Search result: 7 articles

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Year 2009 x
Article

Access_open Wetenschappelijke rechtsgeleerdheid

Commentaar op het preadvies van Carel Smith

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009
Keywords law and hermeneutics, law and normativity, one right answer thesis, legal jurisprudence, legal doctrine
Authors Prof. dr. Arend Soeteman
AbstractAuthor's information

    This article is a comment on Carel Smith’s paper. Smith rightly argues that the study of law has a hermeneutic character. But his interpretation of legal hermeneutics includes the thesis that in hard cases there is no right or true legal decision. This seems to have negative implications for the scholarly character of the study of law: in hard cases any solution goes. This paper argues, against Smith, that the study of law defends right answers for hard cases. It is also normative in another sense: legal answers, in easy cases as well as in hard cases, always presuppose a normative interpretation of the legal sources. This contributes to the differences of opinion under lawyers. But it is no obstacle to the scholarly character of the study of law, as long as a rational debate about these legal answers and the underlying values and principles is possible. Smith’s rejection of the right answer thesis, however, prevents the possibility of such a rational debate.


Prof. dr. Arend Soeteman
Arend Soeteman is professor at the Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam.
Article

Access_open Lettres Persanes 14

Oorlog is natuurlijk erger dan een zoekgeraakte koffer. Staking, geweld en rechtsorde

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009
Keywords law and politics, right to strike, exceptionalism, Benjamin, political action
Authors Dr. mr. Klaas Tindemans
AbstractAuthor's information

    This article discusses the right to strike, with special regard to Belgium. Referring to Walter Benjamin, Tindemans argues that strikes are rechtsetzend rather than rechtserhaltend; they constitute a legal order rather than preserve one. Strikes are exceptional phenomena within any legal system, as they do not fit normal criteria of legal validity. According to Tindemans, strikes are to be considered primarily as extralegal phenomena, as means in a political struggle, confronting the “police” of the core institutions of the state and the legal order. Strikes are political actions, moments of collective aspiration towards political equality, and as such threaten the “pureness” of the legal order in favour of a fragmented politics.


Dr. mr. Klaas Tindemans
Klaas Tindemans is Doctor of Laws and a playwright. He teaches at the RITS, school for audiovisual and performing arts, Erasmushogeschool Brussels.
Article

Access_open Het normatieve karakter van de rechtswetenschap: recht als oordeel

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 3 2009
Keywords legal theory, science, methodology, normativity, knowledge
Authors Prof. mr. Carel Smith
AbstractAuthor's information

    Propositions of law are based upon normative judgement. The interpretation and application of legal provisions rest upon a judgement that determines which weight must be attributed to some point of view or perspective. In this respect, legal theory has a normative character. Its normative character does not preclude legal theory from being a scientific discipline. The scientific character of legal theory is not located in the possibility of testing the correctness of its theories. Rather, legal theory owes it scientific character to the shared standards of production and evaluation of legal arguments: the grammar of justice.


Prof. mr. Carel Smith
Carel Smith is associate professor at the Department of Metajuridica, Faculty of Law, Leiden University.
Article

Access_open Op de bres voor rechtszekerheid

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009
Keywords rechtszekerheid, in dubio pro libertate, Brouwer, rechtspositivisme, constructivisme
Authors Marc Loth
AbstractAuthor's information

    This paper addresses the principle of legal certainty, which was central in the work of Bob Brouwer. He both regretted and disputed the decline of this principle in the theory and practice of law, trying to defend it against the spirit of the time. I argue that this attempt was in vain, because it opposes recent developments in law, as is illustrated by a notorious case of the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, these developments invoke a constructivist account of legal certainty, which opposes Brouwer’s legal positivist account. Additionally, this meta-level shows that legal certainty in its classical form is indefensible, which – of course – does not mean that it is senseless altogether. On the contrary, the principle of legal certainty does have meaning in current legal systems, and it is the task of new generations of young scholars to try to get a grip on it. In doing so, they will undoubtedly make use of Brouwer’s work, which excels both in the depth of thinking and the clarity of writing.


Marc Loth
Marc Loth is raadsheer in de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden.
Book Review

Access_open R.C. Hartendorp, Praktisch gesproken, alledaagse civiele rechtspleging als praktische oordeelsvorming

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009
Keywords oordeelsvorming, rechtspraktijk, hermeneutiek, pragmatisme
Authors Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer
AbstractAuthor's information

    Book review of R.C. Hartendorp, Practically Spoken. Everyday Civil Procedure as Practical Decisioning [Praktisch gesproken, alledaagse civiele rechtspleging als practische oordeelsvorming], Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008, 235 p.


Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer
Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer is universitair docent Rechtssociologie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Article

Access_open Rechtsbeginselen en positivisme!?

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009
Keywords rechtsbeginselen, rechtspositivisme, Brouwer, Dworkin, soft positivism
Authors Arend Soeteman
AbstractAuthor's information

    In this contribution I argue that Brouwer’s legal positivism suffers from an internal tension that is not easily solved. This tension stems from the combination of two strands in Brouwer’s thought. The first is that Brouwer wants to stick to the legal positivist view that the law is fixed by convention. The second is that there can be exceptions to the application of legal rules, based on legal principles. The combination of these two strands is, I argue, problematic, because the conventional basis for legal principles will usually be lacking in hard cases. One may then argue, as Brouwer does, that where conventions are lacking there is no law and the judge is not bound by the law. But then exceptions to rules are also allowed where there are no conventional principles to justify these exceptions. This contradicts Brouwer’s starting point that exceptions to the application of rules are possible on the basis of legal principles.


Arend Soeteman
Arend Soeteman is hoogleraar Encyclopedie en Rechtsfilosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Article

Access_open Recht als sociaal feit en recht als praktische rede

Journal Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Issue 1 2009
Keywords recht als sociaal verschijnsel, recht en praktische rede, recht en moraal, Brouwer
Authors Jaap Hage
AbstractAuthor's information

    Brouwer argued against a vision of the law in which moral considerations partly determine the contents of the law. He did this for moral reasons, mainly because of the uncertainty such a vision would cause. This seems a strange view because it means that the nature of the law would depend on moral considerations concerning legal certainty. Most of the present paper is devoted to exploring two conceptions of the law, law as social fact and law as practical reason. It is argued that a view like Brouwer’s fits in the law as practical reason conception and is therefore not so strange as might seem at first sight.


Jaap Hage
Jaap Hage is hoogleraar Algemene rechtsleer aan de Universiteit Maastricht en gasthoogleraar aan de Universiteit Hasselt.
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