In considering how society generally is regulated, most times focus is always on Acts of parliament that are passed by the legislative arm of government. However, delegated legislation is another aspect of law making that is of immense importance for the regulation of any given society. This form of lawmaking being a deviation from the norm has some challenges in terms of control. This article seeks to examine some of these challenges emphasising that adequate parliamentary scrutiny will prevent the harbouring of bad-quality legislation.

Statutory interpretation is quickly becoming the primary function of our courts. Ambiguity, unexpected scenarios, and drafting errors in legislation compound this challenging task, obliging many judges to turn to debate transcripts and other legislative materials in search of our elected representatives’ intent.
Legislatures are intrinsically the products of the societies that create them, however, with each possessing a diverging structure and rules of procedure. These institutional differences affect bills’ drafting, consideration, and passage, and represent the mechanical process of how legislative bargains are translated into binding statutory text.
Through the lenses of the United Kingdom Parliament and the United States Congress, the fundamental logic behind these institutions’ legislative bargains will be explored, assessing the impact of procedure and the interests that shape the enacting process. Parliamentary tradition emphasizes the foundational role of Her Majesty’s Government in managing virtually all legislation, maintaining a unity of purpose without compromise, amendment, or purposefully ambiguous provisions. Conversely, unique procedures and the multiplicity of veto players within Congress necessitates that compromise is a de facto requirement for passage. The diverging logic behind these legislative bargains offers powerful evidence that institutional characteristics have a dispositive impact on the utility of legislative materials in statutory interpretation.

For the past 15 to 20 years there has been intense discussion in many European countries how mothers in a crisis situation can be prevented from abandoning or even killing their new born babies. Baby-boxes have been installed in a number of countries and/or possibilities for anonymous birth have been discussed or introduced. The Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern over these developments and stated that both developments infringe on the child’s right to know its origins. Both Germany and the Netherlands have taken steps to protect new mothers and their babies in crisis situations by introducing a form of secrecy surrounding the mother’s identity. In Germany this has taken the form of a recently introduced law that keeps the birth and the identity of the mother confidential, in the Netherlands this has taken the form of a protocol drawn up by professionals which aims to keep the birth and the mother’s identity secret. This article will compare and critically discuss these developments in Germany and the Netherlands.

Intangible assets account for 60%-75% of the market capitalization value in most developed stock markets around the world. The US GAAP and IFRS Goodwill and Intangibles accounting regulations (ASC 805, Business Combinations; ASC 350, Goodwill and Intangible Assets; IFRS-3R, Business Combinations; and IAS 38, Accounting for Intangible Assets) are inefficient and create potentially harmful psychological biases. These regulations facilitate earnings management and money laundering, reduce competition within industries, and are likely to increase the incidence of fraud and misconduct. This article introduces a new goodwill/intangibles disclosure/accounting model that can reduce the incidence of fraud, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, and inaccuracy. The article also introduces new economic psychological theories that can explain fraud, misconduct, and non-compliance arising from the implementation of the goodwill/intangibles accounting rules.

‘Restoring American Financial Stability Act’ of 2010 (‘RAFSA’ or the ‘Dodd-Frank Act’) was the first set of statutes in any country that attempted to simultaneously address the Global Financial Crisis, the national securities law framework, the structure of the executive branch of the federal government, and delegation of powers to federal government agencies (to the detriment of state governments). Other countries have enacted statutes that are similar to RAFSA. However, RAFSA and similar statutes in many countries are inefficient and have failed to address the fundamental problems in financial systems, and parts of RAFSA are unconstitutional.