Indigenous people may suffer harm when the environment, sacred places and sacred objects are destroyed or damaged. Restorative justice conferencing, a facilitated face-to-face dialogue involving victims, offenders, and pertinent stakeholders has the potential to repair that harm. This article explores the use of conferencing in this context with case law examples from New Zealand and New South Wales, Australia. As will be discussed, the lack of legislative support for conferencing in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales means it is doubtful that such conferencing will develop past its current embryonic state. As well as using restorative justice conferencing to repair harm from past criminality, this article suggests that further research should explore the use of restorative justice to resolve present conflict, and prevent future conflict, where there is a disconnect between non-Indigenous use of the environment and Indigenous culture embedded in the environment.

Arising from the notions of green criminology and green victimology, green restorative justice can be defined as a restorative justice focused on environmental harm. Harm in this case is understood as criminalised and non-criminalised, and as individual and collective behaviours damaging the ecosystems and the existence of human and non-human beings. Impacts of environmental harm affect health, economic, social and cultural dimensions, and will be experienced in the short, medium and long term. Within this framework, after linking restorative justice to green criminology and green victimology, I will argue that the current weight of the cultural and social movement of transhumanism constitutes an obstacle to the development of restorative justice in this field. The reason is that it fosters individual narcissism, together with the idea of an absence of limits in what is considered technological progress. This progress is seen as inevitable and good per se, and promotes the perception of a lack of social and moral accountability. This reasoning will lead to some final reflections on how restorative justice has to constantly reinvent itself in order to keep creating a critical and inclusive justice of ‘otherness’. By doing so, restorative justice must join the current interdisciplinary conversation on biopolitics and bioethics.

The worldwide existing environmental conflicts have also given rise to worldwide environmental justice movements. Using a diversity of tools that range from petitions to legal actions, what such movements have often shown is that environmental conflicts rarely find a satisfactory resolution through criminal judicial avenues. Given this reality, the important question then is whether there is a place within environmental justice movements for a restorative justice approach, which would lead to the reparation or restoration of the environment and involve the offenders, the victims and other interested parties in the conflict transformation process. Based on the analysis of environmental conflicts collected by the Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade project (EJOLT), and more specifically on two emblematic environmental conflict cases in Nigeria and in Ecuador, the argument will be made that it is essentially due to the characteristics of environmental conflicts, and due to the fact that they almost never find a satisfactory resolution through traditional judicial avenues, that environmental justice movements ask for a restorative approach, and that restorative justice is a sine qua non condition to truly repair environmental injustices, as long as the worldview and nature of the victims is taken into consideration.

As a response to the over-representation of Australian Aboriginal offenders in Western Australian prisons and high rates of reoffending, this article presents a sketch of Western and Australian Aboriginal worldviews and core symbols as a basis for understanding the rehabilitative-restorative needs of this prisoner cohort. The work first reviews and argues that the Western-informed Risk-Need-Responsivity model of programming for Australian Aboriginal prisoners has limited value for preventing reoffending. An introduction and description are then given to an Aboriginal in-prison restorative justice process (AIPRJP) which is delivered in a regional Western Australian prison. The process is largely undergirded by an Australian Aboriginal worldview and directed to delivering a culturally constructive and corrective intervention. The AIPRJP uses a range of symbolic forms (i.e. ritual, myth, play, art, information), which are adapted to the prison context to bring about the aims of restorative justice. The article contends that culturally informed restorative justice processes can produce intermediate outcomes that can directly or indirectly be associated with reductions in reoffending.

This article analyses the visual communication of the Flemish populist right-wing party Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, and investigates whether or not the party uses a specific populist communication style in its campaign posters, whether or not its visual style evolves over time and how the party distinguishes itself from other (right-wing) parties in its use of images. To do this, the image use will be compared with the CVP/CD&V and the Volksunie/N-VA. This use of images will be investigated by analysing election posters from 1991 to 2018. The analysis shows that there is indeed a ‘populist visual style’. These items consist mainly of (negative) metaphors, false dilemmas, caricatures and the use of so-called ‘agonic’ visual techniques.

