The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) pushed state obligations to counter prejudice and stereotypes concerning people with disabilities to the forefront of international human rights law. The CRPD is underpinned by a model of inclusive equality, which views disability as a social construct that results from the interaction between persons with impairments and barriers, including attitudinal barriers, that hinder their participation in society. The recognition dimension of inclusive equality, together with the CRPD’s provisions on awareness raising, mandates that states parties target prejudice and stereotypes about the capabilities and contributions of persons with disabilities to society. Certain human rights treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and, to a much lesser extent, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, require states to eradicate harmful stereotypes and prejudice about people with disabilities in various forms of interpersonal relationships. This trend is also reflected, to a certain extent, in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article assesses the extent to which the aforementioned human rights bodies have elaborated positive obligations requiring states to endeavour to change ‘hearts and minds’ about the inherent capabilities and contributions of people with disabilities. It analyses whether these bodies have struck the right balance in elaborating positive obligations to eliminate prejudice and stereotypes in interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, it highlights the convergences or divergences that are evident in the bodies’ approaches to those obligations.

In this article, we focus on how the education system can be used to promote equality in the context of changing people’s hearts and minds – values, morals and mindsets. The duties contained in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (‘Equality Act’) bind private and public schools, educators, learners, governing bodies and the state. The Equality Act calls on the state and all persons to promote substantive equality, but the relevant sections in the Equality Act have not been given effect yet, and are therefore currently not enforceable. We set out how the duty to promote equality should be concretised in the Equality Act to inter alia use the education system to promote equality in schools; in other words, how should an enforceable duty to promote equality in schools be fashioned in terms of the Equality Act. Should the relevant sections relating to the promotion of equality come into effect in their current form, enforcement of the promotion of equality will take the form of obliging schools to draft action plans and submit these to the South African Human Rights Commission. We deem this approach inadequate and therefore propose certain amendments to the Equality Act to allow for a more sensible monitoring of schools’ duty to promote equality. We explain how the duty to promote equality should then play out practically in the classroom to facilitate a change in learners’ hearts and minds.

On 4 October 2019, the Department of International and European Law at University of Pécs, Faculty of Law organized an anniversary conference to celebrate the 80th birthday of professor emeritus János Bruhács. The conference held in Pécs brought together speakers representing universities and research institutions from all over Hungary. The four sections of the conference dealt with topics ranging from international humanitarian law to international environmental law and the question of fragmentation of the international legal order. The organizers sought to address issues, which represented important fields of research in the works of Professor Bruhács.

A recent challenge to the constitutionality of the Irish Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) has failed. The applicant in the case at hand argued that the WRC was unconstitutional for two reasons: (a) that the WRC carries out the administration of justice in breach of the general constitutional rule that only the courts may administer justice; and (b) several of the statutory procedures of the WRC were so deficient that they failed to vindicate the applicant’s personal constitutional rights. The High Court of Ireland dismissed both arguments.

Online dispute resolution has been posed as a way to further increase access to justice. This article explores the concept of using ODR to increase both ‘access’ and ‘justice’ within the dispute resolution system. The concept of increasing access to the dispute resolution system includes a wide variety of ideas: providing dynamic avenues into the legal process to better serve more people, particularly those with physical disabilities, increasing accessibility to low-income communities and ensuring the platform can be used by non-native English speakers. ODR provides the potential to greatly impact the court system by making the court process more efficient and accurate. While there is great value in integrating ODR into the dispute resolution system, the ODR system itself creates a variety of barriers. In order to effectively increase access to justice through ODR, the ODR system must be developed to maximize ‘accessibility’. The second prong to this discussion explores the concept of ‘justice’ within the context of ODR. Critics of ODR purport that the system values efficiency over justice. This article analyses the legitimacy of ODR as a judicial system through three key factors: representation of individual views, neutrality in decision-making, and trust.

