The stage has been set for humankind’s return to the Moon. This time, however, the purpose is different as the objective has been set for a permanent presence as opposed to the historic exploratory and scientific missions. A permanent presence may result in an intention that is more than purely scientific and thus conduct different from that of the historical missions. While international space law does in broad terms regulate human conduct on celestial bodies like the Moon, there have been differing interpretations of the types of conduct sanctioned by the law. There are of course also activities that might take place in breach of the law with total disregard of any international order. Irrespective of what may unfold in the future, states and other space actors that intend to participate in any Moon settlement will have to prepare themselves strategically for varying degrees of uncertainty and unfolding futures to ensure a state of situational readiness in the settlement process. This work endeavours to showcase the strength of futures methodologies to establish a range of possible futures that can inform the future status of the legal governance system applicable to the Moon landscape. This in turn can serve as the basis from which strategy can be devised that could contribute to a successful settlement mission irrespective of the unfolding future.

The advancing commercialization and democratization of access to space requires a reconceptualization of the foundational principles and values offered by international human rights law (IHRL) to the specific technical, physiological, and legal challenges of outer space. The notion of human rights seeks to establish and safeguard the dignity and value of every human being – it is inherent, broad, and aims to promote tolerance, equality and respect in reducing conflict across diverse and isolated human communities. Technological advancements have given rise to novel and unanticipated human rights concerns in an era where the development of the law lags behind technology. Human rights offer a multitude of benefits conducive to the advancement of prolonged human habitation and activities in outer space. Determining what novel fundamental human rights are required in the context of space requires and understanding premised upon human dignity, respect, and fairness – as underpinned by their relation to human health, safety, wellbeing, and dignity.

The planned creation of colonies on said celestial bodies implies the establishment of permanent human communities on them as well as the creation of permanent structures on (or below) their surface. Obviously, this will be a new phase in the context of space use and exploration. Although, in the light of international law and space law, there can be no colonies (in the traditional sense) in outer space, plans for inhabiting the Moon or Mars can be legally justified in the context of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space. However, the spirit and the provisions of the space treaties in force do not seem able to provide a robust legal framework for the creation of such “space communities”. Consequently, the adoption of a specific, ad hoc legal framework could substantially facilitate the functioning of permanent space settlements. Νo one, however, can rule out the prospect of these newly founded communities opting for an independent and autonomous course through the adoption of their own laws.

This paper attempts to analyse how the law applicable to property rights over various things in outer space should be determined considering the framework of ‘jurisdiction and control’ provided by international law in the age of settling on the Moon and Mars. This thought experiment reveals current uncertainty and the need to embrace private interests in space law.

The 1986 United Nations Principles on Remote Sensing represent a fundamental tool within the international legal regime governing space activities. Indeed, they provide a set of non-binding provisions to guide States willing to conduct remote sensing activities. The paper considers these Principles in light of the dual-use nature of remote sensing technology and products, as well as given the “democratisation” of the use of Earth observation data. Nowadays, remote sensing satellites are operated in many civil, commercial and military applications. In this context, it is necessary to examine the scope of the Principles in order to figure out whether the current legal framework is appropriate, in particular given the dual-use nature of satellite imagery. In addition, some legal issues arise with regard to access to and processing of data which are generated by the private sector for governmental and military uses. In fact, it is now possible to extract military information from commercial and civil Earth observation programmes. So far, the Principles have continued to prove their value and usefulness. However, they do not have been reviewed, especially as regards the technological development of space systems and the evolution of data distribution. Lastly, the paper aims to analyse the Principles by taking into account the rule of access to EO data without discrimination but nevertheless limited for national security reasons.

This article aims to provide the European perspective, highlighting the European Space Agency (ESA) procurement framework for regional industrial development as a potential model for the Middle East. Space activities are increasing across the Middle East and many of these countries are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This means that they must abide by WTO trade principles including competition rules. However, Middle East countries, especially Gulf countries, have developed national procurement frameworks applicable to the oil and gas industry to protect national industry participation and promote local employment. Similar rules of procurement could be proposed for the space industry in order to develop and secure the space industry in the Middle East region. To balance the criteria of regional preference and WTO competition rules, ESA’s industrial space policy could serve as a model for the Middle East.

This paper studies how a new regional approach may enhance legislating or implementing national space laws and regulations through the “National Space Legislation Initiative (NSLI),” which has been implemented under the framework of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). APRSAF was established in 1993 and has been enhancing space activities and international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The NSLI is a new APRSAF initiative launched in 2019 with a view to effectively studying the status of national space laws in the Asia-Pacific region. It aims to promote information sharing and mutual learning on the practices and examples of national space laws in the Asia- Pacific region. It also aims to enhance the capacity of drafting and implementing national space laws in the Asia-Pacific countries in accordance with international norms, including especially established international law rules. This paper first examines the current situations concerning national space law developments in the Asia-Pacific region and analyses how the NSLI can advance it within the APRSAF framework. In addition to analyzing the NSLI's study reports, the significance and implications of this Initiative will also be stated for the reference and future partnership in other countries and regions.

