This introductory article sketches the problématique of this special issue on ‘Subsidiarity in the European Union and beyond’. It starts with a short historical overview of the origins, meanings and implementation of the subsidiarity principle within the EU. Subsequently, it problematizes the concept and application of subsidiarity in a multilevel governance context by examining two fundamental characteristics of this essentially contested concept that render it fascinating to study: its complexity and power-relevance. The relatively new concept of global subsidiarity is briefly discussed to situate the intra-EU discussion in a wider context. This introduction ends by discussing some of the findings of the special issue’s two substantial articles – that both deal with policy topics in which different competence regimes meet – in light of the subsidiarity problématique.

Since the early 1990s, the European Commission applies the State aid rules (part of European competition law) to the funding of national and subnational public broadcasters. This article analyzes to what extent discussions on the regulation and funding of public service broadcasting are determined by a conflictual notion of subsidiarity. Focusing on encounters between the European Commission on the one hand and Germany, the Netherlands and Flanders on the other hand, the article concludes that Member States and the European Commission focus more on competence divisions than on substantive discussions about the future of public service broadcasting. This is particularly regrettable as the digital age requires a thorough re-thinking of the role of public broadcasters in Western European democracies.

This article examines the impact of multi-level governance (MLG) on the democratic input into European Union (EU) trade policy under the Lisbon Treaty. Focusing on two recently concluded EU trade agreements, i.e. the multi-party agreement with Colombia and Peru and the association agreement with Central America, the article traces several dangers and risks that MLG entails for democratic accountability and participation, which are closely tied to the strong output-oriented nature of MLG and its emphasis on technical effi ciency. These dangers of MLG – the article argues – are not accidental, but are fi rmly rooted within an underlying hegemonic social-economic trend, characterised by an intentional (neo-liberal dominated) attempt to de-politise, and even de-democratise, European political policy-making.

An important element in the debate on the hollowed State is the extent to which the subsidiary idea caused a decrease in dominance of the central State and lead to a multifaceted process of decentralisation. A case in point is the recent regionalisation of the competency to organise local government in Belgium. Based on Page and Goldsmith’s three dimensions in intergovernmental relations between central and local government (functions, discretion and access), we test the discourse of the reform of the local government in Flanders to its practice. It is argued that the principles of a subsidiary founded municipal autonomy, a growing fiscal and functional discretion and a personal disentanglement of local and central decision-makers was inspired by northern European models of government relations. These, however, are only partially being confirmed by the praxis of the reforms, as the main principles of the existing southern European models persist.