The concept of control has permeated various disciplines of public international law, most notable international criminal law, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law of statehood as well as the law of responsibility for states and international organizations. Often this notion of control has been used to extend the regular parameters in these disciplines to capture more extraordinary situations and apply the same rules originally developed within areas of law, such as the application of the laws of war to occupation, the rules of human rights treaties to extraterritorial situations or state responsibility to non-state actors. This article will examine this notion of control in all its facets in international law while also addressing some of its controversies and disagreements in the jurisprudence of international institutions, which have utilized this concept. The article will then provide an overview of its uses in international law as well as its overlap from one discipline to another with a view of providing some overarching observations and conclusions.

In dit artikel wordt de waarde van het instituut parlement verkend. Daartoe analyseert de auteur eerst een lezing die de Nederlandse staatsrechtsgeleerde C.W. van der Pot in 1925 over dit thema hield bij de VWR. Vervolgens wordt Van der Pots opvatting gecontrasteerd met de diametraal tegengestelde benadering van Carl Schmitt, die zich, rond dezelfde tijd, over dit vraagstuk boog in Duitsland. Tot slot schetst de auteur, via een alternatieve, wellicht excentrieke, interpretatie van Schmitt waar een belangrijke waarde van het moderne parlement zou kunnen liggen.

Irregular migration by sea is one of the most apparent contemporary political issues, and one that entails many legal challenges. Human smuggling by sea is only one aspect of irregular migration that represents a particular challenge for States, as sovereignty and security interests clash with the principles and obligations of human rights and refugee law. In dealing with the problem of migrant smuggling by sea, States have conflicting roles, including the protection of national borders, suppressing the smuggling of migrants, rescuing migrants and guarding human rights.
The legal framework governing the issue of migrant smuggling at sea stems not only from the rules of the law of the sea and the Smuggling Protocol but also from rules of general international law, in particular human rights law and refugee law. The contemporary practice of States intercepting vessels engaged in migrant smuggling indicates that States have, on several occasions, attempted to fragment the applicable legal framework by relying on laws that allow for enhancing border controls and implementing measures that undermine obligations of human rights and refugee law. This article seeks to discuss the human rights dimension of maritime interception missions and clarify as much as possible the obligations imposed by international law on States towards smuggled migrants and whether or not these obligations limit the capacity of States to act.

This article deals with the questions of scope and the standard of judicial review of a disciplinary decision against a judge. It further addresses the issue of remedial powers, which should be granted to the reviewing authority in this type of cases. It is suggested that the scope of judicial review of a disciplinary decision against a judge should extend to questions of law, fact and discretion. What actually varies is the depth of review or, more precisely, the standards of review and the corresponding level of deference, which must be demonstrated to the primary decision-making authority. It is further suggested that there are several factors that have influence on the formation of the standards of review: the institutional, procedural and expertise factors. As to the remedial capacity, the reviewing court should be provided with the competence to apply adequate remedial measures. The reviewing court should be able to effectively eliminate the identified shortcomings in the proceedings before the first-instance authority. For the effective protection of the rights at issue, it may be important for the reviewing court not only to repeal the decision subject to review, but also take other remedial measures. The legitimacy and necessity for applying particular remedial action should be established by taking into account the same institutional, procedural and expertise factors.

During the two-and-a-half decades while Lithuania has been a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has decided five Lithuanian cases. They all (perhaps but one) raised controversial issues not only of law but also of those pertaining to matters non-legal: psychology, politics, history and so on. There had been follow-ups to most of them, allowing for consideration as to the merits and disadvantages of the respective judgments. These cases are narrated on in their wider-than-legal context and reflected upon from the perspective of their bearing on these issues and of the lessons they taught both to Lithuania, as a respondent State, and to the Court itself.

The present study examines the impact of reminders of political violence with and without an apology on the desire for intergroup revenge in the context of political violence in the Basque Country. We expected attributions of responsibility and perceived in-group victimhood to explain these effects. A total of 257 Basque adults were assigned to three conditions: no reminder, reminders of political violence without an apology and reminders of political violence with an apology. Results showed that, as compared to no reminder condition, reminders of political violence without an apology led to assigning more responsibility to police forces and the Spanish state and less responsibility to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and Basque nationalism, as well as increased perceptions of in-group victimhood and the desire for intergroup revenge. Reminders of political violence accompanied by an apology activated less assignment of responsibility to police forces and the Spanish state, but more responsibility attributions to ETA and Basque nationalism, as well as activated perceptions of in-group victimhood. As expected, there was a sequential indirect effect of reminders without an apology (but not with an apology) on revenge through responsibility attributions and then perceptions of in-group victimhood. We discuss implications of these findings for intergroup relations in post-conflict contexts.