The exploration and use of outer space, an area beyond national jurisdiction, is subject to international legal norms: a multilateral effort since more than half a century. However, the pressure on solutions facilitated or enabled by public international law is augmenting, not least because of new space actors, novel ideas to use and explore outer space and the increasingly ubiquitous concern of maintaining the long-term sustainability of spaceflight. Different actors produce standards, best practices, guidelines and other governance tools; beyond COPUOS, various initiatives of different character by industry and other actors have emerged, in particular in the area of sustainable uses of outer space. This article explores the place and effects of normative pluralism and non-legally binding norms of behaviour in global space governance from a perspective of international law.

The European Union has turned into a significant player in the area of space activities and this has been accompanied by legislative steps. In 2018, it formulated a Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the Space Programme of the Union and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme which seeks to regulate the governance of the key components of the EU space activities. In parallel, the Union adopted also the Directive No 2018/1972 establishing the European Communications Code, which represents the recent developments in the approach to frequency spectrum applicable also to space communication. It is interesting to see that from the legislative point of view European Union is approaching the regulation of space activities and telecommunication differently. Whereas telecommunication, including space communication, is regulated as a part of the European internal market and the respective procedures are substantially harmonised, space activities are based on the provision of the Lisbon Treaty which expressly prohibits any harmonization of national space laws. The common denominator for both areas is the method to codify a whole package of new and older activities in a single document.

The discussion of Space Traffic Management (STM) has rapidly emerged over the past couple of years but policy decisions or concrete actions are yet to be ignited to date. From the beginning of discussions of the Draft International Code of Conduct for Space Activities (ICOC), a combination of a top-down approach engaging the political commitments of States and a bottom-up approach of technically affordable solutions have become essential for realizing sustainable space activities at a global level. These approaches are the logical conclusion of the need to establish common standards and safety regulations across the entirety of operations in outer space. However, after experiencing the multiple disappointments of topdown approaches, some began as bottom-up approaches but ended up as top-down, including the Draft Best Practice Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Space Activities at Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space (COPUOS), ICOC, and the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts for Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Space Activities; therefore, methods of engaging actors must be carefully designed. At this point, considering from the actors’ incentives, a bottom-up approach among civil operators towards global STM rule-making for safe space operations should be promoted. This paper will describe the main reason why the operators have to be the main players at this stage, based on the reluctance of States to regulate traffic in outer space. States are unlikely to regulate other traffic areas, apart from their incentive to maintain the order of the area, as they do not have sovereignty over any part of the area. Civil operators, on the other hand, will become liable for damages due to on-orbit accidents in the near future. The current evaluation standard of fault liability for on-orbit damage will change in the near future, due to the accumulation of cases involving the practical standards of operations. In these circumstances, those operators who do not conform to the stipulated standards will be deemed liable for damages. Therefore, at this stage, operators have incentives to take an important role in the de facto rulemaking process by producing practical standards and guidelines. This process will help secure the future of space activities while forming standards of fault liability affordably.

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, requiring “authorization and continuing supervision” of “national activities in outer space” including those of “nongovernmental entities”, has always been viewed as the primary international obligation driving the establishment of national space legislation for the purpose of addressing private sector space activities. As the Article itself did not provide any further guidance on precisely what categories of ‘national activities by nongovernmental entities’ should thus be subjected to national space law and in particular to a national licensing regime, in academia generally three different interpretations soon came to be put forward on how to interpret the key notion of ‘national’ in this context as scoping such national regimes.
Looking back at 50 years of national space legislation addressing private sector space activities, however, we now have the possibility to look not only at the writings of learned experts, at best a subsidiary source of public international law, but at actual State practice-cum-opinio iuris on the matter. The present paper, on the basis of a survey of more than two dozen existing national space laws, will therefore be able to considerably narrow the appropriate interpretation of ‘national activities in outer space’, so as to diminish the uncertainty as regards what categories of private space activities States may be held responsible for, thus both narrowing the permissible discretion of individual States in scoping their national space law regimes and increasing the coherence and transparency of space law at the international level.

