This paper discusses a framework for governmental projects to enhance industrial capabilities through the lessons learned from the Japanese contractual practice of H3 launch vehicle, comparing with the NASA’s Commercial Orbit Transportation Service (COTS). In 1995, the research and development (R&D) of the H-IIA was started by a former body of JAXA, and each manufacturer was responsible for delivery as required. After twelve-times launches, the operation was privatized to Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Ltd. (MHI). Concerning H3, MHI was selected as a R&D contractor and a launch provider. MHI established the H3 rocket system specification and responsible for delivering the first vehicle to JAXA in 2020, and JAXA is responsible for the total system including its launch base and the H3 flight demonstration. Such a framework gives MHI more creative freedom, but there can be a room for further clarification of the responsibilities. Coincidentally, such a framework between public and private entities is similar to that of the European new flagship launch vehicle, Ariane 6.
Meanwhile in NASA’s COTS, partners are responsible for all of the development and operation but they are not required to deliver their vehicles to NASA, contrary to H3. It allows clear role allocation and companies’ maximum creativity. A series of contracts of the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) after COTS is also remarkable to promote private investment, for example, around half of the total R&D cost is borne by private sectors. Also, cost accounting method does not seem to be applied for the price setting.
The framework like H-2A is still necessary for high-risk R&D conducted by governmental agencies. It will be, however, necessary for projects, which aims at enhancing industrial capabilities through transferring the operations to the private sectors and encouraging innovation, to be taken different measures in relation to selection of prime contractor, delivery and payment in the development phase and to procurement of launch services in the operating phase.

This article deals the issues concerning the hosted payload under international space law. To understand the hosted payload projects, the types of the contracts for such projects are discussed, but the harmonization between the risk allocation of the parties concerned and liability issues for damage caused by the hosted payload is mainly studied.
The hosted payload satellite is said to be the one that the main owner of the satellite spares some space on it for the other party. The details of the projects can be agreed between the parties depending on the projects. Such details are mostly confidential, but the author tries to show the types of collaboration by using the actual examples.
As the hosted payload satellite has more than two parties that have interests in the satellite, it is very important to agree in advance how to allocate the risks between the parties. On this, especially for the projects between the non-governmental entities, the indemnification against the damage of the third parties caused by such satellite should be included. Notwithstanding such allocation, since the damage from the space activities may become enormous and the financial ability of the non-governmental entities may be limited, the State should be the final bearer of the liability against victims as international space law has in mind.
Under international space law, the launching State is liable for the damage caused by space activities. The definition of the launching State under international space law could be found in the Liability Convention or the Registration Convention. When the hosted payload project is driven by the non-governmental entities, the identification of the launching State becomes difficult; such definition involves States, and makes it difficult to determine the launching State for activities of the non-governmental entities. As international space law has focused on the protection of the victims, the relief of the victims of the hosted payload projects should be dealt accordingly. In this respect, it would be ideal that the owner or the operator of the hosted payload (or the State which such owner or operator belongs to) should be regarded as the launching State. Through the discussion at UNCOPUOS or the changes found in the State liability under general international law, the possibility to include such party as the launching State is to be examined.

The United Nations space treaties establish the basic legal framework governing outer space activities. While it is through national space legislation that the spirit and schemes in these treaties are further instilled into specific entities undertaking space activities, launch services contracts play a notable role in final stage of rendezvous and docking with the legal infrastructure at international level. For example, allocation of risk/liability mechanism in these contracts is deeply influenced by treaty provisions and national legislation. These arrangements seem to be made all the more complicated in the context of international launch projects. Growing demand from the small satellite sector for ride hitching opportunities in space launch begs the question of whether and how the launch service contracts need to be tailored to accommodate industry demand and regulatory needs. This paper purports to examine some of the regulatory issues surrounding risk/liability management under standard and piggyback launch services contracts, which reflect deliberate compliance on micro-level with the international and national legal framework on macro-level.

Newly proposed projects of large satellite constellations are challenging the established business models of the satellite industry. Targeting the Low Earth Orbit (LEO), already the most populated orbit for space applications, these constellations pose an increasing risk regarding the sustainable use of outer space. According to the Inter- Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), presenting at the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN COPUOS in 2018, the implementation level of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in LEO is considered as “insufficient and no apparent trend towards a better implementation is observed", when compared with GEO. In parallel, 11 private entities such as OneWeb, Telesat and SpaceX have applied for approval from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to initiate large satellite constellation projects.
Before the launch of these massive constellations, several legal issues have been identified from the perspectives of international obligations related to liability and registration. Taking them into consideration, as well as the IADC recommendations, the present article reviews one of the most fundamental principles in space law, the principle of non-appropriation, to clarify its applicability to the exclusive use of specific LEO orbits by large satellite constellations. After this clarification, the paper concludes with proposals for possible solutions.