In the second half of the 20th century, humanity went through an unprecedented technical and technological development. As a result, technological innovations emerged in the course of the last third of the century which have now become indispensable parts of everyday life, the whole society and even the state. Among them, we must mention the IT sector, which has effectively enabled global contacts and communication between people and organizations across different parts of the world through various tools, programs and networks. Moreover, it also facilitates and simplifies everyday tasks both in the private and the public sector. Cyberspace is a unique and complex phenomenon, since it can be described with physical and geographical concepts, but in addition, its virtual features also have extraordinary relevance. As a result of its remarkable expansion, fundamental areas such as sociology, geopolitics, security policy or warfare must also be reconsidered. This paper provides an overview of the new types of security challenges for the 21st century, most notably security risks related to the cyberspace. In addition, some aspects of cyber warfare, such as cyber intelligence, cyber attack and cyber defense are examined. Particular attention is given to the question whether a cyber attack in itself can reach the level of an armed attack, and if so, what means can be used by the State under attack in defense.

Background: In many European countries caring responsibilities are being reallocated to the older people themselves to keep the welfare state affordable. This policy is often legitimized with reference to the ethical principle of autonomy. Older people are expected to be autonomous, have freedom to make their own decisions, and be self-reliant and self-sufficient as long as possible.
Aim: The purpose of this article is to explore whether and how older people can remain autonomous in order to continue living their lives in accordance with their own values in the context of declining professional caring facilities and shrinking social networks, and which concepts of autonomy can guide professionals and other involved parties in facilitating the choices of older people.
Method: An empirical-ethical approach is used to interpret the moral values enacted in the caring practice for older people. Two cases are presented. One is the narrative of a woman who lives by herself; she has been hospitalized after a fall and hip fracture, but does not want to be operatied. The second is the narrative of man living in a residential home; he wants to be actively involved, doing good deeds like he always did as a Scout. The cases are evaluated with the help of two concepts of autonomy: autonomy as self-determination and relational autonomy.
Results: In both cases the enactment of autonomy remains problematic. In the case of the woman there was not enough care at home to live up to her own values. After she was admitted to a hospital her wish not to be operated was questioned but ultimately honoured due to compassionate interference by close relatives and her oncologist. In the second case there was not enough space for the man to lead his life in the way he always had; his plans for improving the social environment in the care home were torpedoed by management and ultimately the man decided to step back.
Conclusion: In order to do justice to the complexity of each empirical case that involves autonomy of an older person more than one concept of autonomy needs to be applied. Relying on self-determination or relational autonomy exclusively will give professionals and all involved parties a restricted view on the situation, where the wishes of older people are at stake. In both cases autonomy was overruled by system procedures and stereotypical ideas about old people as being weak and not able to make their own decisions. Both cases show, however, that older people - even if they are physically and mentally frail - long to remain morally responsible for the direction their lives are taking, in accordance with their own values. They communicate their wish to determine their own future and at the same time they are interdependent on others to realize their (relational) autonomy and require support in their attempt to maintain their identity. This conclusion has implications for the normative behaviour of the professionals who are involved in care and treatment of older people.
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Achtergrond: In veel landen wordt de verantwoordelijkheid voor de zorg voor ouderen naar de ouderen zelf verplaatst, dit teneinde de welvaartstaat betaalbaar te houden. Dit beleid wordt veelal gelegitimeerd met referentie naar het ethische principe van autonomie. Oudere mensen worden geacht autonoom te zijn, vrij te zijn om hun eigen beslissingen te nemen, en om zo lang mogelijk zelfredzaam te blijven.
