During the COVID-19 crisis a risk of ‘code black’ emerged in the Netherlands. Doctors mentioned that in case of code black, very senior citizens might not receive intensive care treatment for COVID-19 due to shortages. Sociologist Ulrich Beck argued that palpable risks lead to the creation of new networks of solidarity. In this article this assumption is investigated by analyzing the different storylines prevalent in the public discussion about ‘code black’. Initially, storylines showing sympathy with the plight of the elderly came to the fore. However, storylines brought forward by medical organizations eventually dominated, giving them the opportunity to determine health care policy to a large extent. Their sway over policymaking led to a distribution scheme of vaccines that was favourable for medical personnel, but unfavourable for the elderly. The discursive process on code black taken as a whole displayed a struggle over favourable risk positions, instead of the formation of risk solidarity. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2021 |
Keywords | Cosmopolitan solidarity, COVID-19, Health care regulation, Risk society, Argumentative discourse analysis |
Authors | Tobias Arnoldussen |
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Article |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2021 |
Keywords | Discourse, Solidarity, Poststructuralism, Levinas, Derrida |
Authors | Thomas Jacobus de Jong and Carina van de Wetering |
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This contribution explores the meaning and scope of solidarity with the emergence of the coronavirus discourse as formulated by politicians in order to make sense of the virus. It offers a poststructuralist account drawing on discourse theory together with insights from Levinas and Derrida. This leads to a critical reflection on the prevailing view of solidarity as secondary and derivative to corona policies, because solidarity is often subjugated to hegemonic meanings of efficiency. Instead, the argument is made that solidarity refers to the unique responsibility to which the other as wholly other commands me. This appeal for responsibility, that is presented in the face of the other, is to be assumed in the distance between the rules and the singularity of the situation. Accordingly, solidarity is described as a paradox of dependence (calculability) and independence (beyond calculation), that appears in a moment of undecidability, for it can never be overcome. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2021 |
Keywords | Solidarity, COVID-19, Crisis, Normalcy, Exceptionality |
Authors | Amalia Amaya Navarro |
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In times of crisis, we witness exceptional expressions of solidarity. Why does solidarity spring in times of crisis when it wanes in normal times? An inquiry into what may explain the differences between the expression of solidarity in crisis vs. normalcy provides, as I will argue in this article, important insights into the conditions and nature of solidarity. Solidarity requires, I will contend, an egalitarian ethos and state action within and beyond the state. It is neither a momentary political ideal, nor an exclusionary one, which depends for its sustainment on formal, legal, structures. Transient, sectarian, and informal conceptions of solidarity unduly curtail the demands of solidarity by restricting its reach to times of crisis, to in-group recipients, and to the social rather than the legal sphere. The article concludes by discussing some aspects of the dynamics of solidarity and its inherent risks that the analysis of the exceptionality of solidarity helps bring into focus. |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 2 2021 |
Keywords | SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, The state’s duty to protect, Duty to rescue, Responsibility, Solidarity |
Authors | Konstantinos A Papageorgiou |
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The article discusses a range of important normative questions raised by anti-COVID-19 measures and policies. Do governments have the right to impose such severe restrictions on individual freedom and furthermore do citizens have obligations vis-à-vis the state, others and themselves to accept such restrictions? I will argue that a democratic state may legitimately enforce publicly discussed, properly enacted and constitutionally tested laws and policies in order to protect its citizens from risks to life and limb. Even so, there is a natural limit, factual and normative, to what the state or a government can do in this respect. Citizens will also need to take it upon themselves not to harm and to protect others and in the context of a pandemic this means that endorsement of restrictions or other mandatory measures, notably vaccination, is not to be seen as a matter of personal preference concerning the supposedly inviolable sovereignty of one’s own body. |
Editorial |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2021 |
Authors | Iris van Domselaar |
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Book Review |
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Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2021 |
Authors | Gijs van Maanen |
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