The discussion of Space Traffic Management (STM) has rapidly emerged over the past couple of years but policy decisions or concrete actions are yet to be ignited to date. From the beginning of discussions of the Draft International Code of Conduct for Space Activities (ICOC), a combination of a top-down approach engaging the political commitments of States and a bottom-up approach of technically affordable solutions have become essential for realizing sustainable space activities at a global level. These approaches are the logical conclusion of the need to establish common standards and safety regulations across the entirety of operations in outer space. However, after experiencing the multiple disappointments of topdown approaches, some began as bottom-up approaches but ended up as top-down, including the Draft Best Practice Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Space Activities at Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space (COPUOS), ICOC, and the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts for Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Space Activities; therefore, methods of engaging actors must be carefully designed. At this point, considering from the actors’ incentives, a bottom-up approach among civil operators towards global STM rule-making for safe space operations should be promoted. This paper will describe the main reason why the operators have to be the main players at this stage, based on the reluctance of States to regulate traffic in outer space. States are unlikely to regulate other traffic areas, apart from their incentive to maintain the order of the area, as they do not have sovereignty over any part of the area. Civil operators, on the other hand, will become liable for damages due to on-orbit accidents in the near future. The current evaluation standard of fault liability for on-orbit damage will change in the near future, due to the accumulation of cases involving the practical standards of operations. In these circumstances, those operators who do not conform to the stipulated standards will be deemed liable for damages. Therefore, at this stage, operators have incentives to take an important role in the de facto rulemaking process by producing practical standards and guidelines. This process will help secure the future of space activities while forming standards of fault liability affordably.

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, requiring “authorization and continuing supervision” of “national activities in outer space” including those of “nongovernmental entities”, has always been viewed as the primary international obligation driving the establishment of national space legislation for the purpose of addressing private sector space activities. As the Article itself did not provide any further guidance on precisely what categories of ‘national activities by nongovernmental entities’ should thus be subjected to national space law and in particular to a national licensing regime, in academia generally three different interpretations soon came to be put forward on how to interpret the key notion of ‘national’ in this context as scoping such national regimes.
Looking back at 50 years of national space legislation addressing private sector space activities, however, we now have the possibility to look not only at the writings of learned experts, at best a subsidiary source of public international law, but at actual State practice-cum-opinio iuris on the matter. The present paper, on the basis of a survey of more than two dozen existing national space laws, will therefore be able to considerably narrow the appropriate interpretation of ‘national activities in outer space’, so as to diminish the uncertainty as regards what categories of private space activities States may be held responsible for, thus both narrowing the permissible discretion of individual States in scoping their national space law regimes and increasing the coherence and transparency of space law at the international level.

Most if not all space activities require the use of the radio frequency spectrum (RFS); the RFS is essential for satellite and other wireless communications and scientific probes. Countries with advanced industries in the space sector obviously have more developed legislation than States that only aspire to participate in space activities. Even these, however, regulate space activities by which they are directly affected, primarily through their adherence to the International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations (ITU-RR) and policies embedded in the space treaties. Thus, it can be said that most countries have some basic national legislation related to space activities.
Some emerging economies have changed the focus of their activities, from wanting to acquire a satellite for communications, to obtaining a remote-sensing /earth observation satellite. Regardless of the change in focus, they face similar issues: budgetary and personnel constraints, as well as policies of industrialized countries regarding transfer of technology. Despite these challenges, less developed countries have contributed to the expansion of space activities and their regulation, at the national and international level. They participate in ITU Study Groups, and in the UN COPUOS’ sessions, bringing a different perspective to the deliberations of these entities.
This paper will focus on Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), 5G networks and satellite mega- constellations; it will provide an overview of some of their contributions to space law and space activities, while keeping in mind limitations they continue facing.