Most if not all space activities require the use of the radio frequency spectrum (RFS); the RFS is essential for satellite and other wireless communications and scientific probes. Countries with advanced industries in the space sector obviously have more developed legislation than States that only aspire to participate in space activities. Even these, however, regulate space activities by which they are directly affected, primarily through their adherence to the International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations (ITU-RR) and policies embedded in the space treaties. Thus, it can be said that most countries have some basic national legislation related to space activities.
Some emerging economies have changed the focus of their activities, from wanting to acquire a satellite for communications, to obtaining a remote-sensing /earth observation satellite. Regardless of the change in focus, they face similar issues: budgetary and personnel constraints, as well as policies of industrialized countries regarding transfer of technology. Despite these challenges, less developed countries have contributed to the expansion of space activities and their regulation, at the national and international level. They participate in ITU Study Groups, and in the UN COPUOS’ sessions, bringing a different perspective to the deliberations of these entities.
This paper will focus on Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), 5G networks and satellite mega- constellations; it will provide an overview of some of their contributions to space law and space activities, while keeping in mind limitations they continue facing.

Among the numerous space activities, satellite communications remain the most widespread, essential, and advanced. To perform a communication function, satellites need to be placed in orbit and use the radio-frequency spectrum. Such limited natural resources, which require rational, equitable, efficient, and economical use in an interference-free environment, are managed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
Before a new satellite or a satellite network is brought into use, the relevant operator carries out coordination with other operators which utilize satellite networks in the adjacent orbital locations. The results of the coordination procedure are then reflected in coordination agreements. Though coordination may last for years, the difficulty is not so much the conclusion of an agreement as its due performance and enforcement.
Coordination agreements generally contain mutually acceptable technical parameters for the operation of certain frequencies and their breach may cause harmful interference toward communications satellites. At the request of administrations, the ITU carries out investigations of harmful interference and formulates recommendations. Although such a process has a few drawbacks, complete disregard for the content of coordination agreements makes it totally meaningless.
If the ITU’s recommendations cannot satisfy the parties or are not duly followed, or if damage was caused by harmful interference and requires compensation, a judicial recourse seems inevitable. As disputes may involve parties around the globe, to which court should they apply? Commonly drafted by technical experts, coordination agreements hardly provide for a dispute resolution mechanism or governing law, while the application of general rules may bring parties to an exotic jurisdiction equally irrelevant to both. Whatever court is chosen, the question of specific knowledge arises. However, the ITU’s practice has always been not to get involved in disputes.
Therefore, disputes related to coordination agreements pose legal challenges. Where to adjudicate the case and what law to apply are just the tip of the iceberg, while the major question of whether there is a need for a specialized court remains significant. This field of space activities apparently requires legal advice.

To better understand the viability of arbitration in space-related disputes, we designed a survey that examines the use of arbitration clauses in contracts used by space companies, and if the use thereof is mandatory. More specifically, the survey gathers data on contracting parties’ preferred seats of arbitration, arbitration institutions, selection process for arbitrators, and choice of procedural and substantive rules. The survey also captures actual use of arbitration within space related disputes by collecting data on how often such arbitration clauses have been invoked and the number of disputes ultimately resolved by arbitration. Finally, the survey solicits industry preferences for the future development of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution in the space sector. The survey is built in a way that allows break down of results and comparing segments, inter alia, based on the type of contract (e.g., launch contract, insurance contract, investment contract, contract for supply of parts or services). The results of the survey will expose the demand for arbitration and the successes and barriers for the use thereof. Furthermore, the results will allow us to evaluate the success of existing arbitration infrastructure for space-related disputes, including the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities and the Panels of Arbitrators and Experts for Space-related Disputes. To our knowledge, there exist no surveys or catalogues on the use of arbitration in spacerelated disputes. The results of the survey will provide empirical data and trends that may be used by scholars, policymakers and practitioners to anchor future theoretical papers and policy recommendations.

The aim of this paper is to analyse examples of ITA as a relevant model in administering celestial bodies. Proposed missions to the Moon promise ambitious plans which will change the way humanity perceives (and administers?) our closest celestial neighbour. Examples of ITA, which first emerged in the 19^th and early 20^th century are valuable resources for understanding how international organisations can undertake administration of increased presence on celestial bodies. In fact, international organisations already perform such powers (i) either vaguely, e.g. through the OST or (ii) through a clear regulatory mechanism that assigns slots in Geostationary orbit. In order for the regulatory framework to get up to speed with developments in space exploration the solution is two-fold: (i) avoid fragmenting debates on niche-topics (resources, cultural heritage, safety standards) but rather tackle them through a comprehensive framework and (ii) allow the UN (or a body designated by the UN) to actively administer activities on celestial bodies. ITA mechanisms developed in the past 100 years, have proven flexible enough to adapt to multiple scenarios and different political realities. Furthermore they allow international organisations to assume powers of administration without acquiring ownership over the territory and are hence in line with the provisions laid down in the OST. The analysed mechanisms in no way represent a magic solutions to all the alleged shortcomings of the current regulatory environment, it is nevertheless important to establish a nexus between developed examples of ITA and potential future mechanisms administering activities on celestial bodies.