This article studies five category of malicious cyber activities against space assets in order to assess to what extent the existing international telecommunications law and space law address such activities and identify which rules should be pursued to effectively solve them. Five category of such activities include jamming, hijacking, hacking, spoofing, and robbing the control of telemetry, tracking and control (TT&C) of a satellite (a kind of anti-satellite (ASAT)). Actual incidents are selected for analysis. Those are: (i) jamming: Iranian deliberate harmful interference to the Eutelsat satellites solved in the ITU; (ii) hijacking: a terrorist organization, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) hijacking US Intelsat-12 satellite solved by diplomatic negotiation between the Sri Lankan and US Governments using international telecommunications law developed by the ITU and individual national laws; (iii) hacking: alleged Chinese hacking of US NOAA’s information systems; (iv) spoofing: Iranian spoofing of the GPS signals to guide a US/CIA’s RQ-170 UAV into the Iranian territory; and (v) robbing the control of TT&C: alleged Chinese taking control of US remote sensing satellites including Landsat-7 and Terra AM-1. Concluding remarks include: 1) international telecommunications law developed in the ITU can adequately address harmful interference or hijacking as a result of malicious cyber activity as long as that is conducted by a non-State actor; 2) efforts have started in the ITU to strengthen its fact-finding ability in line with the TCBM measures taken in space activities. This orientation may be remembered as a beginning of the new stage that international space law and international telecommunications law would be merged into one field of law: 3) It remains unclear about the implications of an intangible damage occurred to a satellite when its TT&C is robbed of as a result of malicious cyber activity, while it is clear that such an action constitute the violation of the principles of respect for state sovereignty, national jurisdiction and non-intervention. Thus, for promoting peaceful uses of outer space, the elaboration of relevant Articles of the Outer Space Treaty is urgently needed to formulate clear conditions for national space activities.

Since its inception, space law has been governed by principles and rules established by governments and primarily applicable to government activities. Today we are experiencing policy changes to encourage private sector initiatives to carry out government missions and to expand potential profit-making opportunities. The space treaties allow for nongovernmental activities in space but only under the auspices of a nation. Each nation approaches legal solutions in their own way. These variations in national law may create challenges for all space-faring nations. If there are no international agreements, they may create a more fragmented, unpredictable, and unsustainable environment for all participants, both governments and private companies in outer space.
The fragmentation of international law is defined by the development of sets of rules pertaining to specific subject areas that may claim autonomy from principles of general international law. Those subject areas reflect the larger global issues that include the environment, energy, resource availability, migration, health, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Space law is unique and may be considered one of the fragmented areas of international law. The principles of the now 50-year old treaties have been formally acknowledged by all space-faring nations. New developments may threaten that.
At issue are many areas of space law including liability, property rights, and environmental harm. Different on-orbit space activities such as satellite servicing, exploiting resources, and removing debris highlight the types of space activities with many similar legal concerns but which may result in different rules in different nations and even for different rules within a nation. New and growing legal tensions among space-faring nations will arise.
Solutions to this problem are all suboptimal. Neither top-down oversight nor separate bottom-up rules or guidelines will suffice as stable, predictable, and long-lasting regimes that create a favorable legal environment for future public and private space exploration and use.

Cyber security opens a new dimension in the discussion on human activities in outer space. The part of the law pertaining to cyberspace which is of interest for this paper is the regulation related to cyber activities in outer space.
Space activities are not immune from malicious cyber activities as transmission signals are vulnerable to cyber access. The range of threats is very wide and can include the loss of control, the disruption of services and the modification or loss of data. While it is clear that the malicious uses of cyberspace constitute a large spectrum of threats for space operations, the legal rules applicable to cyber operations have still to be determined.
This paper will first tackle definitional matters in order to describe the technical nature of cyberspace and to address the question on how cyber law may touch upon outer space activities. Then, questions of the applicability of international law and space law to cyber activities as well as measures to address the consequences of cyber threats to the space infrastructure will be addressed.

