Whereas Pettit distinguishes between responsibility for the enactment of a directly harmful act and responsibility for the arrangement or constitution that channels the formation of a corporate agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions, we should acknowledge the existence of yet a third level of responsibility: the enactment of corporate arrangements that makes the enactment of harmful corporate actions likely or unavoidable. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | collective responsibility, individual responsibility |
Authors | prof. Bert van den Brink |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | responsibility, accountability, imputation, liability |
Authors | prof. Bert van Roermund and prof. Jan Vranken |
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Responsibility disappears into the background of private law as it deals with imputation of liability. Fitness to be held liable is determined by normative viewpoints different from moral ones, in particular by convictions on how society ought to be organized so as to avoid or end conflict between private citizens. Modes of discursive control are geared to making authoritative decisions in view of the same end, and corporate agency is created, restricted or enlarged to undercut or to impose individual liability. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2009 |
Keywords | collective criminal responsibility;, individual responsibility |
Authors | dr. Govert den Hartogh |
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This paper argues, against Pettit’s thesis about the incorporation of responsibility, that holding collective agents criminally responsible is necessarily either redundant or unfair: redundant if responsibility can be distributed without remainder over individual persons; unfair if it cannot. It should be the task of legal systems to create chains of individual criminal responsibility encompassing executives, officials, and members of corporate agents. |