Central to restorative justice interventions that follow revised reintegrative shaming theory (Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001) is individual capacity to manage shame and pride in safe and supportive spaces. From a random sample of 1,967 Australians who responded to a national crime survey, 1,045 completed a module about bullying experiences at work over the past year, along with measures of shame and pride management (the MOSS-SASD and MOPS scales). Those who identified themselves as having bullied others were pride-focused, not shame-focused. They were more likely to express narcissistic pride over their work success, lauding their feats over others, and were less likely to express humble pride, sharing their success with others. In contrast, victims were defined by acknowledged and displaced shame over work task failures. In addition to these personal impediments to social reintegration, those who bullied and those targeted had low trust in others, particularly professionals. While these findings do not challenge macro interventions for culture change through more respectful and restorative practices, they provide a basis for setting boundaries for the appropriate use of restorative justice meetings to address particular workplace bullying complaints.

This article is part of a broader discussion about attaining a full-fledged child-friendly (criminal) justice. Attaining that goal is particularly challenging in cases of international parental abduction, due to the involvement of two branches of law. It is examined to what extent the current interaction guarantees a decision in the best interests of the child. More specifically, the implications of the adage le criminel tient le civil en état are scrutinised from a children’s rights perspective.
The central research question reads: “to what extent can the adage le criminal tient le civil and état be upheld when further elaborating the best interests of the child in criminal law, more specifically in the interaction between civil and criminal law?” The research wants to contribute to the debate of the difficult triangular relationship between civil law, criminal law and children's rights law.
In cases of child abduction, the link and interaction between the two procedures goes beyond the traditionally accepted scope of civil damages arising from a criminal offense. Nevertheless, both procedures following a parental abduction are based on the same facts and are inextricably linked, which means that they have to be assessed together, which means that they should be judged together. The question arises as to how the two parallel procedures can be coordinated better, now that it is clear that they may significantly influence each other.
A full-fledged application of the adage means that a decision concerning the return of the child can only be handed down from the moment when the criminal proceeding (concerning the prosecution of the parent) is completed. It is immediately clear that this cannot be in the best interests of the child.
It is argued that the adage must be abandoned or reversed to guarantee article 3 CRC. This statement is substantiated with arguments of both practical (referring to the time course) and fundamental (importance of the child best interets as a first consideration) nature. Thereby counterarguments are anticipated.
---
Dit artikel kadert binnen de bredere discussie inzake het streven naar een kindvriendelijk (straf)rechtssysteem. In zaken van internationale parentale ontvoering, waarbij twee rechtstakken betrokken zijn, is dit bijzonder uitdagend. Er wordt onderzocht in welke mate de huidige interactie tussen beide rechtstakken het belang van het kind waarborgt. Concreet wordt het adagium le criminel tient le civil en état vanuit een kinderrechten-perspectief aan een kritische blik onderworpen.
De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: “in welke mate is het adagium le criminel tient le civil and état houdbaar in de verdere uitwerking van het belang van het kind in het strafrecht, meer bepaald in de wisselwerking tussen burgerlijk en strafrecht?” Het artikel wil aan het belang van het kind een duidelijkere positie geven in de moeilijke driehoeksverhouding tussen burgerlijk recht, strafrecht en kinderrechten.
In zaken van kinderontvoering gaat het de toepassing van het adagium verder dan de traditioneel aanvaarde reikwijdte van civielrechtelijke schadevergoedingen die voortvloeien uit een strafbaar feit. Niettemin zijn beide procedures, volgend op een parentale ontvoering, gebaseerd op dezelfde feiten en onlosmakelijk verbonden met elkaar, wat betekent dat ze samen moeten worden beoordeeld. De vraag rijst hoe de twee parallelle procedures beter gecoördineerd kunnen worden, nu duidelijk is dat ze elkaar op een significante manier kunnen beïnvloeden.
Onverkorte toepassing van het adagium betekent dat de burgerlijke beslissing betreffende de terugkeer van het kind pas kan plaatsvinden vanaf het moment dat de strafrechtelijke procedure (betreffende de vervolging van de ouder) is voltooid. Het is meteen duidelijk dat dit niet in het belang van het kind kan zijn.
Er wordt geargumenteerd dat het adagium moet worden verlaten dan wel omgedraaid om artikel 3 IVRK te garanderen. Argumenten van zowel praktische (verwijzend naar de tijdsverloop) als fundamentele (belang van het kind als eerste overweging) aard onderbouwen dit standpunt. Daarbij wordt geanticipeerd op tegenargumenten.

The German Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, the ‘BAG’) has held that pre-employment as a freelancer must be taken into account in relation to the number of years having been with a firm as a freelancer when assessing the legality of a fixed-term contract due to the character of the specific deployment.