The grand project of “Belt and Road” Space Information Corridor proposed by China, which aims to integrate its space-based platforms for comprehensive space applications under the Belt and Road Initiative, resonates with calls and recommendations of the United Nations conferences on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space for increased international cooperation in space projects to address common challenges. This project is expected to translate the potentials of space technology for socioeconomic development into real benefits for billions of people along the Belt and Road region. The Chinese government has released guidelines in 2016 to identify the general goals and major tasks.
As we celebrate legacy of the UNISPACE conferences this year, it is beneficial to also focus on the ramifications of large scale space projects for governance of space activities on national, regional and international level. On the one hand, policy and legal aspects are important factors to be taken into account in project planning and implementation. On the other hand, the need to accommodate requirements of space projects could stimulate adjustment or innovation in space policies and regulations. The “B&R” Space Information Corridor offers us a chance to explore such interaction between space project and space governance. Based on analysis of the relevant aspects of legal environment, this paper purports to examine opportunities and challenges confronted with during implementation of the “mega-project” from legal perspectives.

This paper analyzes, on the one hand, the legitimate expectations and needs of the industries in terms of intellectual property protection for outer space research, as they need to be protected against violations and be free to grant exploitation licenses. On the other hand, it investigates if the use and exploitation of outer space and celestial bodies is carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.
The key issue of the protection of inventions in accordance with national and international regulations will also be addressed in the paper.
The paper will start from a combined analysis of art. 5 of the IGA, establishing that each Partner shall retain jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers, and art. 21 of the IGA, which regulates intellectual property based on the quasi-territorial principle, and sets out that the regulations of the State in whose registered modules the invention occurs shall apply. The paper aims to examine national intellectual property protection regulations, highlighting possible conflicts of applicable national laws with respect to the place where the invention occurs and inventor nationality, but also regarding the recognition of the different patent systems adopted by ISS Partner States. European Partner States enjoy a privileged position, as set forth by paragraph 2 of art. 21 of the IGA.
As the unique environment of the ISS calls for quick recognition of intellectual property licenses obtained in other Partner States, the paper will analyze the different Partners’ national legislation, existing International Conventions on the matter, such as the TRIPS Agreement, and European patent regulations, which streamline procedures and introduce stringent minimum protection standards in all the areas of intellectual property.

The growth of private launch service providers in the United States stems from choices made by legislators and policy-makers that, whether intentional or not, created a market for these launch services. The first of these choices was made in 1985 when President Reagan issued an executive order allowing NASA to use the Space Shuttle to deliver commercial satellites into orbit only if the satellite required the “unique capabilities” of the Shuttle. As a result, the need for launch services for satellites that did not meet this standard quickly grew and private industry soon began filling this need. The demand for private launch services became even greater when, in 1988, President Reagan issued another directive requiring government agencies to use commercial launch service providers “to the fullest extent feasible.” When the last operational Space Shuttle, the Atlantis, was retired in 2011, the U.S. government no longer had an operational launch vehicle that could reach the International Space Station. Not wanting to rely on foreign spacecraft and wanting to spur the further growth of private industry, NASA launched programs to encourage the development of private launch services to deliver crew and cargo to the ISS. These programs resulted in the rapid development of multiple private launch service providers that now compete to deliver cargo and crew to the ISS. This paper will explain the role that these policies played in the evolution of the U.S. launch service industry and whether the adoption of the US approach is appropriate for other countries where the governmental space programs and related private industry are quite different from the space program and private industry of the United States.

In 2017, more than $3.9 billion of private capital was invested in commercial space companies. This represents, in a single year, more than half of the total amount of private investment during the preceding five years. The private space sector has also witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of investor participants. The industry continues to expand, and analysts predict that it will grow to a multi-trillion dollar industry in the next two decades. The industry is also witnessing rapidly falling launch prices – and as launch prices drop, the barrier to enter space also decreases. In addition to facilitating the expansion of existing space-based businesses, such as telecommunications and Earth observation, greater access to outer space opens the door for new entrants into fields such as space manufacturing, mining and tourism.
Almost half of all investment in space companies since the year 2000, the vast majority of which was made within the last six years, has been from venture capital (“VC”) firms. VC investors seek eventually to monetize their investment by exiting through a sale of the company to a third party (usually an existing space industry player, but sometimes to another financial buyer) or through an initial public offering. Acquisitions by industry competitors are particularly common in the satellite sector, where established incumbents often look for outside innovation (for example, Terra Bella’s acquisition by Planet or DigitalGlobe’s acquisition by MDA). Furthermore, space activities are very costly, but benefit from economies of scale – evidenced by joint ventures between Lockheed and Boeing (United Launch Alliance) and between Airbus and Safran.
In light of the increasing frequency of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) deal making in the space industry, this paper will examine publicly disclosed acquisition agreements governing certain prior deals in the industry in order to draw conclusions about the unique risks faced by commercial space acquirers and how they have sought to mitigate such risks. From diligence considerations to key terms of the acquisition agreements (such as the representations and warranties), this paper will provide practical insight into the most important considerations for private deals in this growing and rapidly changing industry.