding of the concepts and the linkage between cyber and space activities.

Outer Space is an international common area, where exploration and use are recognized as the rights of all countries (Art.1, Outer Space Treaty (OST)). States bear international responsibility for their national activities, including those carried out by non-governmental entities with the requirement of “authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State” (Art.6, OST). Due to the operational nature of space activities, it is physically and legally unrealistic to separate them by some territorial criteria. Hence, it is natural for safety operations and other common domains of traffic, such as aviation or maritime, to pursue a certain level of unification of national control, although concrete measures for realizing the OST requirements are entrusted to each State. Thus, establishing an international regime for space traffic management is becoming a critical issue in contemporary space governance. From this point of view, the implementation of Art. 6 of the OST must be revisited as a precedent since it is the sole and explicit requirement of international law for States when controlling their space activities. Practically, national legislation for implementing this requirement is lumbering, even within major space powers. Thus, it is only in this decade that national regulations have rapidly begun to emerge. Based on the analysis of several practical cases, focusing particularly on non-governmental space activities, this paper aims to present the possibility and boundary of effective “authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State” to retain effective control, for the safety and sustainability of space activities.

The exploration and use of outer space, an area beyond national jurisdiction, is subject to international legal norms: a multilateral effort since more than half a century. However, the pressure on solutions facilitated or enabled by public international law is augmenting, not least because of new space actors, novel ideas to use and explore outer space and the increasingly ubiquitous concern of maintaining the long-term sustainability of spaceflight. Different actors produce standards, best practices, guidelines and other governance tools; beyond COPUOS, various initiatives of different character by industry and other actors have emerged, in particular in the area of sustainable uses of outer space. This article explores the place and effects of normative pluralism and non-legally binding norms of behaviour in global space governance from a perspective of international law.

In 2020, SpaceX, OneWeb, and other companies lead the construction of the space-based internet constellation. Although it may take time for these constellations to enter extensive commerce, for space-based internet constellation operators (hereinafter Operators), obtaining an operating license is as important as achieving technical goals. As the laws and regulations on telecommunication qualification authorization, radio equipment type approval (hereinafter TA), and cross-border data protection, and Operators need to conduct compliance reviews before conduct business in accordance with the characteristics of their spacebased internet access products. Factors such as a vast land area, huge population, and complex terrain are expected to create a huge satellite Network market in China.

This paper will analyze and classify the satellite Network products related to China’s laws and regulations currently in force. This paper focuses on Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of Radio Operation, Administrative Provisions on the Establishment of Space radiocommunication Networks as well as the Setup and Use of Earth Stations, Telecommunication Regulation of the People’s Republic of China, and other related regulations, etc. This paper will give a brief compliance guide for satellite network operators who plan to conduct business in China by analyzing business models and laws. Finally, this paper will analyze the legislative trends of laws and regulations related to the satellite network and policy trends and the changes and opportunities that may be brought to satellite network compliance.

Humanity, in more recent years, has witnessed a dramatic acceleration of changes in various aspects of life. The various technological advances throughout history have their effects in many different fields of science, among which International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is not exempt. In addition to customary norms, IHL has been codified in various treaties. It should be also noted that other normative instruments have been dynamically inserted within the scope of IHL, with the purpose of following the evolution of war technology, linked to the reception of humanitarian issues by States, standing as additional protocols. However, there is controversy about the need to update IHL in the face of certain new technologies, even though they may make belligerence possible in other environments, such as cyber and outer space. At this point, some theorists argue that the principles enshrined in that branch of law are sufficient to cope with the aforementioned developments. However, practice has shown that these new war like scenarios have raised doubts in the international community as to the applicability of IHL in certain circumstances that were previously unexplored. For this reason, efforts have been made to understand the topic, resulting in documents that, if not binding, at least bring a guiding character to the issue. It is, therefore, this theme that this research project addresses, seeking to identify the need to update the IHL due to the novelty of the considered environment.

Nowadays, dramatic advancement in space technologies has impressed all the aspects of human life. The protection of human life in aviation and maritime has firmly tied to precise data and crucial information derived from the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). The present article aims to find a binding solution to ensure the continuity of providing positioning satellite services for aviation and sea navigation for all States. For this purpose, after analyzing the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects and the Charter on the Rights and Obligations of States Relating to the GNSS Services and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, this article seeks to address three crucial questions using the qualitative method. First, what are the harmful effects of malfunction and discontinuity of GNSS services on human life? Second, is there any obligatory provision in Space Law instruments that ensures the continuity of obligation to provide GNSS services? Therefore, from the human rights law perspective, this study tries to recognize the provision of GNSS services as a legal obligation of the provider States and prove that all the provider States should not discontinue these services.

In this article the question is reviewed whether two by the EU Commission proposed financial instruments to stimulate ‘green’ ship scrapping, (i) a Ship Recycling Fund (SRF) and (ii) a Ship Recycling License (SRL), might be qualified as a ‘tax’ under Article 192(2) TFEU. Qualification as such a “tax” would mean that the EU Commission can only introduce such a financial instrument with unanimity voting. The authors first explore the concept of ‘tax’ in the TFEU in general and in Article 192(2) TFEU in particular. Based on this analysis, the authors conclude that levies paid to an SRF might be qualified as an ‘earmarked tax’ falling within the definition of a ‘fiscal provision’ in the meaning of Article 192(2) TFEU, which means that levies to such a fund can only be introduced by unanimity voting. The SRL fee consists of two elements: (i) a fee to cover administrative expenses and (ii) a contribution to a savings account. The fee to cover administrative expenses is qualified by the authors as a retribution that should not be qualified as a fiscal provision in the meaning of Article 192(2) TFEU. The contribution to a blocked savings account can neither be qualified as a tax nor as a retribution. Therefore, the SRL fee can be introduced without unanimity voting by the EU Council.

In the context of a takeover of an activity which requires substantial operating resources, not transferring the substantial operating resources cannot necessarily preclude the classification as a transfer of an undertaking, since other factual circumstances make it possible to establish that the identity of the economic entity has been retained.