Doel: Het doel van dit artikel is om te onderzoeken of en hoe oudere mensen autonoom kunnen blijven teneinde hun leven in overeenstemming met hun eigen waarden te kunnen voortzetten in de context van teruglopende professionele zorgactiviteiten en krimpende sociale netwerken, en welke concepten van autonomie zorgprofessionals en andere betrokken partijen kunnen helpen bij het faciliteren van de keuzes door ouderen.
Methode: Een empirisch-ethische benadering wordt gebuikt om de morele waarden in de zorgpraktijk voor ouderen te interpreteren. Twee casussen worden gepresenteerd. De eerste is het verhaal van een vrouw die op zichzelf woont. Ze is na een val waarbij haar heup is gebroken, in een ziekenhuis opgenomen, maar ze wil niet geopereerd worden. De tweede is het verhaal van een man die in een verzorgingshuis woont. Hij wil actief betrokken worden en goede dingen doen zoals hij die altijd heeft gedaan toen hij padvinder was. Beide verhalen worden met behulp van twee concepten van autonomie geëvalueerd: autonomie als zelfbeschikking en relationele autonomie.
Resultaat: In beide casussen blijft de verwezenlijking van autonomie problematisch. In het geval van de vrouw was er thuis onvoldoende zorg om volgens haar waarden te kunnen leven. Toen zij in het ziekenhuis was opgenomen werd haar wens om niet te worden geopereerd tegen gehouden, maar uiteindelijk ingewilligd als gevolg van bemoeienis uit hoofde van barmhartigheid door directe verwanten en haar oncoloog. In het tweede geval was er voor de man onvoldoende ruimte om zijn leven te leiden op de manier zoals hij dat altijd had gedaan. Zijn plannen om de sociale omgeving in het verzorgingshuis te verbeteren werden door het management getorpedeerd en uiteindelijk heeft hij zich ervan teruggetrokken.
Conclusie: Teneinde recht te doen aan de complexiteit van beide casussen die betrekking hebben op de autonomie van een oudere, dient meer dan één concept voor autonomie te worden ingezet. Het vertrouwen in zelfbeschikking of relationele autonomie alleen zal aan de professionals en alle andere betrokken partijen een beperkt zicht geven van de situatie wanneer het de wensen van ouderen betreft. In beide gevallen werd de autonomie ter zijde geschoven door protocollen en stereotypische ideeën over ouderen als kwetsbare personen die niet in staat zouden zijn om zelf hun beslissingen te nemen. Echter tonen beide voorbeelden aan dat ouderen, zelfs als ze fysiek en mentaal kwetsbaar zijn, de wens hebben om moreel verantwoordelijk te blijven voor de richting die hun leven zal nemen, in overeenstemming met hun eigen waarden. Zij geven de wens aan om hun eigen toekomst te bepalen en tegelijkertijd zijn ze onderling afhankelijk van anderen om hun (relationele) autonomie te verwezenlijken, én hebben ze behoefte aan steun bij hun poging om hun identiteit te behouden. Deze conclusie heeft gevolgen voor het normatieve handelen van professionals die bij de zorg en behandeling van ouderen betrokken zijn.

The Dutch Corporate Governance Code-2016 stipulates that the executive board is responsible for creating a culture serving long-term value creation. Because the DCGC is law for public firms with this stipulation, the concept of culture is moved from the realm of informal administrative instruments to that of formal instruments, subject to dispute in case the duty of care is questioned. This article explains the provenance of the concept of culture, its multiplicity of attributed meanings and roles, and its changing nature in the digital era. Also, the article explains that for long-term value creation, more and different measures are needed than culture, values, vision, strategy or codes of conducts. This raises the question of whether an executive board having publicly committed the firm to long-term value creation demonstrates a credible commitment by complying with the DCGC, respectively culture as a means only, and can exculpate itself doing so. The answer is: no.

The judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Particularly important is the Court’s repeated citation and incorporation of various provisions of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into its interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights. This aids in greater understanding of the normative value of the Declaration’s provisions, particularly when coupled with the dramatic increase in affirmations of that instrument by UN treaty bodies, Special Procedures and others. The Court’s analysis also adds detail and further content to the bare architecture of the Declaration’s general principles and further contributes to the crystallisation of the discrete, although still evolving, body of law upholding indigenous peoples’ rights. Uptake of the Court’s jurisprudence by domestic tribunals further contributes to this state of dynamic interplay between sources and different fields of law.

