This article points out that the UK Human Rights Act, 1998 does not have a clear provision guaranteeing a person’s right to a nationality. Instead, this right is buried in the European Court of Human Rights decisions of Smirnova v Russia, 2003 and Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya v. Russia, 2018. In these cases, the Court stretched the scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1953 on non-interference with private life by public authorities to extend to nationality. The humanitarian crisis arising from the Windrush Scandal was caused by the UK Government’s decision to destroy the Windrush Generation’s landing cards in the full knowledge that for many these slips of paper were the only evidence of their legitimate arrival in Britain between 1948 and 1971.
The kindling for this debacle was the ‘hostile environment policy’, later the ‘compliant environment policy’ that operated to formally strip British citizens of their right to a nationality in flagrant violation of international and domestic law. This article argues that the Human Rights Act, 1998 must be amended to include a very clear provision that guarantees in the UK a person’s right to a nationality as a portal to a person’s inalienable right to life. This balances the wide discretion of the Secretary of State under Section 4 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002 to deprive a person of their right to a nationality if they are deemed to have done something seriously prejudicial to the interests of the UK.
This article also strongly recommends that the Preamble to the UK Human Rights Act, 1998 as a de facto bill of rights, be amended to put into statutory language Independent Advisor Wendy Williams’ ‘unqualified apology’ recommendation in the Windrush Lessons Learned Report for the deaths, serious bodily and mental harm inflicted on the Windrush Generation. This type of statutory contrition is in line with those of countries that have carried out similar grievous institutional abuses and their pledge to prevent similar atrocities in the future. This article’s contribution to the scholarship on the Human Rights Act, 1998 is that the Windrush Generation Scandal, like African slavery and British colonization, has long-term intergenerational effects. As such, it is fundamentally important that there is a sharp, comprehensive and enforceable legal mechanism for safeguarding the rights and interests of citizens as well as settled migrants of ethnically non-British ancestry who are clearly vulnerable to bureaucratic impulses.

The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity document is the latest international instrument to address gender-based crimes under international law and the first to do so outside the context of international courts. The elaboration of a treaty on crimes against humanity provides a critical opportunity to affirm that gender-based crimes are among the gravest crimes under international law. This article examines discussions on the meaning of the term ‘gender’ under the ILC’s Draft Articles, with reference to the discussions two decades prior on the definition of ‘gender’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the basis for the Articles’ consideration of sexual and gender-based violence. It then turns to the ILC consultation process, and the 2019 discussion of the ILC’s Draft Articles in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the term ‘gender’. Additionally, it considers a number of concerns raised by States and civil society on the definition of some of the gender-based crimes included in the Draft Articles and concludes by arguing for a comprehensive gender analysis of all of the Draft Articles.

In the aftermath of World War I, Hungary had to relinquish approximately two-thirds of its former territory and over half of its population under the terms of the Trianon Peace Treaty of 4 June 1920. This inevitably brought about a change in the nationality of persons pertaining to territories transferred to other states. However, the interpretation and implementation of articles concerning nationality were highly ambiguous. For example, the rights of citizenship in a commune, the so-called pertinenza, was not defined in the peace treaty, although the determination of affected persons and beneficiaries of the right of option was explicitly based on that particular criterion. Hence, the fate of these individuals largely depended on the domestic legal regulation and the subjective treaty interpretations of successor states. The application of treaty provisions was not always in conformity with the text, which sometimes proved advantageous, other times disadvantageous for the affected persons. This study seeks to explore the theoretical background, the past and present interpretation, the practical application and the judicial treatment of articles concerning nationality in the Trianon Peace Treaty. The paper also exposes the major problems and shortcomings of the Treaty and makes suggestions for an appropriate wording and adequate interpretation of relevant treaty provisions. Furthermore, in order to provide a full picture of how territorial changes following World War I affected the nationality of millions of individuals, the study takes into consideration other contemporary international instruments with a bearing on the change of nationality or its consequences.

