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Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly x

Access_open Ownership, Governance and Related Trade-Offs in Agricultural Cooperatives

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 4 2014
Keywords investment constraints, collective decision-making, organizational complexity, agricultural cooperative, residual ownership rights
Authors Constantine Iliopoulos
AbstractAuthor's information

    Agricultural cooperatives represent a key institutional arrangement in the world food and agriculture industries. Understanding these business organizations by adopting multi-disciplinary perspectives serves both scholarly and societal needs. This article addresses two issues: (1) how agricultural cooperatives choose from a plethora of ownership and governance features and (2) what are the main trade-offs cooperatives face in making these choices. Both issues have important implications for the efficiency of collective entrepreneurship organizations in food supply chains and thus for food nutrition security and food quality. The article proffers observations based on the extant literature and the author’s field experience. It is concluded that agricultural cooperatives choose ownership and governance features in an attempt to attract risk capital for investments while optimizing collective decision-making efficiency. The main trade-offs that cooperatives address while making these choices are between (1) investor mentality and member-patron control, (2) organizational complexity and vagueness of ownership rights, (3) the need for risk capital and member control, (4) organizational complexity and member control and (5) management monitoring costs and the costs of collective decision-making. These observations are highly relevant for organizational scholars, cooperative practitioners and policymakers as they inform decision-making in cooperatives in more than one way.

Constantine Iliopoulos
Dr. Iliopoulos is the Director of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute and Adjunct Professor at the Agricultural University of Athens, Athens, Greece. E-mail:

Access_open Corporate Governance and the Great Recession

An Alternative Explanation for Germany's Success in the Post-2008 World

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 1 2014
Keywords Great Recession, Germany, corporate governance, institutional complementarity, EMU
Authors Pavlos E. Masouros
AbstractAuthor's information

    The ability of a nation to resist a crisis depends on the institutional or spatio-temporal fixes it possesses, which can buffer the effects of the crisis, switch the crisis to other nations or defer its effects to the future. Corporate governance configurations in a given country can function as institutional or spatio-temporal fixes provided they are positioned within an appropriate institutional environment that can give rise to beneficial complementarities.
    Germany seems to resist most effectively compared with other nations (be it nations of the insider or the outsider model of corporate governance) the effects of the post-2008 crisis. This article posits that this is due to an institutional complementarity between Germany's corporate governance system, its system of industrial relations and the monetary institutions of the European Monetary Union. The advent of shareholder value has blended in a beneficial way with an established system of cooperative collective bargaining, with traditional stakeholderist institutions, but also with the asymmetrical design of the EMU that benefits trade surplus countries, and this institutional complementarity has endowed Germany with a comparative advantage over other nations (particularly EU Member States) to pursue its export-led growth strategy and emerge as a champion economy amidst the crisis.

Pavlos E. Masouros
Assistant Professor of Corporate Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands; Attorney-at-Law, Athens, Greece.

Access_open Law and China’s Economic Growth

A Macroeconomic Perspective

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 1 2012
Keywords China, economic imbalance, factor markets, economic policies, law and regulations
Authors Guangdong Xu
AbstractAuthor's information

    China is now stuck in an investment-driven growth pattern that has helped it achieve excessive economic growth in the short run but at the cost of environmental quality, ordinary citizens’ welfare, and long-term economic health. Two main factors can be identified as responsible for the formation and continuation of the current growth pattern. One is economic policy, especially fiscal and financial policies, which contribute to the decline in household consumption by depressing household disposable income and reducing social services provided by the government. The other is the law and regulations that the government has used to subsidize investment and production by distorting factor markets, including markets for capital, land, labor, energy, and environment. A systematic legal and institutional reform whose purpose is to liberalize factor markets is therefore required to rebalance China’s economy.

Guangdong Xu
China University of Political Science and Law.
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