This article outlines an approach, derived from Ann and Robert Seidman’s Institutionalist Legislative Drafting Theory and Methodology (ILTAM), for drafting laws and developing implementing policies and programmes to realize legislative objectives and promote necessary behavioural change throughout a jurisdiction despite significant sub-jurisdictional socio-economic differences. ILTAM can serve as a powerful tool for catalysing the development of situationally appropriate programmes to initiate and sustain behavioural change in furtherance of legislative objectives. The article begins by discussing the movement towards legislative standardization, and its benefits and failings. It then introduces the concept of informal jurisdictions, and highlights modifications to ILTAM that improve the methodology’s efficacy in devising solutions that work in those jurisdictions. The article then describes the power of intransitive law as a mechanism for catalysing progress towards shared objectives in a manner that allows for localized approaches, promotes governmental responsiveness, brings innovation, and maximizes participatory governance. Lastly, it describes the importance that Ann and Robert Seidman placed on institutionalizing on-going monitoring, evaluation and learning processes; and describes how intransitive drafting techniques can focus implementation on motivating behavioural change while systematically identifying needed policy and law reforms in response to suboptimal legislative outcomes.

As evidence-based legislation develops, and as technology puts more information at our fingertips, there should be a better understanding of what exactly constitutes reliable evidence. Robert and Ann Seidman devoted their professional careers to developing the evidence-based Institutional Legislative Theory and Methodology and teaching it to legislative drafters around the world. Although ILTAM was firmly grounded in – and driven by – evidence, the question becomes what evidence is reliable and a worthy input for the methodology. Further, how can the drafter avoid the misuses of evidence such as confirmation bias and naïve beliefs? We aim to give a guide for using evidence by offering examples of evidence-based legislation in practice and through a proposed hierarchy of evidence from most to least reliable:

1. Experiments within the jurisdiction / lessons from other jurisdictions.

2. Information on a topic or issue that was formally requested by the legislature or produced to the legislature under oath or under the penalties of perjury.

3. Studies / information provided by a government agency.

4. Expert or scientific studies.

5. Economic or mathematical models and statistics.

6. Information provided by special interests.

7. Stories, apocrypha and uncorroborated tales.

In western civil law jurisdictions, 19th century large-scale codification projects have made way for more specific, technical operations. While several terms for various operations are used – from coordination to consolidation or recasting – they all serve to compile normative texts within one single document for the sake of clarity and legal certainty. A more fundamental distinction can be made between formal and substantial codifications, the one more technical, the other large and fundamental. Substantial law reforms are problematized in this era of multilevel governance and digitalization. Nowadays, substantial codifications are essentially non-exhaustive, inconsistent, and fragmentized. Also, they rely upon formal consolidations, and generate new formal consolidations. While formal consolidations are still treated as logistic projects, more developed ICT tools may enable their transformation into continuous processes.

This paper examines the intersection between the two professions – law and medicine – with reference to systematic transformations that have characterized their development in the past century. In particular, the paper examines the co-emergence of the new public health and health promotion scholarship along with the development of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement in the second half of the 20th century. The two movements, with their later developments, have aspired to change the focus of professionals in the field, and both have been tremendously successful on the one hand, and on the other have remained marginal to mainstream training and identity building of contemporary lawyers and doctors.

This article presents an account of sovereignty as a concept that signifies in jural terms the nature and quality of political relations within the modern state. It argues, first, that sovereignty is a politico-legal concept that expresses the autonomous nature of the state’s political power and its specific mode of operation in the form of law and, secondly, that many political scientists and lawyers present a skewed account by confusing sovereignty with governmental competence. After clarifying its meaning, the significance of contemporary governmental change is explained as one that, in certain respects, involves an erosion of sovereignty.