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Article

Access_open Independent Supervisory Directors in Family-Controlled Publicly Listed Corporations

Is There a Need to Revisit the EU Independence Standards?

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 1 2015
Keywords corporate governance, board independence, independent non-executive or supervisory directors, listed family businesses, minority expropriation problem
Authors Fabian Imach
AbstractAuthor's information

    This contribution analyzes whether the current focus of the EU regulator on empowering independent directors is effective in corporations with a concentrated (family) ownership structure. The basic hypothesis of this contribution is that, contrary to the excessively optimistic expectations of the EU regulator, there are serious inefficiencies in the concept of independent directors when it comes to concentrated (family) ownership structures. The contribution relies on a series of empirical studies indicating a positive correlation between operating performance and family influence in European stock corporations.


Fabian Imach
Fabian Imach is management consultant at Societaet CHORVS AG, Gesellschaft für disruptive Wettbewerbsgestaltung in Düsseldorf. He has previously worked for BMW AG, JAFFÉ Rechtsanwälte Insolvenzverwalter (Lawyers and Insolvency Administrators) and Porsche Consulting GmbH. He holds a Master degree from Maastricht University, Faculty of Law.
Article

Access_open Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the European Union

Lessons from Behavioural Science

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 1 2013
Keywords behavioural economics, credit rating agenies, lulling effect, neuroeconomics, due diligence
Authors Fabian Amtenbrink and Klaus Heine
AbstractAuthor's information

    Since the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis, the search for its causes has been in full flight on both sides of the Atlantic. Inter alia, fundamental failures in the evaluation of risk and the role that Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) play in the assessment of credit risk are discussed. More specifically, the question is raised as to what the role of CRAs is in the financial markets, why this role may be problematic and how the main weaknesses of the present system can be addressed in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. This contribution does not aim to provide a discussion of all theoretical aspects that might be involved in an economic analysis of CRAs, but to better understand the main behavioural economics and normative arguments that may be related. Thereby, the current EU regulatory framework on CRAs and credit ratings will be scrutinized. The basic hypothesis of this contribution is that the current and proposed future EU regulatory framework does not fully succeed in effectively tackling failures in the CRA market, because insights from behavioural economics are widely neglected.


Fabian Amtenbrink
Dr. Amtenbrink is Professor of European Union Law at the Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Bruges).

Klaus Heine
Dr. Heine is Professor of Law and Economics and Jean Monnet Chair of Economic Analysis of European Law at the Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Article

Access_open Public and Private Regulation

Mapping the Labyrinth

Journal The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Issue 1 2012
Keywords private regulation, regulatory impact assessment, standard-setting, voluntary certification, sustainabbility reporting, effectiveness indicators, governance indicators
Authors Fabrizio Cafaggi and Andrea Renda
AbstractAuthor's information

    Private governance is currently being evoked as a viable solution to many public policy goals. However, in some circumstances it has shown to produce more harm than good, and even disastrous consequences like in the case of the financial crisis that is raging in most advanced economies. Although the current track record of private regulatory schemes is mixed, policy guidance documents around the world still require that policymakers award priority to self- and co-regulation, with little or no additional guidance being given to policymakers to devise when, and under what circumstances, these solutions can prove viable from a public policy perspective. With an array of examples from several policy fields, this paper approaches regulation as a public-private collaborative form and attempts to identify possible policy tools to be applied by public policymakers to efficiently and effectively approach private governance as a solution, rather than a problem. We propose a six-step theoretical framework and argue that IA techniques should: (i) define an integrated framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used as an alternative or as a complement to public legislation; (ii) Involve private parties in public IAs in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the regulatory objectives; and (iii) Contemplate the deployment of indicators related to governance and activities of the regulators and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regulators.


Fabrizio Cafaggi
European University Institute, Fiesole Università di Trento (F. Cafaggi).

Andrea Renda
LUISS Guido Carli, Rome; Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; European University Institute, Fiesole (A. Renda).
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