European Journal of Law Reform

Article

A More Forceful Collective Redress Schemes in the EU Competition Law

What Is the Potential for Achieving Full Compensation?

Keywords full compensation, private enforcement, damages actions, collective actions, deterrence
Authors Žygimantas Juška
Author's information

307006 Žygimantas Juška
PhD candidate at Leiden University. The author was the EU Fulbright Schuman grantee at Stanford University and the University of Michigan (2015-2016). Hence, this article is based on the study performed in the United States.
  • Abstract

      The damages actions reform of the European Union is predetermined to fail in achieving its stated goal of full compensation. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Directive on damages actions fails to maintain a balance between the claims of direct and indirect purchasers. Second, the EU policy is not designed to collect a large group of antitrust victims, who have suffered only a low-value harm (e.g., end consumers). The only way to achieve compensation effectiveness is to overstep the bounds of the EU compensatory regime, which is trapped in the grip of conservatism. In such circumstances, this article will explore three forceful scenarios of collective redress that include different types of deterrence-based remedies. The principal aim is to assess the chances of these scenarios in achieving full compensation. After assessing them, the best possible mechanism for compensating victims will be designed. In turn, it will allow the evaluation of to what extent such a scheme can ensure the achievement of full compensation.

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