Over the past few decades, international commercial arbitration has experienced major developments in various fields. A major recent development that will spread widely in the years to come relates to technology and the necessity of international commercial arbitration to adapt to the new needs of the market. The path of technological development in commerce is determined by forces other than the needs of legal practitioners. Moreover, the lack of real connection to a sole place, in disputes where the multi-parties have not selected the seat, can create serious obstacles for the arbitral proceedings in blockchain technology disputes. In this regard, smart contracts, however, appear to have identifiable parties with an identified physical point of connection that ultimately can be adapted to the existing place of the arbitration theory within the international arbitration legal framework.

This article examines the applicability of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) in Afghanistan. It evaluates whether ODR can resolve disputes in a traditional justice system, like Jirga, where the formal justice system is weak. This analysis questions whether ODR can complement the traditional jurisdiction system, where the public relies on customary practices to solve disputes. Further, the analysis focuses on the applicability of ODR in insecure areas, where access to formal judicial processes is limited. The findings from this study suggest the development of effective dispute resolution mechanisms in Afghanistan, mainly using ODR.

This article considers the recent reforms in English Civil Justice System, especially the new Online Civil Money Claim (OCMC). To make the UK courts easily accessible and affordable, Lord Justice Briggs in his Civil Courts Structure Review recommended for the introduction of an Online Solutions Court. This is a revolutionary step because it embeds alternative dispute resolution (ADR), in particular mediation, into the court system. This is very important because mediation emerged as an alternative to courts but has become an integral part of it. This study critically examines how mediation is being embedded into the English Civil Justice System and argues for a balanced relationship between litigation and mediation because they complement each other. This article is divided into four sections (a) Section 2 will discuss how the Online Court will impact the open justice; (b) Section 3 will provide an overview of the three stages of OCMC; (c) Section 4 will carry out a critical analysis of the OCMC; and (d) Section 5 will seek to put forward solutions and recommendations in light of the findings.

Jurisdictions around the world are experimenting with the use of artificially intelligent systems to help them adjudicate cases. With heavily overloaded dockets and cases that go on for years, many courts in the U.S. are eager to follow suit. However, American authorities should be slow to substitute human judges with automated entities. The uniqueness of the U.S. Constitution has demands that artificially intelligent “judges” may not be able to meet, starting with a machine’s lack of what may be called “true intelligence”. Philosopher John Searle wrote about the distinction between true intelligence and artificial intelligence in his famous “Chinese Room” analogy, which is applicable to the discussion of artificial intelligence in the courtroom. Former Navy Reserves officer, robotics engineer, and current patent lawyer Bob Lambrechts analyzed the idea of robots in court in his article, May It Please the Algorithm. Other scholars have started to explore it, too, but the idea of robots as judges remains a vast legal frontier that ought to be excavated thoroughly before it is inhabited by the American legal system.

This article will briefly and non-exhaustively examine the emergency measures taken by some international arbitral institutions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Such emergency measures, as will be seen, were primarily and due to necessity geared towards moving arbitrations online. Section 1 briefly describes some reasons why the status quo prior to COVID-19 for certain arbitral institutions likely made it necessary to implement e-measures: in other words, it will provide examples of the types of constraints that may have previously prevented arbitral institutions from being more electronic/online. Section 2 broadly identifies the e-measures taken by arbitral institutions, and extracts some general trends therefrom. Finally, Section 3 will offer some brief conclusions and thoughts concerning the future of such e-measures.

This article will discuss how we can learn from barriers of internet censorship to create opportunities for better access to the justice system through newer and more reliable Online Dispute Resolution technology. These advancements in technology can help in the application of security measures for materials disclosed in the use of online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms and reduce people’s fears of privacy concerns. This in turn will promote the use of ODR and provide greater access to the justice system, especially for those people who cannot afford more traditional forms of legal services by making more convenient platforms that are less costly, less time consuming, and more readily available to people via their laptops. Technology is advancing and it is advancing fast, we choose whether we advance with it or stay behind. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us the vulnerabilities of our society and how technologically far behind we are, perhaps it was just the push that we needed.