Studies on the relationship between EU citizenship and Member State legal orders speak either of the loss of control over national sovereignty or, on the contrary, the judicial deconstruction of Union citizenship. These firm positions on how EU citizenship should be perceived fit well with the two markedly different mindsets represented in legal literature: while representatives of the federalist view envision a politically integrated, supranational community behind the treaty provisions on EU citizenship, sovereignists oppose the extension of EU powers via judicial interpretation tooth and nail. This study aims to find an answer to the question whether the CJEU, in its latest judgments on EU citizenship issues, has succeeded in consolidating the constitutional basis of EU citizenship in a way that is reassuring for Member States, i.e. by respecting the principle of conferral. In this respect, it may be established that in both cases analyzed below, such as the Delvigne and Tjebbes cases, the CJEU made well-balanced decisions keeping EU as well as Member State interests in mind, which, although has brought no substantial progress in the process of recognizing EU citizenship as an autonomous status, makes efforts to consolidate the fundamental characteristic thereof.

The concept of control has permeated various disciplines of public international law, most notable international criminal law, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law of statehood as well as the law of responsibility for states and international organizations. Often this notion of control has been used to extend the regular parameters in these disciplines to capture more extraordinary situations and apply the same rules originally developed within areas of law, such as the application of the laws of war to occupation, the rules of human rights treaties to extraterritorial situations or state responsibility to non-state actors. This article will examine this notion of control in all its facets in international law while also addressing some of its controversies and disagreements in the jurisprudence of international institutions, which have utilized this concept. The article will then provide an overview of its uses in international law as well as its overlap from one discipline to another with a view of providing some overarching observations and conclusions.

In modern society, the right to equality is not just a universal moral obligation; it is rather an expression of a generally accepted rule in international law that all people have equal rights, independently of differences based on innate or acquired personal characteristics. Prohibition of discrimination is a civilization heritage, and it is determined by systematically overcoming prejudices and stereotypes as key factors of discrimination, where educational institutions, media, public authority, and non-governmental organizations all have a vital role. Tackling with discrimination is not just the application of rules regulated by law and taking necessary measures towards social groups which are in an unequal position, but it is also a continuous development of tolerance when it comes to ethnicity, religion, gender, minorities, as well as acceptance of the existing interpersonal differences. It is well known that the area of West Balkans is often a breeding ground where stereotypes and prejudices thrive for decades. The strategic aim of the Republic of Serbia is membership in the European Union, and so nation-wide law regulation concerning this matter is directed at complying with the European Union Law since the prohibition of discrimination is one of the pillars of the European Union Law. In this article, the influence of the European Union Law and practical measures taken by the European Court of Human Rights in order to prohibit discrimination in a specific international and private domain are analyzed.

This article describes the status quo in cross-border surrogacy cases, more specifically how national courts deal with the recognition of parenthood validly established abroad. As the recognition of motherhood is deemed to violate the national ordre public, the solutions so far, i.e. recognition of fatherhood and adoption, will be examined. Moreover, the arguments for an alleged ordre public-violation concerning motherhood will be presented. Finally, the question whether the European Human Right Convention has an impact on the interpretation of the best interest of the child will be answered.

This paper shows that Fuller and Arendt converge on a different point than the point Rundle focuses on. What Fuller and Arendt seem to share in their legal thoughts is not so much an interest in the experience of law-as-such (the interaction between responsible agency and law as a complex institution), but rather an interest in the junction of law and injustice. By not sufficiently focusing on the experience of legal injustice, Rundle overlooks an important point of divergence between Arendt and Fuller. In particular, Arendt differs from Fuller in her conviction that ‘injustice in a legal form’ is an integral part of modern legal systems.

Can jurisprudence fruitfully pursue a synthesis of Arendt’s political theory and Fuller’s normative legal philosophy? Might their ideas of the juridical person and the legal subject be aligned as a result of a shared concern for the value of legality, specifically of an institutional complex which is structured through the stability and predictability of the rule of law? It is doubtful that Arendt's concern for the phenomena of plurality, political freedom and action can usefully be brought into line with Fuller's normativist focus on legality, subjectivity and the inner morality of law. This doubt is explored by juxtaposing Arendt's theory of action and her remarks on the revolution, foundation and augmentation of power and authority with Fuller's philosophy that, however critical of its positivist adversaries, remains ultimately tied to a Hobbesian tradition which views authority and power in abstract, hierarchical and individualist terms.