Since the early 1990s, the European Commission applies the State aid rules (part of European competition law) to the funding of national and subnational public broadcasters. This article analyzes to what extent discussions on the regulation and funding of public service broadcasting are determined by a conflictual notion of subsidiarity. Focusing on encounters between the European Commission on the one hand and Germany, the Netherlands and Flanders on the other hand, the article concludes that Member States and the European Commission focus more on competence divisions than on substantive discussions about the future of public service broadcasting. This is particularly regrettable as the digital age requires a thorough re-thinking of the role of public broadcasters in Western European democracies.

This article examines the impact of multi-level governance (MLG) on the democratic input into European Union (EU) trade policy under the Lisbon Treaty. Focusing on two recently concluded EU trade agreements, i.e. the multi-party agreement with Colombia and Peru and the association agreement with Central America, the article traces several dangers and risks that MLG entails for democratic accountability and participation, which are closely tied to the strong output-oriented nature of MLG and its emphasis on technical effi ciency. These dangers of MLG – the article argues – are not accidental, but are fi rmly rooted within an underlying hegemonic social-economic trend, characterised by an intentional (neo-liberal dominated) attempt to de-politise, and even de-democratise, European political policy-making.