Online dispute resolution is an incredibly powerful tool for litigants, particularly in the area of family law. In the United States, courts with flooded dockets in both metropolitan and rural areas have employed various online systems and software programs to help parties better work through issues. While ODR can provide such benefits as a quicker and less expensive resolution, it also presents some concerns which need addressed by the legal community. For example, many who would otherwise benefit from ODR may struggle with access to the necessary technology, or could greatly benefit from advice on how to phrase opinions in a neutral manner, so as not to derail an emotionally charged discussion. Further, while a history of domestic violence among parties necessitates screening, it is possible that they may be able to utilize ODR if counsel is present. Finally, to promote candor and problem-solving among the parties, all ODR platforms should be as secure as possible.

This article seeks to present a brief outline of the various means through which the draft bills and recommendations drafted by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland and published in its reports are followed up by the Irish Parliament, the Oireachtas. The Commission’s position within the Irish legislative architecture is explained, as is the process through which bills become laws in Ireland. The Commission, it is noted, occupies an unusual role. Although there is no requirement for its publications to result in legislation, ultimately the lion’s share of its output is followed up on in the legislative process in one form or another, with its publications attracting the attention of both the government and opposition parties. The challenges and advantages presented by operating within a small jurisdiction are also outlined, while some thoughts are offered on the Commission’s future.

This article argues in favour of lowering the voting age to 16. First, it outlines a respect-based account of democracy where the right to vote is grounded in a respect for citizens’ autonomous capacities. It then outlines a normative account of autonomy, modelled on Rawls’s two moral powers, saying what criteria must be met for an individual to possess a (pro tanto) moral right to vote. Second, it engages with empirical psychology to show that by the age of 16 (if not earlier) individuals have developed all of the cognitive components of autonomy. Therefore, since 16- and 17-year-olds (and quite probably those a little younger) possess the natural features required for autonomy, then, to the extent that respect for autonomy requires granting political rights including the right to vote – and barring some special circumstances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-olds should be granted the right to vote.

Gender specificity in legislation started being questioned in the late 20th century, and the need to reform the way in which laws have been written for more than one-hundred years has been particularly evident in English-language jurisdictions. In the 1990s and 2000s, the adoption of a plain English style forced legislative drafters to avoid sentences of undue length, superfluous definitions, repeated words and gender specificity with the aim of achieving clarity and minimizing ambiguity.
Experts in the legal field have suggested reorganizing sentences, avoiding male pronouns, repeating the noun in place of the pronoun, replacing a nominalization with a verb form, resorting to ‘the singular they’. This article gives a linguistic insight into the use of ‘singular they’ in English, beginning with a historical background and going on to assess the impact of its use in the primary legislation issued in a selection of English-language jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the US) in the last decade (2008-2018). Given the environment of legislative drafting techniques, where considerable reliance on precedent is inevitable, proposals to change legislative language may produce interesting results in different jurisdictions.

This article is aimed at clarifying the legal implications of blockchain when applied to contracts and the impact of smart contracts in conflict prevention and dispute resolution.

The Internet and communications technology are changing every aspect of our lives. Now ODR is set to revolutionize commercial dispute resolution across APEC with the adoption of a new ODR Collaborative Framework. In this article, we will look at the challenges APEC small businesses face today and how the APEC ODR Collaborative Framework provides a much-needed solution to improve justice and boost trade.

We are currently witnessing a revolution in access to justice and a parallel revolution in justice delivery, design and experience. As dispute resolution design scholars tell us, the implementation of any new dispute intervention plan in a system should involve all of its stakeholders from the beginning. In our justice system there are three primary stakeholders, who have been traditionally involved in processes of innovation and change: the courts, the parties and the lawyers. Courts and parties have been involved in the development of online dispute resolution (ODR). However, one significant justice stakeholder, the legal profession, has been relatively absent from the table thus far – whether by lack of awareness, by lack of will or innovative spirit or by lack of invitation: lawyers.

This is a written representation of the presentation given on 29 October 2019, at 3:20 pm Eastern at the NCSC ODR2019 Summit held at the Colonial Williamsburg Lodge in Williamsburg, VA.