This introductory article sketches the problématique of this special issue on ‘Subsidiarity in the European Union and beyond’. It starts with a short historical overview of the origins, meanings and implementation of the subsidiarity principle within the EU. Subsequently, it problematizes the concept and application of subsidiarity in a multilevel governance context by examining two fundamental characteristics of this essentially contested concept that render it fascinating to study: its complexity and power-relevance. The relatively new concept of global subsidiarity is briefly discussed to situate the intra-EU discussion in a wider context. This introduction ends by discussing some of the findings of the special issue’s two substantial articles – that both deal with policy topics in which different competence regimes meet – in light of the subsidiarity problématique.

Since the early 1990s, the European Commission applies the State aid rules (part of European competition law) to the funding of national and subnational public broadcasters. This article analyzes to what extent discussions on the regulation and funding of public service broadcasting are determined by a conflictual notion of subsidiarity. Focusing on encounters between the European Commission on the one hand and Germany, the Netherlands and Flanders on the other hand, the article concludes that Member States and the European Commission focus more on competence divisions than on substantive discussions about the future of public service broadcasting. This is particularly regrettable as the digital age requires a thorough re-thinking of the role of public broadcasters in Western European democracies.

Political parties are the building blocks of representative democracy since they traditionally perform roles that are considered essential for the functioning and well-being of democracy. In the study and evaluation of the democratic system as a whole, as a general rule, parties are treated as unitary actors. Most political parties, however, are membership organizations and their external functioning is partly dependent on internal affairs, including the behavior and opinions of their members. In this paper we open the black box of parties and show on the basis of a 2008 survey among seven political parties how united or divided ordinary Dutch party members are with respect to various political issues and orientations. It is shown that most parties are rather united on most issues. They are least united on two of the most pertinent issues of today’s politics, i.e. the integration of ethnic minorities and European integration.

The institutional setting of the 1994 local elections was characterized by a by law introduced limitation of campaign expenditures and the increased share (at least 25%) of female candidates. In spite of compulsory voting rules, the turnout decreased with 1,2%. The proportion of blanc or invalid votes increased slightly with 0,3%. The results of the local elections followed the trends drawn by the 1991 general election. This means general losses for the traditional parties and large progress for the extreme right-wing parties. In the Flemish region, the winners were the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok, the ecologist AGALEV and the VLD liberals. The others parties lost votes. This was particularly the case for the Flemish-nationalist VU, followed by the socialists (SP) and the christian-democrats (CVP). In the Walloons region, all the traditional parties were set back or stagnated. The socialists (PS) suffered the largest decline, but the liberals (PRL) and christian-democrats (PSC) lost voters too. The ecologist ECOLO only kept a modest status quo position. On the other hand, the extreme right-wing parties Front National and Agir realised a breakthrough. In Brussels, we notice the same tendencies, set-backs for the traditional parties and progress for the extreme rightwing parties (of both languages). The ecologists belonged there also to the winning side. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the local political system should not be dramatized. In general terms, parties supporting the leaving political majorities in the municipalities were no langer electorally favoured. On the contrary, the liberals realized better results in these municipalities where they belonged to the opposition.

Political and sociological research indicates that the use of consociational techniques has been a major means of ensuring peace and stability in a divided society like Belgium. This paper attempts to cast a first look at another component: what are the legal mechanisms of confiictmanagement in Belgium? This question is studied on the basis of the case of the school-confiict, which is one aspect of the ideological dividing line; this was indeed the first to be institutionalised in Belgium. The drafting of the 1831 Constitution was the first great exercise in consensus-seeking and the same approach prevailed over much of the 19th century. It was interrupted, however, during the first «School War» which was waged from 1879 to 1884. After the First World War a number of issues in the educational dispute were settled by way of package-deals, which were an attempt to replace zero-sum games by more-or-less choices. However a second School War erupted from 1950 to 1958. After the 1958 elections the balance of power was such that compromise showed necessary again: this situation led to the «School Pact» which tried to institutionalise consociational solution-seeking in this field. The Pact system was later applied in numerous other fields where mere majoritarian decision-making was discarded. White in the School issue these solutions were not as yet legalised, in later agreements they were. The paper argues that the main aim of these approaches is to avoid adjudication on these issues by third confiict-solvers, such as courts and tribunals. Instead allocation is arranged between the participants to the deal; these partners are the political parties who claim to represent the whole range of public opinion. In this way «soft law» is created: this development represents a creeping undermining of the Rule of Law.

The crisis which arose in Australia in October-November 1975 led to the dismissal of the Labour Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by the Governor-General Sir John Kerr, the formation of a caretaker Government by the opposition leader Malcolm Fraser and the simultaneous dissolution of the Houses of the Federal Parliament. The constitutional issues involved in that crisis are studied. The opinion is maintained that the rational coherence of the parliamentary system require an effective head of State with the responsibility of acting personally in unusual circumstances, rather than the strict law definitely lapsed and the issue even then ruled by the «constitutional conventions» of Cabinet government.

In 1974, the belgian House of representatives as well as the Senate have decided to bring about some deep changes in their respective rules of procedure. These changes, worked-out within the rank and file of theresearch centres of the three principal political forces, are based on the specialization which is naturally met within an assembly. The Senate and the House of representatives, while respecting the proportional representation of the groups, got divided respectively into four and six sections destined to discuss definitively projects and propositions of law, budgets, as well as hear interpellations. The final vote is, in any case, left to the plenary assembly. This is the way the belgian Houses put into practice the idea of specialized chambers, which was evoked within the Association of the Secretaries general of Parliaments, in the early fifties, following the procedural innovation of the 1947 italian Constitution. The reform functions fully in the Senate, whereas the House of representatives calls up the sections to discuss only budgets and interpellations in relation to them.