Search result: 5 articles

x
The search results will be filtered on:
Year 2013 x Category Article x

Laura Gyeney
Laura Gyeney Ph.D. is a Senior Lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic University Faculty of law and Political Sciences, Budapest (Hungary). She is the Deputy Head of the EU Law Department, the Director of Minority Law Protection Institute. She has a Master in Economics, Politics and Institutions of European and Global Relations at the University of Sacro Cuore, Milano (2001) and a Diploma in an introduction to English Law and the Law of the European Union, University of Cambridge (2006).

Eva Nanopoulos
Bob Alexander Fellow and Lecturer in Law at King’s College, Cambridge, where she is also acting as Director of Studies in Law and Equal Opportunities Tutor.
Article

Access_open An Eclectic Approach to Loyalty-Promoting Instruments in Corporate Law: Revisiting Hirschman's Model of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

Journal Erasmus Law Review, Issue 2 2013
Keywords Eclecticism, corporate law & economics, corporate constitutionalism, loyalty-promoting instruments
Authors Bart Bootsma MSc LLM
AbstractAuthor's information

    This essay analyses the shareholder role in corporate governance in terms of Albert Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. The term 'exit' is embedded in a law & economics framework, while 'voice' relates to a corporate constitutional framework. The essay takes an eclectic approach and argues that, in order to understand the shareholder role in its full breadth and depth, the corporate law & economics framework can 'share the analytical stage' with a corporate constitutional framework. It is argued that Hirschman's concept of 'loyalty' is the connecting link between the corporate law & economics and corporate constitutional framework. Corporate law is perceived as a Janus head, as it is influenced by corporate law & economics as well as by corporate constitutional considerations. In the discussion on the shareholder role in public corporations, it is debated whether corporate law should facilitate loyalty-promoting instruments, such as loyalty dividend and loyalty warrants. In this essay, these instruments are analysed based on the eclectic approach. It is argued that loyalty dividend and warrants are law & economics instruments (i.e. financial incentives) based on corporate constitutional motives (i.e. promoting loyalty in order to change the exit/voice mix in favour of voice).


Bart Bootsma MSc LLM
PhD candidate in the corporate law department at Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Email: bootsma@law.eur.nl. The research for this article has been supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in the Open Competition in the Social Sciences 2010. The author is grateful to Ellen Hey, Klaus Heine, Michael Faure, Matthijs de Jongh and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

    In this paper, I will firstly illustrate the broader context of the contractualisation of family law by drawing upon the oscillations in family regulation between private and public regulators, in the light of the so-called family law exceptionalism. I consider the contractualisation of family law to be the ordering of the family by families and individuals through the use of legally binding private instruments. I will elaborate upon the substantive and jurisdictional contractualisation of family law in Sections 2 and 3 of this paper respectively. The deliberately 'impressionist' presentation of Section 1-3 leads onto the conclusion which proposes that States benevolently tolerate substantive contractualisation through a lower standard of judicial review, and that, whilst they actively stimulate jurisdictional contractualisation of the content of family relations, the formation and dissolution of family relations still appear to fall within the State's exclusive domain (Section 4).
    ---
    In deze bijdrage situeer ik eerst de 21ste eeuwse contractualisering van het familierecht in de historische pendelbeweging tussen publieke en private regulering van familieleven. Die leidde in de 19de en 20ste eeuw tot de aanneming van een bijzondere, niet-contractuele, aard van het familierecht (sectie 1). Ik beschouw als contractualisering van het familierecht: de regulering van familieleven door de familie en door individuen, door middel van juridisch bindende privaatrechtelijke instrumenten. Ik zal ingaan op de inhoudelijke en jurisdictionele contractualisering van het familierecht in respectievelijk de secties 2 en 3 van deze bijdrage. De bewust 'impressionistische' uiteenzetting in secties 1-3 leidt naar de conclusie dat Staten enerzijds een welwillende houding aannemen ten opzichte van inhoudelijke contractualisering, doordat een lagere norm van rechterlijke toetsing wordt gehanteerd. Anderzijds stimuleren zij actief de jurisdictionele contractualisering van de inhoud van familierelaties. Het aangaan en de beëindiging van familierelaties blijven daarentegen het exclusieve domein van de Staat (sectie 4).


Prof. dr. Frederik Swennen
Frederik Swennen is a senior lecturer at the University of Antwerp and an attorney at the Brussels Bar.

Frans G. von der Dunk
University of Nebraska, College of Law, Space, Cyber and Telecommunications Law Program, Fvonderdunk2@unl.edu.
Showing all 5 results
You can search full text for articles by entering your search term in the search field. If you click the search button the search results will be shown on a fresh page where the search results can be narrowed down by category or year.