This article draws on Hans Kelsen’s theory of democracy to argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the democratic legitimacy of either the European Union (EU) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The legitimacy problems from which the EU in general and the ECJ in particular are alleged to suffer seem to result mainly from our rigid adherence to the outdated conception of democracy as popular self-legislation. Because we tend to approach the Union’s political and judicial practice from the perspective of this democracy conception, we are not able to observe what is blindingly obvious, that is, the viability and persistence of both this mega-leviathan and the highest court thereof. It is, therefore, imperative that we modernize and adjust our conception of democracy in order to comprehend the new reality to which these bodies have given rise, rather than to call for ‘reforms’ in a futile attempt to bring this reality into accordance with our ancient preconceptions about what democratic governance ought to be. Kelsen is the democratic theorist whose work has enabled us to venture into that direction.

The article uses the 2009 decision of the German Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty as a basis for an analysis of the relationship between EU law and Member State law, especially Member State constitutions. The authors argue that an uncritical openness of Member States to supremacy of EU law and the interpretations made of it by the European Court of Justice is not necessary but rather an analytical attitude towards the development of EU with active legal argumentation to protect the rule of law – a deliberative supranationalism. A constitutional dialogue between Member States and the EU is the best protection and promoter of rule of law. The constitutional discussions in Estonia are used as an illustration of the balancing of national constitutional principles and supremacy or EU law.

“Good Governance” is a term used worldwide to measure, analyse and compare, mainly quantitatively and qualitatively, but not exclusively, public governments, for the purpose of qualifying them for international developmental aid, for improving government and administration domestically, etc.
In Section A the use of the key term is explained more thoroughly; Section B lists goals and effects of governance from the international, supranational (European) and national perspective; Section C contains guidelines for governance as vested in constitution and law and Section D describes the main instruments and tools to work on better governance.