Germany reacted to the rise of piracy around the Horn of Africa not only by deploying its armed forces to the region, but also by overhauling the legal regime concerning private security providers. It introduced a dedicated licensing scheme mandatory for German maritime security providers and maritime security providers wishing to offer their services on German-flagged vessels. This legal reform resulted in a licensing system with detailed standards for the internal organisation of a security company and the execution of maritime security services. Content wise, the German law borrows broadly from internationally accepted standards. Despite deficits in state oversight and compliance control, the licensing scheme sets a high standard e.g. by mandating that a security team must consist of a minimum of four security guards. The lacking success of the scheme suggested by the low number of companies still holding a license may be due to the fact that ship-owners have traditionally been reluctant to travel high-risk areas under the German flag. Nevertheless, the German law is an example of a national regulation that has had some impact on the industry at large.

This article tries to answer two questions: 1) How does the cooperation between the Belgian (federal) and Flemish (regional) government work within the field of multilateral policy?; 2) How is the multilateral policy of the Belgian federation and the Flemish government received at the multilateral level (especially within the CoE en the WTO)? The Belgian constitution has foreseen a system in which all governments (federal en regional) are equal. This has important consequences for Belgian delegations in multilateral fora: in 'mixed' dossiers, no government has decisive power. Thus, all Belgian governments are objective allies in guarding the externally projected image of the federation. Nevertheless, this seems to be a 'grey area' in the cooperation among the various Belgian governments.