Air, Water, Food, Shelter, Sleep: These are the five basic requirements for a human being to survive. Providing these basics to a single person is a harrowing challenge; providing them to 1,200 souls on the merciless Martian landscape is nearly impossible. Nonetheless, in 2032 SpaceX successfully constructed Valinor – the first human scientific settlement on Mars-by transporting hundreds of scientists, engineers, scientific experiments and the most technologically advanced survival equipment ever created to the red planet. Each year saw more successful missions to Valinor, and the world community grew more excited about the realization of mankind’s expansion into the cosmos. However, after 15 years of exciting scientific discoveries and over 350 billion dollars invested in its survival and sustainability, Valinor remained monetarily profitless. After the stock market crash of 2047, SpaceX was purchased by OnlyEarth Corp., an oil conglomerate that saw Valinor as a threat to its fiscal security. Over the next three years, OnlyEarth reduced its regular supply missions to Valinor, demanding that Valinor produce massive quantities of Martian raw materials in exchange for fresh supplies from Earth. When Valinor refused to comply with these demands, OnlyEarth ended re-supply missions altogether. With the flow of corporate resources now stemmed, Valinor’s leadership was forced to redesign the sociopolitical and legal structure of its 1,200+ inhabitants to ensure the colony’s survival.

Currently, the space industry is witnessing a commercialisation wave which, at least in parts, can be considered as disruptive. New technology and market trends associated to this commercialisation wave are circumscribed by the term NewSpace. Along with the NewSpace trend, there is a wave of investment in commercial space activities. Favourable framework conditions supporting commercialisation are key factors for investment decisions and the commercial success of companies along the entire value chain.
Laws and regulations concerning commercial space activities are established in many countries, but they are currently reviewed and amended in the light of technology and market trends. Certain new services and applications are not yet addressed under national laws, or there is no consensus on their treatment at international level. Overall, there are significant uncertainties and/or evolutions regarding the legal framework in which space companies are operating. Companies along the value chain require different types of governmental approvals, including licenses under national space legislation, licenses under national telecommunications or media law, frequency assignments, market access authorizations, or export/import licenses. Delays in authorisation procedures and/or the denial/revocation of governmental approvals may have serious impacts on investments in space ventures.
So far, investment treaties have not been extensively employed by the space industry for ensuring favourable political and legal conditions supporting their activities. However, the wave of commercial space companies and activities around the globe raises questions on the potential future role of public investment law.

The three “global commons (GC)” Antarctica, outer space and the high seas/deep seabed, which do not fall under the sovereignty of States (“State-free”), have become a symbol of peaceful cooperation and coordination of the international community. The international treaties which have already been negotiated from the 1950s show an astonishing degree of foresight concerning common public interest. Today, however, each of the three spaces is at risk in at least one of the following areas: peace and arms control, sustainability of use, and just and fair distribution of resources and benefits. This has gone so far that States have begun questioning the concept of nonappropriation. Could this potentially lead to conflicts – even armed conflicts? A new approach to the preservation and fair management of the GC is therefore necessary and requires appropriate political and diplomatic action. This paper intends to tackle the three GC together in order to identify steps for further developing their governance and to investigate, whether joint diplomatic initiatives for the three GC could be more effective than isolated efforts to deal with single hotspots. It will be argued that the future of the GC lies in the establishment of comparable moratoria, thresholds, fees and codes of conduct drawing from best practices in one or more of the three GC.

This paper discusses a framework for governmental projects to enhance industrial capabilities through the lessons learned from the Japanese contractual practice of H3 launch vehicle, comparing with the NASA’s Commercial Orbit Transportation Service (COTS). In 1995, the research and development (R&D) of the H-IIA was started by a former body of JAXA, and each manufacturer was responsible for delivery as required. After twelve-times launches, the operation was privatized to Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Ltd. (MHI). Concerning H3, MHI was selected as a R&D contractor and a launch provider. MHI established the H3 rocket system specification and responsible for delivering the first vehicle to JAXA in 2020, and JAXA is responsible for the total system including its launch base and the H3 flight demonstration. Such a framework gives MHI more creative freedom, but there can be a room for further clarification of the responsibilities. Coincidentally, such a framework between public and private entities is similar to that of the European new flagship launch vehicle, Ariane 6.
Meanwhile in NASA’s COTS, partners are responsible for all of the development and operation but they are not required to deliver their vehicles to NASA, contrary to H3. It allows clear role allocation and companies’ maximum creativity. A series of contracts of the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) after COTS is also remarkable to promote private investment, for example, around half of the total R&D cost is borne by private sectors. Also, cost accounting method does not seem to be applied for the price setting.
The framework like H-2A is still necessary for high-risk R&D conducted by governmental agencies. It will be, however, necessary for projects, which aims at enhancing industrial capabilities through transferring the operations to the private sectors and encouraging innovation, to be taken different measures in relation to selection of prime contractor, delivery and payment in the development phase and to procurement of launch services in the operating phase.