This study is focused on the evaluation of successes and failures of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). This analysis of Mercosur’s integration seeks to identify the reasons why the bloc has stagnated in an incomplete customs union condition, although it was originally created to achieve a common market status. To understand the evolution of Mercosur, the study offers some thoughts about the role of the European Union (EU) as a model for regional integration. Although an EU-style integration has served as a model, it does not necessarily set the standards by which integration can be measured as we analyse other integration efforts. However, the case of Mercosur is emblematic: during its initial years, Mercosur specifically received EU technical assistance to promote integration according to EU-style integration. Its main original goal was to become a common market, but so far, almost thirty years after its creation, it remains an imperfect customs union.
The article demonstrates the extent to which almost thirty years of integration in South America could be considered a failure, which would be one more in a list of previous attempts of integration in Latin America, since the 1960s. Whether it is a failure or not, it is impossible to envisage EU-style economic and political integration in South America in the foreseeable future. So far, member states, including Brazil, which could supposedly become the engine of economic and political integration in South America, have remained sceptical about the possibility of integrating further politically and economically. As member states suffer political and economic turmoil, they have concentrated on domestic recovery before being able to dedicate sufficient time and energy to being at the forefront of integration.

The growth of private launch service providers in the United States stems from choices made by legislators and policy-makers that, whether intentional or not, created a market for these launch services. The first of these choices was made in 1985 when President Reagan issued an executive order allowing NASA to use the Space Shuttle to deliver commercial satellites into orbit only if the satellite required the “unique capabilities” of the Shuttle. As a result, the need for launch services for satellites that did not meet this standard quickly grew and private industry soon began filling this need. The demand for private launch services became even greater when, in 1988, President Reagan issued another directive requiring government agencies to use commercial launch service providers “to the fullest extent feasible.” When the last operational Space Shuttle, the Atlantis, was retired in 2011, the U.S. government no longer had an operational launch vehicle that could reach the International Space Station. Not wanting to rely on foreign spacecraft and wanting to spur the further growth of private industry, NASA launched programs to encourage the development of private launch services to deliver crew and cargo to the ISS. These programs resulted in the rapid development of multiple private launch service providers that now compete to deliver cargo and crew to the ISS. This paper will explain the role that these policies played in the evolution of the U.S. launch service industry and whether the adoption of the US approach is appropriate for other countries where the governmental space programs and related private industry are quite different from the space program and private industry of the United States.

“Good Governance” is a term used worldwide to measure, analyse and compare, mainly quantitatively and qualitatively, but not exclusively, public governments, for the purpose of qualifying them for international developmental aid, for improving government and administration domestically, etc.
In Section A the use of the key term is explained more thoroughly; Section B lists goals and effects of governance from the international, supranational (European) and national perspective; Section C contains guidelines for governance as vested in constitution and law and Section D describes the main instruments and tools to work on better governance.