Among the numerous space activities, satellite communications remain the most widespread, essential, and advanced. To perform a communication function, satellites need to be placed in orbit and use the radio-frequency spectrum. Such limited natural resources, which require rational, equitable, efficient, and economical use in an interference-free environment, are managed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
Before a new satellite or a satellite network is brought into use, the relevant operator carries out coordination with other operators which utilize satellite networks in the adjacent orbital locations. The results of the coordination procedure are then reflected in coordination agreements. Though coordination may last for years, the difficulty is not so much the conclusion of an agreement as its due performance and enforcement.
Coordination agreements generally contain mutually acceptable technical parameters for the operation of certain frequencies and their breach may cause harmful interference toward communications satellites. At the request of administrations, the ITU carries out investigations of harmful interference and formulates recommendations. Although such a process has a few drawbacks, complete disregard for the content of coordination agreements makes it totally meaningless.
If the ITU’s recommendations cannot satisfy the parties or are not duly followed, or if damage was caused by harmful interference and requires compensation, a judicial recourse seems inevitable. As disputes may involve parties around the globe, to which court should they apply? Commonly drafted by technical experts, coordination agreements hardly provide for a dispute resolution mechanism or governing law, while the application of general rules may bring parties to an exotic jurisdiction equally irrelevant to both. Whatever court is chosen, the question of specific knowledge arises. However, the ITU’s practice has always been not to get involved in disputes.
Therefore, disputes related to coordination agreements pose legal challenges. Where to adjudicate the case and what law to apply are just the tip of the iceberg, while the major question of whether there is a need for a specialized court remains significant. This field of space activities apparently requires legal advice.

To better understand the viability of arbitration in space-related disputes, we designed a survey that examines the use of arbitration clauses in contracts used by space companies, and if the use thereof is mandatory. More specifically, the survey gathers data on contracting parties’ preferred seats of arbitration, arbitration institutions, selection process for arbitrators, and choice of procedural and substantive rules. The survey also captures actual use of arbitration within space related disputes by collecting data on how often such arbitration clauses have been invoked and the number of disputes ultimately resolved by arbitration. Finally, the survey solicits industry preferences for the future development of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution in the space sector. The survey is built in a way that allows break down of results and comparing segments, inter alia, based on the type of contract (e.g., launch contract, insurance contract, investment contract, contract for supply of parts or services). The results of the survey will expose the demand for arbitration and the successes and barriers for the use thereof. Furthermore, the results will allow us to evaluate the success of existing arbitration infrastructure for space-related disputes, including the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities and the Panels of Arbitrators and Experts for Space-related Disputes. To our knowledge, there exist no surveys or catalogues on the use of arbitration in spacerelated disputes. The results of the survey will provide empirical data and trends that may be used by scholars, policymakers and practitioners to anchor future theoretical papers and policy recommendations.

The aim of this paper is to analyse examples of ITA as a relevant model in administering celestial bodies. Proposed missions to the Moon promise ambitious plans which will change the way humanity perceives (and administers?) our closest celestial neighbour. Examples of ITA, which first emerged in the 19^th and early 20^th century are valuable resources for understanding how international organisations can undertake administration of increased presence on celestial bodies. In fact, international organisations already perform such powers (i) either vaguely, e.g. through the OST or (ii) through a clear regulatory mechanism that assigns slots in Geostationary orbit. In order for the regulatory framework to get up to speed with developments in space exploration the solution is two-fold: (i) avoid fragmenting debates on niche-topics (resources, cultural heritage, safety standards) but rather tackle them through a comprehensive framework and (ii) allow the UN (or a body designated by the UN) to actively administer activities on celestial bodies. ITA mechanisms developed in the past 100 years, have proven flexible enough to adapt to multiple scenarios and different political realities. Furthermore they allow international organisations to assume powers of administration without acquiring ownership over the territory and are hence in line with the provisions laid down in the OST. The analysed mechanisms in no way represent a magic solutions to all the alleged shortcomings of the current regulatory environment, it is nevertheless important to establish a nexus between developed examples of ITA and potential future mechanisms administering activities on celestial bodies.

Air, Water, Food, Shelter, Sleep: These are the five basic requirements for a human being to survive. Providing these basics to a single person is a harrowing challenge; providing them to 1,200 souls on the merciless Martian landscape is nearly impossible. Nonetheless, in 2032 SpaceX successfully constructed Valinor – the first human scientific settlement on Mars-by transporting hundreds of scientists, engineers, scientific experiments and the most technologically advanced survival equipment ever created to the red planet. Each year saw more successful missions to Valinor, and the world community grew more excited about the realization of mankind’s expansion into the cosmos. However, after 15 years of exciting scientific discoveries and over 350 billion dollars invested in its survival and sustainability, Valinor remained monetarily profitless. After the stock market crash of 2047, SpaceX was purchased by OnlyEarth Corp., an oil conglomerate that saw Valinor as a threat to its fiscal security. Over the next three years, OnlyEarth reduced its regular supply missions to Valinor, demanding that Valinor produce massive quantities of Martian raw materials in exchange for fresh supplies from Earth. When Valinor refused to comply with these demands, OnlyEarth ended re-supply missions altogether. With the flow of corporate resources now stemmed, Valinor’s leadership was forced to redesign the sociopolitical and legal structure of its 1,200+ inhabitants to ensure the colony’s survival.